MOVING FORWARD ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RIYADH 001408

SIPDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, NAVCENT, J5
DOE FOR WBRYAN
DEPARTMENT FOR P, S/CT, AND NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2028
TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET LE MARR MCAP MOPS OVP PGOV
PREL, PTER, SA, YM
SUBJECT: MOVING FORWARD ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION

REF: A. RIYADH 1252 B. RIYADH 1230

Classified By: Ambassador Ford M. Fraker for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (S) Summary: The Ambassador accompanied by CENTCOM J5
met Assistant Minister for Security Affairs Prince Mohammed
bin Naif (MBN) to discuss the next steps in implementing the
Critical Infrastructure and Border Protection (CIP) program
designed to safeguard Saudi Arabia's oil production and water
desalination facilities. MBN welcomed a visit in October by
the Secretary for the Strategic Dialogue and for P to
follow-up with a Joint CIP Commission meeting. The Saudis
are ready to begin funding the CIP program and they are eager
to establish an Facilities Security Forces (FSF) under
CENTCOM's guidance. The next step is to assist the Saudis in
drafting a Letter of Request (LOR) for the establishment of
an Office of the Program Manager-Facilities Security Forces
(OPM-FSF). It was presented to the Saudis that it would be
best for the effectiveness of CIP to only contract with U.S.
companies. Atmospherics were extremely positive with the
Prince, where he welcomed the proposed next steps, offered
full Saudi cooperation, and named working-level MOI POCs. He
also offered his views on regional and local threats. End
summary.

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CIP Formation and Concept
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2. (S) The Ambassador accompanied by CENTCOM J5 MG John
Allardice, DCM, GRPO, with associated staff, met Assistant
Minister for Security Affairs Prince Mohammed bin Naif (MBN)
on Sept. 11 in Jeddah to discuss the next steps in
implementing the CIP program. MBN emphasized the importance
and urgency of CIP. He mentioned how despite Al Qaeda in the
Kingdom being beaten down, there are continuing threats to
target Saudi oil facilities with the goal of destabilizing
the region and damaging the global economy.


3. (S) The Ambassador informed MBN of the Secretary's
expected visit to the Kingdom on Oct 19-20 to continue the
U.S.-Saudi Strategic Dialogue, noting CIP would be a major
topic. He suggested that Under Secretary for Political
Affairs William Burns arrive later in October to chair with
MBN the first Joint CIP Commission meeting. The Ambassador
described how the Embassy established an inter-agency CIP
Cell with the DCM as the CIP Coordinator. The cell will
serve as MOI's working-level partner for this project. The
Ambassador said the Joint CIP Commission will follow the
JECOR (U.S.-Saudi Arabia Joint Economic Commission, Riyadh)
model of undertaking several, simultaneous projects under a
single USG management and funding structure. For CIP, the
in-country management and funding authority would rest with
the Ambassador, who will be supported by the Coordinator and
the CIP cell. Overall responsibility for CIP within DOS
rests with P, as outlined in the agreement signed by
Secretary Rice and Minister of the Interior Naif bin 'abd
al-'Aziz in May; P and MBN would act as Co-Chairmen of the
Commission.


4. (S) The Ambassador provided MBN an outline of the seven
Working Groups (WG) to be established under the Joint
Commission framework. The WGs would be based in Riyadh and
they would include U.S. and Saudi participants designated to
conduct the daily work of coordination, training, equipping,
assessment, and guidance pertaining to their particular tasks:

- Infrastructure WG
- Ports/Terminal WG
- Facilities Security Forces WG

RIYADH 00001408 002 OF 004


- Border Guard WG
- Nuclear Security WG
- Maritime WG
- Internal Security WG


5. (S) MBN was extremely receptive to both the Secretary's
and P's proposed visits, and he assured us of MOI's full
cooperation with the Embassy Riyadh CIP Cell, CENTCOM, and
all other USG agencies. He named MG Dr. Sa'ad al-Jabri as
the MOI's lead working level contact.

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OPM-FSF
--------------


6. (S) MG Allardice presented CENTCOM's draft proposal for
the establishment of a CIP training organization to support
and guide MOI's planned 35,000 man force. This organization
-- Office of the Program Manager, Facilities Security Force
(OPM-FSF) -- would be modeled along the lines of OPM-Saudi
Arabia National Guard, by which DOD has successfully
partnered with the Saudi government in developing the Saudi
Arabia National Guard (SANG) since 1973. OPM-FSF essentially
could also provide the U.S. participation for the WGs on FSF,
Ports and Terminals, and other groups that would benefit from
CENTCOM's assistance and expertise. He added that the final
report of the DOE-led vulnerability assessment of the Abqaiq
oil facility conducted in August, with MOI and CENTCOM
participation, would be ready by mid-October and that this
could serve as a stepping stone for future vulnerability
assessments. MG Allardice advised the next step for OPM-FSF
would be an LOR from the SAG to the USG requesting the
establishment of OPM-FSF, and he offered CENTCOM's
assistance to MOI in drafting this LOR. He recommended the
LOR be made ready before the Joint Commission meeting in
October.


