Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08RIYADH1321
2008-08-27 23:22:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

SHI'A POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA'S

Tags:  KIRF KISL PINR PREL PTER PGOV PINS SA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHRH #1321/01 2402322
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 272322Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9078
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 RIYADH 001321 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ARP, INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2018
TAGS: KIRF KISL PINR PREL PTER PGOV PINS SA
SUBJECT: SHI'A POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA'S
EASTERN PROVINCE (C-CT7-00989)

REF: A. 08 RIYADH 853

B. 08 RIYADH 1197

C. 08 RIYADH 1283

Classified By: CG JOHN KINCANNON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 RIYADH 001321

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ARP, INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2018
TAGS: KIRF KISL PINR PREL PTER PGOV PINS SA
SUBJECT: SHI'A POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA'S
EASTERN PROVINCE (C-CT7-00989)

REF: A. 08 RIYADH 853

B. 08 RIYADH 1197

C. 08 RIYADH 1283

Classified By: CG JOHN KINCANNON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The Shi'a of the Eastern Province (EP) -
located primarily in the oases of Qatif and al-Ahsa -
comprise the vast majority of the Saudi Shi'a, the largest
minority in the Kingdom. With strong socio-religious ties to
Iran, and residing on lands holding one quarter of the
world's oil reserves, the EP Shi'a are a community of much
more importance to regional stability and politics than their
population size - some 1.5 million people - might suggest.
In the face of the historical legacy and current reality of
discrimination by a Nejd-dominated Saudi culture, the EP
Shi'a have responded by developing dynamic political
structures that, among other roles, represent community
interests in dialogue with the SAG and tie the community to
other regional movements (Ref A). This cable documents
Post's current understanding of the most influential
organizations in the Saudi Shi'a community, their religious
and political leaders, their goals and ideals relative to one
another, and their ties to actors in the region, particularly
Iraq and Iran. END SUMMARY.


2. (S/NF) This report is the product of numerous
conversations with contacts throughout the Shi'a community of
Saudi Arabia. Most information comes from self-identified
members of the Islahiyyah Movement, although Post has also
had several direct meetings with various members of what this
report has termed "non-aligned" groups. Post has not had
direct contact with any self-identified leaders of Saudi
Hizbollah, although Post has had contact with Sheikhs and
community actors who enjoy close relationships with Saudi
Hizbollah.

--------------
-------------- The Politically Active --------------
--------------

--------------

The Reform or Islahiyyah Movement
--------------

A Brief History
--------------


3. (S/NF) In 1975, Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar, with the help of
leading Eastern Province personalities such as Sheikh Tawfiq
al-Saif and his brother Sheikh Fawzi al-Saif, founded the
Islamic Revolution Organization (IRO),a Saudi-focused
political movement that advocated overthrowing the Saudi
monarchy and using Islam to fundamentally alter culture and
society. The IRO had close ties to the Movement of the
Vanguards' Missionaries (MVM, or Harakat al-risaliyin
al-tala' in Arabic),founded in 1968 in Karbala and seen as
the second organized Shi'a political movement in the Gulf,
after the Da'wa party. As we understand it, the IRO was a
Saudi-focused group under the umbrella of the MVM, both
organizations following the religious leadership of Sayyid
Muhammad al-Shirazi. In addition to advocating for the
general politicization of Shi'ism in the EP, al-Saffar and
other IRO imams played a key role in agitating for the brief
EP Shi'a uprising of November 1979 which followed on the
heels of the Iranian Revolution, giving fiery speeches
calling for followers to rise up in protest. Soon after
these EP protests, Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar, Sheikh Tawfiq
al-Saif and others fled the Kingdom and sought refuge in
Iran.


