Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08RIYADH1205
2008-08-06 10:34:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

SAUDI MFA OFFICIAL ON IRAQ

Tags:  ASEC IR IZ MCAP MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0695
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INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 001205 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

CENTCOM FOR GEN PETRAEUS; DEPARTMENT FOR S/I, NEA/ARP AND
NEA/I; BAGHDAD FOR AMB CROCKER, MNF-I CG GEN ODIERNO AND
RFORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2018
TAGS: ASEC IR IZ MCAP MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI MFA OFFICIAL ON IRAQ

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2306

B. WALKER-GFOELLER AUG 4 E-MAIL

C. RIYADH 1150

D. RIYADH 1034

E. RIYADH 767

F. RIYADH 708

G. RIYADH 649

Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires Michael Gfoeller
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 001205

NOFORN
SIPDIS

CENTCOM FOR GEN PETRAEUS; DEPARTMENT FOR S/I, NEA/ARP AND
NEA/I; BAGHDAD FOR AMB CROCKER, MNF-I CG GEN ODIERNO AND
RFORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2018
TAGS: ASEC IR IZ MCAP MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI MFA OFFICIAL ON IRAQ

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2306

B. WALKER-GFOELLER AUG 4 E-MAIL

C. RIYADH 1150

D. RIYADH 1034

E. RIYADH 767

F. RIYADH 708

G. RIYADH 649

Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires Michael Gfoeller
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. The Saudis support USG policy and strategy
in establishing a stable Iraq. However, the Saudis remain
extremely distrustful of PM Maliki and highly concerned over
Iranian influence there. Therefore, they are still hesitant,
at least for the interim, to commit any political capital or
monetary funds for Iraqi reconstruction, including I-CERP.
END SUMMARY.


2. (S/NF) In a routine meeting on Aug. 5 to discuss overall
bilateral issues, A/Pol Counselor and Saudi MFA Western
Affairs Department Dr. Ra'ed Krimley engaged in a frank
discussion of Iraq and related security issues. Krimley
emphasized repeatedly he was expressing Saudi King Abdullah
bin Abdulaziz Al Saud's views.


3. (S/NF) Krimley admitted that the Iraqi security situation
was continually improving, offering that the MFA is in the
selection process for a Saudi Ambassador to Iraq, although he
gave no information on when one would be appointed. However,
he repeated the SAG's, including King Abdullah's personal,
distrust of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki. Krimley
noted that after Maliki's return from his most recent visit
to Tehran, Maliki began publicly calling for a reduction in
U.S. troops in Iraq and for a harder line regarding the
proposed Status of Forces Agreement. A/Pol Counselor,
referencing previous discussions with the SAG, strongly urged
the Saudis to contribute to I-CERP as soon as possible. In
his response, Krimley was non-committal about when funds
would be made available. Krimley did acknowledge that Saudi
Chief of General Intelligence Prince Muqrin Bin Abdulaziz Al
Saud and Iraqi National Security Advisor Mowaffaq Rubaie had
been in regular contact. But this had been solely for
intelligence sharing, not for Saudi-funded
aid/reconstruction-related projects in Iraq.


4. (S/NF) Discussion turned to the upcoming Iraqi provincial
elections. Krimley agreed that these elections are a
necessary next step for national Iraqi reconciliation. He
acknowledged that the SAG has links to various Sunni and Shia
groups in Iraq. That said, he claimed the SAG has minimal
political influence with them. Krimley opined that the
Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI) leader Abd al-Aziz
al-Hakim was "more clever" than Office of the Martyr Sadr
(OMS) leader Muqtada al-Sadr. He offered that Hakim was
"biding his time" until U.S. forces eventually draw down in
Iraq, when ISCI would begin to exert its "own influence on
the Iraqi political structure." Krimley, while criticizing
the U.S. decision to effect regime change in Iraq, stressed
that the U.S. must maintain a strong military presence in
Iraq to "ensure security for everyone."


5. (S/NF) COMMENT. Krimley is currently the highest-ranking
MFA policy official still in the Kingdom. He is a protg
and close advisor of Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal,
who works directly for the minister and is frequently seen in
Saud al-Faisal's office. Although we cannot be sure that
Krimley's comments accurately reflect the views of the King
and the Foreign Minister, it is quite probable that they do.


6. (S/NF) Krimley's comments match what we have been long

RIYADH 00001205 002 OF 002


hearing from the SAG. King Abdullah's vehement distrust of
Maliki colors the SAG's relationship with the GOI. The
Saudis remain extremely concerned over Iran's intentions in
the region, and particularly fearful of Iran achieving de
facto control of Iraq. They recognize the importance of a
stable Iraq being able to counter Iranian expansionism.
Therefore, they strongly favor a continued U.S. military
commitment in Iraq and are worried about the effect of a
precipitous U.S. withdrawal. They want Iraq to develop into
a stable, secular, Arab-ruled neighbor free of Iranian
influence or overt Shia extremism. They will likely, at
least for the interim, maintain a wait and see attitude
towards Iraq until they develop more trust in the GOI and are
assured of a lasting U.S. presence in Iraq. Despite
Krimley's non-committal approach, we believe there is value
to continue to address the Saudis to contribute to I-CERP.
END COMMENT.
GFOELLER