7. (S) MBN was enthused by the OPM-FSF concept. He agreed
to draft the LOR with CENTCOM's assistance, and he eagerly
awaited the DOE vulnerability assessment and its
recommendations. He mentioned there was some SAG concern
about the pace of CIP developments since the May signing of
the Technical Cooperation Agreement, yet he felt reassured by
the USG's current actions. MBN agreed to make an initial
deposit of USD 500,000 into the CIP account established by
the Department of the Treasury, and he gladly accepted Post's
offer to assist in the technical process of making the first
deposit. He expressed appreciation for having only one point
of contact (i.e. the CIP account) for funding, as it made it
much simpler for MOI. It was made clear by MBN that he was
ready to sign any additional MOUs with us, but wanted to
avoid bureaucracy as much as possible and to move forward as
quickly as possible with a CIP structure based on a single
point of contact between the USG and SAG for oversight and
funding.


8. (S) MBN mentioned his desire for high-technology sensors
to supplement border and installation security operations,
indicating he wanted more than just trained border troops.
He stated the Saudi border force along the Kingdom's northern
frontier with Iraq could be manned by 2000 troops instead of
6000, because high-technology sensors provided the same
level, and often superior, coverage than ground forces alone.
MBN pointed out that over the long-run automated sensors are
more cost effective than having to continually recruit and
train new personnel. Also, mechanical sensors are less
likely than a non-local FSF trooper to inflame tribal
sensitivities among the border population.

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RIYADH 00001408 003 OF 004


U.S.- Only Contractors
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9. (S) In a follow-on private meeting between MBN, the
Ambassador, and DCM, the Ambassador explained that CIP would
be most effective if only U.S. companies were utilized
because it would facilitate inter-operability and it would
ease working relationships with the USG-led CIP WGs. The
Ambassador specifically mentioned Raytheon's bid for the
Command/Control/Communications/Computer/Intel ligence (C4I)
contract for the Saudi Border Guard Development Program.
(Note: Thales, Raytheon and EADS, whose respective bids are
USD 3.6 bn, USD 3.2 bn, and USD 1.8 bn, are all in
competition for this contract with their bid proposals
currently awaiting the SAG's final decision). The Ambassador
asserted that the issue was more than simply commercial
advocacy, and that the utilization of only U.S. companies for
CIP was in the national security interest of both the U.S.
and Saudi Arabia.

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Views on Threats
--------------


10. (S) Throughout the discussions MBN commented on various
threats. He informed us that MOI had just concluded a
successful operation resulting in several arrests of
terrorists in the Kingdom, mentioning that MOI remained
active in countering cyber sites that promote terrorism and
incite religious extremism. He expressed concern with
Lebanon's volatile political situation, asking for MG
Allardice's opinion, as he made several recent trips there.
MBN was worried about external threats to the Kingdom's oil
facilities, as well as internal threats. He said he knew
terrorists, naming both Al Qaeda and Hizbollah, wanted to
infiltrate Saudi Aramco. He expanded that terrorists also
likely use the Hajj and Umrah as opportunities to enter the
Kingdom and to then conduct terrorist operations.


11. (S) Additionally, MBN opined that Yemen was similar to
lawless Afghanistan, with Al-Qaeda having relocated to Yemen,
although terrorists were still targeting Saudi Arabia from
their new locations. He informed us that the Saudi-Yemen
Commission, headed by Crown Prince Sultan bin 'abd al-'Aziz
and Yemeni Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Mujawwar, was active
in promoting construction projects along the mountainous
Saudi-Yemeni border to counter Al-Qaeda. He continued that
to avoid corruption the SAG will use "projects instead of
cash" as assistance to Yemen.

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Comment
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12. (S) Comment: MBN made clear the SAG's great interest in
CIP and its willingness to capitalize the CIP bank account,
while expecting the USG to act quickly and responsively. We
recommend the first payment of these moneys be used to pay
DOE for the USD 355,000 cost of the Abqaiq assessment, so
that further vulnerability assessments can be made. The
upcoming Strategic Dialogue followed by the Joint Commission
are excellent venues to move forward on this project. MBN is
looking for the rapid establishment of OPM-FSF. We believe
the LOR for OPM-FSF should be drafted and prepared for
signatures as quickly as possible. Likewise, any MOUs that
must be established should be prepared parallel to the
drafting of the LOR. The Saudis appear fully ready to
cooperate with us on CIP, which provides us significant
opportunities on a broad range of issues in our bilateral
relationship, while addressing the significant vulnerability

RIYADH 00001408 004 OF 004


of the Kingdom's oil facilities, whose damage would
jeopardize the U.S. and global economies. End Comment.
FRAKER