4. (S/NF) Many IRO members who remained in Saudi Arabia were
arrested and faced alleged torture in the Saudi prison
system. In the mid-1980s, in response to this SAG crackdown,
some IRO members began to adopt the theory of "wilayat
al-faqih," in which a country is led by a single religious
figure, and accepted the religious leadership of Iranian
leader and Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah al-Khomeini. Most
IRO leaders continued loyal to Shirazi and rejected this
shifting of perspective. These IRO leaders instead moved in
a completely different direction relative to those advocating
closer ties with Iran. Al-Saffar proposed in a 1985 IRO
meeting the adoption of a more moderate agenda, changing the

RIYADH 00001321 002 OF 007


IRO from a revolutionary to a reform-minded organization.
Though the proposal was not adopted in 1985 due to fears of
provoking the MVM and IRO members still in Saudi Arabia, the
movement had begun to change to the course that defines its
modern-day agenda. After a 1987 event in which a large
number of Iranian pilgrims were killed in Mecca, King Fahd
sought to release tensions and issued a general amnesty to
Shi'a political prisoners in the EP, largely IRO members.
The 1988 ceasefire between Iran and Iraq and the Gulf War of
1990-91 further changed regional political dynamics and
encouraged the IRO along the path of reform, rather than
revolution.


5. (S/NF) As a result of this new moderation, as well as
deteriorating relationships with Iranian political leaders,
the IRO lost any welcome in Iran and members and operations
moved to Syria in the late-1980s. In 1991, the organization
led by Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar and other like-minded sheikhs
officially changed its name from the IRO to the Reform
Movement (Islahiyyah). The group also broke from its
association with the MVM, deciding to seek improved economic
conditions, respect for human rights, and greater
transparency in exchange for recognition of the authority of
the Saudi state. The Reform Movement's new moderation began
to pay dividends in improved dialogue and increased contact
with the Saudi regime, and in 1993 an important accord was
reached. Meeting with King Fahd and high-ranking princes in
Jeddah, Reform Movement leaders Tawfiq al-Saif, Jafar
al-Shayeb, Isa al-Muzel, and Sadeq al-Jubran negotiated an
agreement to allow all exiled Shi'a - including those not
affiliated with the Reform Movement - to return to the
Kingdom. King Fahd also agreed to address economic
disparities, increase religious rights, undo previously
enforced travel bans, and resolve the issue of Shi'a mosques
and husseiniyyas. Though this accommodating sentiment
angered hard-line Shi'a, it gained the widespread approval of
non-ideological Saudi Shi'a hopeful of a better day-to-day
existence. When the exiled Islahiyyah leaders returned to
Saudi Arabia after the accord, they were received with
widespread community support, and this dominant position
within the community continues until this day. This dominant
position has eroded to a degree, however, by what is seen as
a lack of commitment over the last 15 years by the SAG to the
terms of the 1993 agreement; for example, the continued
community perception of religious discrimination and economic
disadvantage.

The Islahiyyah Movement Today
--------------


6. (S/NF) The Reform (Islahiyyah) Movement in 2008 continues
committed to largely the same ideals that it advocated in
1993, working with the Saudi government and SAG institutions
in pursuit of economic equality, greater religious freedom,
increased community participation in governance, and
observance of human rights. The still largely Islamist
Islahiyyah Movement has also shown that it is committed to
the principals of non-violence and the promotion of the
status of women. The organization's religious-political
leader remains Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar, regarded as the most
influential Shi'a leader in the Eastern Province. Sheikh
Saffar has been a prominent participant in King Abdullah's
National Dialogue Initiative, participated in the June Mecca
Conference on Interfaith Dialogue, and was the only Saudi
Shi'a to participate in July's Madrid Conference on
Interfaith Dialogue. Other influential names in the
organization include Tawfiq al-Saif, Jafar al-Shayeb, Isa
al-Muzel and Mohammad al Mahfoudh of Qatif, and Sadeq
al-Jubran in al-Ahsa. One indication of the Reform
Movement's continued commitment to working with the SAG
regime is the participation by Movement leaders in the Qatif
municipal council elections. The Islahiyyah movement agrees
with the idea of increased representational governance, one
of their primary differences with Saudi Hizbollah, which
advocates the idea of "wilayet al-faqih" or rule by a supreme
clerical leader. The Reformists dominated the 2005 municipal
council elections, with all Qatif seats won by candidates
having some affiliation to the Islahiyyah movement.


