UPDATED SAUDI VIEWS ON JCCIP IMPLEMENTATION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 001579

SIPDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP, CENTCOM FOR POLAD, NAVCENT AND J5, DOE
FOR KKOLEVAR AND WBRYAN, DEPARTMEMT FOR P, NEA, S/CT AND
NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018
TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET MARR MCAP MOPS OVP PGOV PREL
PTER, SA
SUBJECT: UPDATED SAUDI VIEWS ON JCCIP IMPLEMENTATION

REF: A. RIYADH 1408

B. RIYADH 1298

Classified By: Ambassador Ford M. Fraker for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (S) SUMMARY. The Ambassador met with Assistant Minister of
Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayif bin 'abd al-'Aziz (MBN) to
discuss the next steps in implementation of the Joint
Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Border
Security (JCCIP). MBN reiterated the urgency posed
by the threat of a terrorist attack against Saudi oil
facilities. He made the same point earlier in the day to U/S
Edelman. The Prince emphasized the Saudi desire to keep a
single point of contact and single point of payment as the
Saudis develop and fund JCCIP. Previously, the DCM met with
MOI officials to discuss the structure of JCCIP and the Saudi
request to reduce the initial number of working groups to
three. MOI also proposed that JCCIP undertake work on cyber
security, based on the Saudi assessment that the Kingdom is
vulnerable in this regard. END SUMMARY.

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The Urgent Need for Progress
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2. (S) On October 18, Ambassador Fraker met with Assistant
Minister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayif bin 'abd
al-'Aziz (MBN) to discuss the next steps in implementing the
Joint Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection and
Border Security (JCCIP). MBN had met earlier in the day with
DOD Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman
(Septel) where MBN urged the USG to move quickly in assisting
MOI stand up the Facilities Security Force (FSF). Both
Ambassador Fraker and Ambassador Edelman underscored USG
commitment to standing up the JCCIP.


3. (S) MBN reiterated to Ambassador Fraker the urgent need to
address the real threat of a terrorist attack against Saudi
oil facilities. There are 25 Tier 1 critical oil
production-related sites in the Kingdom that are vulnerable
to terrorist attack. A successful attack on any of these
facilities would have an immediate, and devastating, impact
on the global economy; e.g., 70% of Saudi oil (7 million
barrels) flows through Abqaiq, which Al Qaeda unsuccessfully
attacked in Feb, 2006. MBN noted that since then, the MOI
has foiled several other plans to attack Saudi ARAMCO
facilities.


4. (S) MBN noted that his grandfather King Abdulaziz had
always placed high value on his strategic relationship with
the United Sates and had advised his sons to do likewise.
After the Abqaiq attack in 2006, the Saudi government had
realized that it must do much more to protect its critical
infrastructure which was in fact critical to both the Saudi
and global economies. MBN said he had been tasked by his
superiors to meet these new security requirements. He had
been given a budget and the authority to recruit 35,000 men
to carry out this project. As his grandfather had advised,
he had turned to the United States for help.


5. (S) Now nearly two years after their initial request,
little has been achieved. Until recently, the Prince said he
and the senior leadership of the MOI had doubted American
interest in our commitment to JCCIP. Since his meetings with
CENTCOM J5 MG John Allardice on September 11 in Jeddah
(Reftel A),he now believes the USG is indeed serious, but
stressed the need to show progress to the Kingdom's senior
leaders, including his father, the Minister of Interior, and
his uncle, the King.

RIYADH 00001579 002 OF 003



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The Need for Efficiency
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6. (S) The Ambassador again noted to MBN that JCCIP
implementation would be most effective if a U.S. company was
utilized for the Command and Control portion of the Border
Guard Modernization Project since this would facilitate
inter-operability and ease working relationships with USG-led
JCCIP WGs. Raytheon's bid for the Command/ Control/
Communications/ Computer/ Intelligence (C4I) contract for the
Saudi Border Guard Development Program remains pending
(Reftel A). MBN responded that the SAG's
decision on the company selected will be done "by the book"
and based on who offers the best systems for the best price.


7. (S) MBN then repeated the Saudi desire for a single point
of contact with the USG for JCCIP, as well as a single point
of payment for USG services to the MOI. Which he said was
the "only way" this could work.


