Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08RIYADH1078
2008-07-13 08:34:00
SECRET
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

THE VISIT OF THE MNF-I COMMANDER TO THE KINGDOM OF

Tags:  MARR MASS MCAP PGOV PINS PREL PTER SA 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 130834Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8760
INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T RIYADH 001078 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2018
TAGS: MARR MASS MCAP PGOV PINS PREL PTER SA
SUBJECT: THE VISIT OF THE MNF-I COMMANDER TO THE KINGDOM OF
SAUDI ARABIA

Classified By: PM Counselor C.A. Hudson for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

S E C R E T RIYADH 001078


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2018
TAGS: MARR MASS MCAP PGOV PINS PREL PTER SA
SUBJECT: THE VISIT OF THE MNF-I COMMANDER TO THE KINGDOM OF
SAUDI ARABIA

Classified By: PM Counselor C.A. Hudson for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (U) SUMMARY: Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Commander
David Petraeus met with King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud
and the primary cabinet officials responsible for the
national security of Saudi Arabia. The meetings were frank
yet quite cordial and appeared to establish Petraeus as an
official likely to gain easy future access. END SUMMARY


2. (SBU) Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Commander David
Petraeus and his delegation were received by HM the Custodian
of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud
on June 30th. The granting of the audience was itself a
clear sign of the improving ties between the United States
and the Kingdom and of the personal esteem in which the
General is held. Immediately after the meeting, the King was
rushed to the airport to begin his travel to a much
anticipated conference on inter-faith dialogue.


3. (S) Over the course of his 43-hour visit to the Kingdom
General Petraeus engaged in discussions spanning the full
range of Saudi and regional security interests with the
officials primarily charged with the day-to-day protection of
the Kingdom. In addition to the initial audience with HM the
King, General Petraeus met separately with HRH Prince Mugren
bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Head of the General Intelligence
Presidency; HRH Prince Khalid bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al
Saud, Assistant Minister of Defense and Aviation; and, HRH
Prince Mohammed bin Naif bin Abdulaziz Al Saud Assistant
Minister of Interior for Security Affairs. NOTE: Prince
Mugren is the brother of the King and is considered, by most
observers, to be among the two or three leading contenders to
emerge as the next Crown Prince. Despite their titles as
&assistant8 ministers, both Princes Khalid and Mohammed are
charged with the day-to-day operations of their ministries in
the place and stead of their fathers Prince Sultan bin
Abdulaziz (the Crown Prince and Minister of Defense and

Aviation) and Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz (the Minister of
Interior Affairs). Each session began with a detailed and
well received briefing from General Petraeus on the status of
U.S. operations in Iraq. The meeting with Prince Khalid also
brought out Saudi concerns in the, often onerous, clearance
process required for both Foreign Military (FMS) and Direct
Sales. The Prince,s comments quickly moved to their
sensitivity over U.S. policies governing the releasability of
arms and defense technology for sale to the Kingdom. He drew
comparisons with neighbors like Kuwait when he questioned how
other states were cleared for sales that were denied to Saudi
Arabia ) a long time ally. He reiterated his oft noted
complaint about the Saudi purchase of F-15s and receiving an
aircraft &with little more capability than an F-58. Visa
processing for military applicants also surfaced as a point
of contention. Direct (and at times FMS) sales of weapon
systems or equipment often require training in civilian
facilities which would not permit use of official (A2) visas
and the alternative business visas (B1 or B1/B2) would
require a personal interview and fingerprinting. From the
perspective of Prince Khalid, such a requirement for a
military officer would be demeaning and he would not permit
one of his officers to apply under those conditions. (Note:
His comments should be taken seriously. He halted all
training for MODA personnel in the United States for two
years in response to previous objections to U.S.
releasability policies.)


4. (S) The session with Prince Mohammed bin Naif focused on
the Kingdom's counter- terrorism and border security efforts,
as well as, the bilateral Critical Infrastructure Protection
(CIP) program. Prince Mohammed and Under Secretary of State
(P) Nicholas Burns co-chair the Joint Working Group that
oversees the CIP's planning and development. Prince Mohammed
displayed clear enthusiasm about the prospect of rapid
implementation of CIP and encouraged General Petraeus to play
a major role in the program,s development as U.S. Central
Command Commander. General Petraeus and the Prince also
discussed the current status of efforts to agree upon process
modalities for fashioning an interagency Security Assistance
) like organization that would parallel, in function, the
operations of the U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) or
the Office of the Program Manager-Saudi Arabian National
Guard (OPM-SANG).


5. (S) U.S. efforts to secure and agree upon the modalities
for Saudi financial assistance for Iraqi development was the
central theme of the General Petraeus, discussions with
Prince Mugren. The General had been specifically referred to
the Prince for discussions on this matter during the earlier
Royal Audience. Owing to the diplomatic, technical and legal
complexities of the issue; however, Prince Mugren bowed to
the limits of his authority and committed only to seek the
advise and counsel of the King.


Al-Maliki still Viewed with Suspicion


6. (S) Early in the Royal Audience, General Petraeus
presented the compliments and best wishes of the President,
Ambassador Crocker, and other American officials; however,
when he mentioned Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the
King interrupted with &I can,t accept that8 (only half in
jest). Even after the General's briefing on the improvements
achieved over the past months and the King's recognition of
progress there was no indication of a softening of Court
skepticism of al-Maliki, his intentions, or the nature of his
ties to Iran. Indeed, the King used the discussion to tack
into a dialogue on the security of the Saudi northern border
as a vulnerability of the Kingdom. While reference to the
northern border, as a potential conduit for insurgents and
war refugees, has been common over the years, the King spoke
of drug, arms, and other contraband in a manner normally
reserved for the southern border with Yemen.

COMMENT: The General's reception was among the warmest and
most cordial of any senior U.S. flag officer in recent
memory. The King appeared to study each movement and response
closely and, judging from his response, a solid foundation
for the future was laid. END COMMENT.


FRAKER