7. (S/NF) With the 2001 death of MVM/IRO/Islahiyyah religious
leader Sayyid Muhammad al-Shirazi, a new "marja," or source
of emulation, was sought. Both Shirazi's brother and son
attempted to assume leadership of his followers, but after a

RIYADH 00001321 003 OF 007


period of flux neither was successful in fully assuming his
mantle. The influential role played by Grand Ayatollah
Sayyid Ali al-Sistani in Iraq post-2003 generated great
popularity in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province. The Reform
Movement leadership gravitated to him. Although the
relationship to a "marja" is significantly less important
today than it was in previous decades - particularly among
the internationally-exposed and very moderate Islamist
leadership of the Movement - the Islahiyyah Movement
continues to subscribe to the leadership of al-Sistani
reflecting a political evolution away from activist
Ayatollahs such as Shirazi to a much closer identification
with Shi'a religious "quietism."


8. (S/NF) Major Ayatollahs of Iraq and Iran have many
official representatives (known as wakeels) in Saudi Arabia,
with different representatives having different ranges of
proxy powers, depending on their seniority and religious
pedigree; among the authorities exercised by a representative
or "wakeel" is collection of khums (the one-fifth of income
paid by Shi'a to religious authorities),certification of
religious rites, and resolution of disputes. Though Sheikh
Hassan al-Saffar is a "wakeel" for Ayatollah al-Sistani,
community sources report that the highest ranking "wakeel"
for al-Sistani is Sayyid Ali al-Nasr of Dammam. Despite
al-Saffar being likely the most powerful political figure in
the Shi'a community of Saudi Arabia, the largely apolitical
al-Nasr is the higher-ranking religious authority.

--------------
Saudi Hizbollah
--------------


9. (S/NF) In response to the killing of Iranian pilgrims in
Mecca in 1987, as well as the increasingly moderate message
of the IRO and the distancing of that organization from the
Iranian regime, a group of more-radical EP Shi'a who were
strong supporters of the Iranian republic took shape. The
group claimed responsibility for a series of small explosions
in Jubail and Juaymah in the EP in early 1988, and began
calling itself Saudi Hizbollah, or "Hizbollah al-Hijaz,"
somewhat confusingly referencing the region located in the
west of Saudi Arabia. Four members of the group were
involved in a conflict with security forces in the summer of
1988 and were subsequently executed, only further
radicalizing the community. Saudi Hizbollah - despite exiled
Hizbollahis using the accord negotiated by the Islahiyyah
leaders to return to Saudi Arabia - denounced the efforts of
the Reform Movement to seek compromise with the SAG,
describing this moderation as surrender. Contacts have
widely reported that Hizbollah continued to advocate the idea
of opposition and armed insurrection throughout the course of
the 1980s and 1990s. The 1996 al-Khobar Towers bombing has
been linked to a small group of Shi'a affiliated with Saudi
Hizbollah, nine of whom remain today in Saudi prison. The
ultimate political responsibility for the al-Khobar Towers
bombing remains a hotly debated topic in the intelligence
community and the memoirs of different American political
leaders of that era. Many Saudi Shi'a attribute the
al-Khobar attack to al-Qaida, a view that has little evidence
to support it.


10. (S/NF) Activists in the Saudi Shi'a community report that
in its current form, Saudi Hizbollah has largely ended its
support of armed insurrection and goal of overthrowing the
Saudi regime, and today functions mainly as a social and
religious organizational force. Seen almost unanimously as
the second most influential organization in the Saudi Shi'a
community, the group is described as strong in its opposition
to perceived abuses of the SAG, more aggressive in its
rhetoric, and unabashedly closer socially and religiously to
the leadership of Iran. The political ties of Saudi
Hizbollah to Iran remain unclear. Although gaining reliable
information on this shadowy organization is difficult, Saudi
Hizbollah appears currently more committed to its Saudi
identity and willing to work with the SAG. Hizbollah
principals have engaged in public dialogue with the SAG, even
going as far as to participate at the invitation of the SAG
in the Saudi National Dialogue. Clearly the political ideas
of Saudi Hizbollah are influenced by overarching
organizational ties to Iran, but the nature of the
organization's current ties to Iran are unclear to us, with
most Post contacts arguing it is minimal.