8. (S) Earlier this month, DCM had a working-level meeting
with Major General Dr. Sa'ad al-Jabri, Special Advisor to MBN
to discuss an improved structure for the JCCIP Working
Groups. Al-Jabri proposed that JCCIP should initially
consist of only three working groups: JWG for Industrial
Security, JWG for Facilities Security Force and JWG for
Internal Security.

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JWG for Industrial Security
--------------


9. (S) Al-Jabri explained that the Joint Working Group on
Industrial Security (JWG/IS) would continue with the
assistance of the Department of Energy provided under the
Joint Working Group Memorandum of Understanding signed in
December 2006. Al-Jabri believed JWG/IS should be a
permanent group of U.S. and Saudi personnel working jointly
in Riyadh. This vision would require both the U.S. and Saudi
sides to increase their substantive staffs assigned to JCCIP.
MOI is identifying counterparts for U.S. personnel. MOI
also is trying to locate housing and office space on the
Diplomatic Quarter for all JWGs. Al-Jabri noted that some
MOI offices connected with JCCIP might relocate to the
Diplomatic Quarter to facilitate closer cooperation.


10. (S) Programmatically, the JWG/IS would cover all security
matters "inside the fence" of critical facilities. The work
of this group would include assessments of facilities,
developing and implementing security standards and
regulations, monitoring the MOI's industrial security system,
and assistance with MOI's national contingency planning.
This group would work tacitly with the owners like ARAMCO and
SABIC. This JWG would essentially mirror those of various
MOI's departments which are responsible for all policy,
procedures, and standards at critical facilities.


11. (S) Regarding future site assessments, MOI wants to
review the results of the Abqaiq assessment, scheduled to be
presented by DOE on Oct. 27 in Riyadh, before it commits to
further assessments. Additionally, MOI requests U.S.
assistance in developing a Threat Advisory System (similar to
system used by the Department of Homeland Security).

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JWG for Facilities Security Force
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RIYADH 00001579 003 OF 003




12. (S) The FSF is responsible for protecting everything
"outside the perimeter fence." It will not be involved in
what goes on inside the facility. Al-Jabri wants to move
quickly on the JWG for Facilities Security Force (JWG/FSF).
He said this is MOI's top priority. He characterized the
work of this JWG as "building an army from scratch".
Al-Jabri agreed that this could best be done through
CENTCOM's proposal for an OPM-FSF similar to OPM-SANG which
has successfully advised the Saudi Arabian National Guard for
many years. Like its namesake, OPM-FSF will advise on
organization, recruitment, training, and operations. This
week, MOI will receive CENTCOM's draft Letter of Request
(LOR) to review, which is the initial step in the FMS process
to establish OPM-FSF.


13. (S) Al-Jabri said that the MOI wants the Facilities
Security Force working group to assume responsibility for
Maritime Security and help the FSF assume coastal/maritime
duties currently performed by MOI's Coast Guard. These
duties include the protection of on-shore oil facilities such
as the Ras Tannurah and Safaniyah sites, desalination plants
and power plants, as well as off-shore oil platforms and
loading sites. 5,000 of FSF's authorized strength is to be
dedicated to maritime protection.

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JWG for Internal Security
--------------


14. (S) The third JWG, JWG-Internal Security, would encompass
assessments, training, and performance testing for elements
of the MOI not covered by the other two working groups.
Al-Jabri specifically wants to add cyber security to the list
of areas for U.S.- Saudi cooperation. Al-Jabri stressed his
strong interest in this topic because he believed Saudi
Arabia was vulnerable to the threat of a cyber attack.

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Comment
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15. (S) COMMENT. The Saudis began discussing critical
infrastructure protection with us just after the Feb. 2006
failed attack against Abqaiq. Two years later, they are just
about to receive their first detailed threat assessment.
They believe the threat is very real and are pressing us to
move more quickly in implementing JCCIP. Prince Mohammed bin
Naif was unusually blunt with both the Ambassador and
Undersecretary Edelman. Accurate or not, he believes that
should a successful attack disrupt global energy supplies
occur, a lack of urgency on the part of the USG will be
partially to blame.


16. (S) The consolidation into three working groups is due to
MOI's lack of capacity to staff more working groups. The
creation of the Internal Security Working Group is the first
indication we have received of MOI interest to expand JCCIP
beyond the relatively limited scope of infrastructure
protection. END COMMENT.
FRAKER