Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08RIGA89
2008-02-15 15:35:00
SECRET
Embassy Riga
Cable title:  

LATVIAN PASSPORT SCANDAL CONTINUES

Tags:  CVIS KCRM KFRD PGOV PREL LG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9683
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHRA #0089/01 0461535
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151535Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIGA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4717
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIGA 000089 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2018
TAGS: CVIS KCRM KFRD PGOV PREL LG
SUBJECT: LATVIAN PASSPORT SCANDAL CONTINUES

REF: A. RIGA 23

B. RIGA 36

Classified By: Ambassador Larson for reason 1.4(d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIGA 000089

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2018
TAGS: CVIS KCRM KFRD PGOV PREL LG
SUBJECT: LATVIAN PASSPORT SCANDAL CONTINUES

REF: A. RIGA 23

B. RIGA 36

Classified By: Ambassador Larson for reason 1.4(d).


1. (C) Summary. Recent meetings between Post, the GOL MFA and
the Latvian security police (LSP) have yielded more specific
information on developments in the passport scandal (ref. a).
The LSP cautioned that the final numbers of cases, and all
specific information on identities, is not complete, as the
investigation is ongoing. Although the MFA promised Post on
several occasions that new information would be forwarded as
soon as it was available, this has not been the case so far.
Coordination within the GOL has been a major problem, meaning
that the MFA has been informed of developments at the same
time we were. That aside, Foreign Minister Maris Riekstins,
Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis and President Valdis Zatlers
have all weighed in publicly on the potential damage the
scandal has done to Latvia's hopes of joining the U.S. Visa
Waiver Program. End summary.


2. (SBU) On February 6, RSO met with investigators from the
Latvian Security Police Department (LSP) to discuss
developments in the passport scandal (ref. a). Investigators
stated that the investigation is still fluid and that they
expect more fraudulently-obtained passports to be discovered
in the coming months. Thus far, 30 of the 79 illegal
passports had been recovered. Some of the passport recipients
are outside of Latvia, making recovery of the passports
difficult, but the LSP anticipated confiscating more in the
near future. The investigators delivered to RSO a list of 79
names and passport numbers which were fraudulently obtained.
When queried as to why it took so long to pass much of this
information to us (ref. b),the Security Police
representatives stated that the case was evolving, and the
sensitive nature of the facts required some discretion until
the facts of what happened were more thoroughly uncovered.
LSP officials expressed exasperation with the media leaks
which they felt hurt efforts to investigate the matter
thoroughly.


3. (C) Embassy officers, including the DCM, RSO, CONS chief

and Poloff participated in follow up meetings on February 11
and 14 with MFA U/S Edgars Skuja and Rulans Nikoforovs of the
LSP to discuss further updates to the case. In the meetings,
Skuja reiterated that the GOL was committed to keeping in
contact with the U.S. Embassy regarding the scandal. He
explained that they will continue to provide all the
information that they have to us as it is available, and that
preventive measures have been put in place in the passport
agency to keep a similar problem from happening in the
future. Skuja referred to the submission to the Embassy of a
nonpaper, which detailed what happened (outlining the scope
of the issue),why it happened (cited as mainly the human
factor),and what preventive measures have been taken
(specifically increasing security and to avoid human error
and illegal intervention in the future). (Note: The revised
process for passport adjudication was detailed in the
February 14 meeting. Vilnis Jekabsons, Head of the Office of
Citizenship and Migration Affairs, stated that the process
for adjudicating passport applications now includes several
verification checks involving three different bureaus within
the agency in different physical locations. Under the
previous adjudication process an application was accepted,
approved and entered into the Citizenship data register by a
single person from a regional office. In addition to a more
secure application process, the GOL is conducting background
checks on all passport office employees, including a check of
their finances. End note.) The LSP underlined their
continuing effort to increase reliability and internal checks
to their passport issuing system. The Latvian MFA also
forwarded a chronology of events in the case. DHS has
requested a visit for March to receive their own briefing
about the passport scandal prior to the negotiations on the
Memorandum of Understanding on Visa Waiver.


4. (S) One of Post's greatest concerns has been the transfer
of information from the GOL and Latvian law enforcement to
the Embassy. Skuja committed to sharing all information as it
was available and "to make (the information flow) absolutely
transparent..." During the February 11 meeting, however,
Nikiforovs detailed information that was not previously
available to the Embassy. He said that LSP had uncovered
eight additional cases in which Latvian passports were issued
to false Latvian identities. (Thus the total number of false
passports is now 87.) In addition, LSP was investigating an
estimated 57 identities some or all of which might turn out
to be false. (Note: According to CCD, person's having the
same name and date of birth as several of the identities on
this list have applied for and received NIVs on what is
presumed to be their true identity. End Note.) LSP has
identified the real names of 40 individuals who had illegally
obtained false Latvian passports. (Note: One of the list of

RIGA 00000089 002 OF 002


40 applied for an NIV but was refused because the company he
intended to visit in New York City was a known front for
Russian organized crime. This person's son applied at the
same time and was also refused. End Note.) Nikiforovs stated
that immigration services are continuing their
investigations. DCM once again stressed the importance of
providing us information as soon as they receive it. He
added that it was unacceptable that the Latvians had not
immediately passed us the eight false Latvian names and 40
real names. Skuja privately told us that this was the first
the MFA had heard of the lists of 8 or 40.


5. (S) On February 13, detailed information on the 8
additional identities, which Post did not previously know
about, was passed to the RSO. Nikoforovs stated these 8 names
have now been removed from the Latvian citizenship register.
(Note: A check of the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD)
indicated that one individual with the same name and date of
birth as one of these eight identities had submitted an
application for a U.S. nonimmigrant visa (NIV) using a
Russian passport. That application was refused because of
known ties to Russian organized crime. End Note)


6. (U) In light of DHS's recent statement regarding the
readiness of the Czech Republic, Greece and Estonia to join
the VWP, GOL officials have been asked in the press about
their views of how the ongoing situation will affect Latvia's
chances of joining the program. Prime Minister Godmanis
recently changed his opinion on the matter from his previous
view that it had no effect (ref. a),now stating that the
scandal had, in fact, negatively impacted Latvia's movement
toward visa-free travel to the U.S. Foreign Minister
Riekstins took a broader view of the situation, focusing on
the recent reduction of the visa refusal rate, and asserting
that Latvia met all other requirements. President Zatlers
stated that the VWP is an important subject and one that is
always raised at meetings with U.S. officials. Overall, the
press has stated that it was naive to hope that the scandal
would have no effect at all of Latvia's hope of joining the
VWP.


7. (C) Comment: During the two MFA meetings it was apparent
to all parties that there were breakdowns in communication
among Latvian government agencies. The information that the
LSP representative revealed was also not known to the MFA.
The atmosphere became chillier when DCM stressed the need for
timely communication with the U.S. Embassy, echoing Skuja's
own thoughts about the LSP. The scope of the scandal is not
fully known, although it is becoming clearer as
investigations progress that it is quite large. The best,
consistent dialogue we have had with the GOL is during
high-level meetings where all Latvian offices are forced to
reveal information that should be freely forthcoming. As
Latvia's preparedness for VWP is assessed, we will need to
ask tough questions about how they intend to address the
information flow and coordination issues, both within the GOL
and from the GOL to us, which this episode has highlighted.
End Comment
LARSON