RIYADH 00001321 004 OF 007




11. (S/NF) According to most Shi'a community activists, Saudi
Hizbollah no longer seeks the overthrow of the Saudi
government. The only contrary information we have on this
topic comes from ex-political activist turned leading human
rights advocate Ibrahim al-Mugaiteeb (strictly protect).
Al-Mugaiteeb, who enjoys close ties to both Reform Movement
and Saudi Hizbollah members, believes that Hizbollah
continues arming itself today with Iranian agents recruiting
Saudi Shi'a through a base of operations in Medina. Per his
account, these Shi'a are then indoctrinated and trained in
Iran and Syria before being redeployed in Saudi Arabia.
Al-Mugaiteeb, who claimed in summer of 2008 to have been
offered a chance to visit Tehran for meetings with the
Iranian regime including the Revolutionary Guard, states that
Hizbollah's movement is not one of the masses, but rather one
of an ideologically committed and well-trained minority ready
to strike when called upon.

Saudi Hizbollah Leadership
--------------


12. (S/NF) Although contacts have reported that people
following different marjas comprise the ranks of Saudi
Hizbollah, the leadership and vast majority of Hizbollahis
follow the religious leadership of Ayatollah Sayyid Ali
al-Khamenei and believe in the principal of "wilayet
al-faqih." The highest ranking "wakeel" of al-Khamenei in
the Kingdom is reported to be Abdulhadi al-Fadali, a former
professor at Jeddah's King Abdul Aziz University said to be
in his 70s and in very poor health. Al-Fadali, who actually
received his religious education in Najaf rather than Iran,
is seen by contacts as likely the highest ranking Shi'a
religious scholar in all of Saudi Arabia. Due to the respect
for his religious authority, though he is a primarily
apolitical figure, he is seen as an important part - and even
described by some as the "leader" - of Saudi Hizbollah. This
is in contrast to al-Sistani "wakeel" Sayyid Ali al-Nasr, who
does not seem to play as influential a role in the political
sphere, perhaps emulating the "quietism" sometimes ascribed
to al-Sistani.


13. (S/NF) With al-Fadali in very poor physical health, there
are reportedly quiet community discussions as to who will
become the next head "wakeel" for al-Khamenei. Community
insiders report this seems to be a race between two Saudi
Hizbollah leaders, Sheikh Hassan al-Nimr and Sheikh
Abdulkareem al-Hubayl, both of Qatif. The appointment of
either to the position of primary "wakeel" would be a
significant development considering each man's close ties to
the political history and social organization of Saudi
Hizbollah. Hassan al-Nimr, wealthier and widely considered
the stronger religious scholar, seems to be the favorite.
However, his status has recently taken a hit in the eyes of
many due to the claims by his brother, Sheikh Jafar al-Nimr,
that after years of research, the family has determined they
are descendents of the Prophet Muhammad. Having not revealed
the research involved in this determination, many have chided
the claim, including al-Hubayl and his supporters. For
example, prominent Hizbollahi Sheikh Kamal al-Hassan of
Safwa, a town in the Qatif area, recently spoke out publicly
against Hassan al-Nimr and his family's claims. Sheikh
Hashim al-Shakhs is widely identified as a high-ranking
political leader in Saudi Hizbollah, while Hussein al-Aish of
al-Ahsa has also been identified by rasid.com manager Hussain
al-Alaq (strictly protect) as a high-ranking Hizbollah
religious figure.


14. (S/NF) Many Qateefis report that the "rising star" among
Saudi Shi'a religious figures is Sheikh Munir al-Khabaz.
During the past several years, Al-Khabaz has drawn crowds for
his Ashura sermons exceeded in size only by those of Sheikh
Hassan al-Saffar, and is often described as a primarily
apolitical religious scholar. The majority of Saudi Shi'a
community activists describe al-Khabaz as conservative,
although human rights activist Ibrahim al-Mugaiteeb (strictly
protect) has asserted to us that al-Khabaz is in fact a
high-ranking Hizbollah religious figure. This is not a claim
that has been echoed by other contacts, but one firmly
supported by al-Mugaiteeb.

--------------
The "Non-Aligned" Groups

RIYADH 00001321 005 OF 007


--------------


15. (S/NF) Given the clear supremacy of the Islahiyyah and
Hizbollah political organizations within the Saudi Shi'a
community, this report has chosen to group other politically
active organizations under the heading of "non-aligned"
groups. This is not a classification given to these groups
by the EP Shi'a community, and the term does not imply any
coordination between "non-aligned" organizations. This term
is simply an attempt by Post to express divergence from the
two dominant political movements. Further, these groups have
varying degrees of organizational structure, and are
generally much less defined relative to the two dominant
groups. For this reason, these groupings are open to greater
interpretation of where lines should be drawn and what
qualifies as a "group" rather than simply a sheikh or small
number of activists following similar ideas.


16. (S/NF) With the death in 2001 of Sayyid Muhammad
al-Shirazi, the leadership of the Islahiyyah Movement chose
to follow al-Sistani as marja. This was not the case for all
previous IRO/Islahiyyah figures, however. Many chose to
follow the leadership of Shirazi's brother, Sayyid Sadeq
al-Shirazi, a more typical evolution of the transfer of
religious emulation, often highly determined by family ties.
Most of these figures remain relatively close in ideology to
the Reform Movement, and Hussain al-Alaq has identified Yusif
Salman al-Mahdi as a prominent follower of Sayyid Sadeq.
Al-Mahdi still enjoys close ties to al-Saffar, though he
supposedly follows al-Shirazi.


17. (S/NF) In addition to al-Sistani and Sayyid Sadeq
al-Shirazi, with the death of Sayyid Muhammad al-Shirazi
other members of the former IRO/Islahiyyah line chose to
follow the leadership of Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi, a
Karbala-based religious leader. Al-Mudarrisi had been the
chief political leader of the MVM under the religious
guidance of Sayyid Muhammad al-Shirazi, and is known for
being one of the founders of the Islamic Action Organization
in Iraq. A leading "wakeel" for al-Mudarrisi is Qatif sheikh
Mohammad al-Habib, someone described as having significantly
more authority in the community than the more polemic and
recently discussed Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr who is also aligned
with Mudarrisi. Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, of no close relation to
Hizbollah leader Sheikh Hassan al-Nimr, has garnered wide
media attention over the past months due to his strong calls
for Shi'a rights and closer ties to Iran (Ref B, C).


18. (S/NF) A group often classified by the name of their
regular social gathering or "diwaniya" is the Diwaniyat
al-Qatif group. Contacts describe this group as primarily
comprised of the previous generation's leadership and the
aristocracy of the Qatif community which has largely been
marginalized by the active and organized political
organizations of Islahiyyah and Hizbollah. Prominent names
include Sheikh Abdullah al-Khunaizi, Sheikh Hussain al-Bayyat
and Sheikh Samir al-Bayyat, and certain members of the
al-Jishi and al-Awami families. Contacts portray this former
"Qatifi royalty" as trying to reinsert itself in the politics
of the day after years of relative aloofness, with an
interest in reviving the previous authority of their
families. This group has political views largely in line
with the goals and ideas of the Islahiyyah Movement, but
views the Islahis as political "arrivistes" without their
blue-blood pedigree. They also disagree with the Islahiyya
movement's tactics, for example their use of mass media for
publicity. Some contacts have described popular sheikh Munir
al-Khabaz as affiliated with this group.


19. (S/NF) Shi'a liberals make up a group small in number
and influence, with no religious base to spread their
message. The most prominent member of this group is likely
Najeeb al-Khunaizi, who organizes regular forums in his
basement that are well-attended by up to 100 guests of varied
political backgrounds. Thanks to the intellectual packaging
of its ideas and arguments for things such as a
constitutional monarchy, the group - whose members often had
ties to the now defunct Communist movement in Saudi Arabia -
often garners more international media than its local profile
merits.

--------------
Shirazi: How it is Used, What it Means

RIYADH 00001321 006 OF 007


--------------


20. (S/NF) The analysis of Western governments with regards
to the Saudi Shi'a community often imprecisely uses the term
"Shirazi" to describe the dominant political movement within
the EP that is more properly described in our view as the
Islahiyyah Movement. The misuse of this term is often
perpetuated by a casual employment of the word by members of
the Shi'a community itself. The fundamental reference of the
term "Shirazi" is to those people who followed the religious
leadership of Sayyid Muhammad al-Shirazi, who died in 2001.
Al-Shirazi was a prolific Islamic jurist who EP Shi'a
followers describe as having been one of the first religious
progressives, a leader who advocated the use of human
understanding (ijtihad) to further the guidance of the
Qu'ran. He is also notable for his application of religious
principles to modern studies in politics and economics, and
his advocacy for freedom of expression, tolerance and
political plurality. Though he espoused non-violence, some
of his followers, particularly those in Iraq led by Muhammad
Taqi al-Mudarrisi, have at times advocated violence for
political purposes.


21. (S/NF) Given the complicated organizational evolution of
the MVM, IRO and Islahiyyah Movement, and the subsequent
further splitting of the followers of al-Shirazi upon the
Ayatollah's death into the camps of three different marjas
(al-Sistani, al-Mudarissi and Sadeq al-Shirazi),using the
term "Shirazi" to describe a person's affiliation today is
not useful. For example, Hassan al-Saffar is often described
as the leader of the "Shirazis." Nimr al-Nimr, though, is
also defined as a Shirazi, as he evolved out of the MVM
movement. Sheikh al-Saffar is strongly committed to working
with the Saudi regime, denounces the use of violence, and
takes great pains to separate himself from linkage to the
Iranian regime. Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr refuses to renounce
violence, has publicly justified the use of foreign forces to
protect EP Shi'a interests, ominously warns of clashes, and
takes every opportunity to denounce the SAG. Yet, though the
two are diametrically opposed in current political ideals and
religious guidance, they are both "Shirazis" due to their
previous following of Sayyid Muhammad al-Shirazi. In our
view, the term "Shirazi" should be used only in a historical
context to refer to someone previously affiliated with the
umbrella of Sayyid Muhammad al-Shiraz. This term has little
meaning in defining current political or religious tendencies.

--------------
-------------- The Politically Inactive --------------
--------------


22. (S/NF) Often described as traditionalists, there is also
a significant portion of the EP Shi'a community that does not
participate actively in political dialogue or movements,
rejecting politics in favor of a view that supports the ideas
of "taqiyya," or dissimulation - distancing oneself from
association with corrupt rulers not appointed by a rightful
Imam - and "intizar," or waiting for the return of the Mahdi
as prescribed by Shi'a religious belief. Jafar al-Shayeb, a
leading Islahiyyah figure describes the traditionalists as
being made up of both Akhbaris and Usulis. Akhbaris are
those leaders who reject the idea of "ijtihad" or reasoning
in the creation of new laws, and instead only believe in the
Qu'ran and hadeeth as sources of instruction. Akhbaris are
particularly prominent in Bahrain. Usuli is a term that
encompasses all Shi'a who accept the authority of qualified
religious leaders to use reasoning in creation of law, and
includes the vast majority of Shi'a in the world. Al-Shayeb
uses the term Usuli to refer specifically to those EP Shi'a
who accept reasoning as part of Islamic jurisprudence, but
continue to believe in "taqiyya" and "intizar." Though these
politically inactive ideologies have largely been
marginalized by the dynamic efforts over the past four
decades of the active political movements, some Post contacts
describe growth in the influence of these traditionalists
thanks to a perceived lack of progress in the politicking of
the more governmentally-active Shi'a political and religious
figures.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


RIYADH 00001321 007 OF 007



23. (S/NF) Documenting the political machinations of the
Saudi Shi'a is difficult given the hyper-politicization of
the community, and the secrecy with which the community
carries out much of its political activity due to the
historical suspicions of the SAG toward Shi'a political
organizing. This cable endeavors to spell out Post's best -
although certainly not complete or incontrovertible -
understanding of the political make-up of the EP Shi'a
community today.


24. (S/NF) USG engagement of the Saudi Shi'a community is
also of great importance. Several of the Reform Movement's
top political leaders - including Jafar al-Shayeb and Isa
al-Muzel - are U.S.-educated, and even more are
Western-educated. Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar's own son and
nephew study at a university in Iowa. Nearly all Reform
Movement leaders express an interest to work with the USG on
promoting our shared core values. Many prominent Saudi
Shi'a, however, encounter significant difficulties when
applying for U.S. visas due to information included in visa
watch lists - good, bad, and otherwise - that the SAG has
provided to the USG. While the USG certainly has an interest
in continuing to monitor and understand all facets of the
Saudi Shi'a community, we believe opportunities exist in the
future to facilitate greater travel by Saudi Shi'a leaders
and their families to the United States. The USG goal should
be to help empower those Saudi Shi'a leaders that seek to
work closely with the SAG in creating a stronger Saudi state
and to further marginalize leaders who advocate violence,
radicalization, or foreign interference by Iran.

(APPROVED:JKINCANNON)
GFOELLER