TFGG01: SUPPORTING LATVIA IN LIGHT OF GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIGA 000511

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PHUM NATO EUN RS GG LG
SUBJECT: TFGG01: SUPPORTING LATVIA IN LIGHT OF GEORGIA

REF: RIGA 496

Classified By: Ambassador Charles Larson, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Post leadership met internally to discuss ways the USG
could show support for Latvia in the aftermath of the Russian
invasion of Georgia, both to reassure the Latvians of our
security commitment and to help them make policy adjustments
to deal with the new international relationship with Russia.


2. (C) Proposed items focus on reassurance of USG support,
assistance on upgrading security measures and planning,
assistance to increase Latvia's energy independence, and
exploration of measures that could further the integration of
ethnic Russians into Latvian society.

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Reassurance
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3. (C) The single most important step we could take to
reassure the Latvian public of our commitment to them and
their security would be to admit Latvia to the visa waiver
program. While we well understand that admission is based on
criteria, moving ahead with one Baltic country before the
others could lead to an unhelpful round of self doubt in
Latvia.


4. (C) Post also proposes that the Department look at
scheduling various high-level visits to Latvia, both for
consultations/policy coordination and to publicly show USG
solidarity with Latvia as a NATO ally on the frontline with
Russia. Possible outreach could include visits from
Secretary Rice, U/S Burns, and/or A/S Fried. Additionally,
we suggest coordination with DOD/EUCOM to arrange a series of
flag-level military visits to Latvia. Such visits could
occur in conjunction with Latvia's 90th anniversary of
independence celebrations on November 18, and could include
flyovers of US aircraft.

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Security Enhancement
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5. (C) Post suggests that the USG increase bilateral military
assistance to Latvia and make available USG defense planning
resources to the Latvian Ministry of Defense.


6. (C) We also recommend expanding both FMF and IMET
assistance, with the emphasis on IMET. While Latvia does
have a limit on how much training assistance it can absorb,
we recommend a sufficient increase to make up for recent
reductions and to make available high-level, strategic
courses to Latvian leadership. On FMF, restoring some of the
cuts we took in FY08 would demonstrate our commitment to
Latvian military modernization.


7. (C) The GOL wants assistance with development of
self-defense plans for Latvia. Regardless of any potential
Latvian request to NATO, we should make USG expertise and
resources available on a bilateral basis to assist the GOL in
developing their own NATO-compatible self-defense plans.


8. (C) Post also recommends that the USG look for creative
means to provide Latvia with expertise on countering
cyber-attack threats. This expertise could include
cooperation with the NATO cyber-defense center in Estonia.

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Energy Independence
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9. (C) Latvia faces a greater threat from Russia in the form
of energy and economic dominance, than from overt military
attack. We therefore recommend that the USG more actively
work to make proposals of a Swedish-Baltic electrical link a
reality. This engagement would move the issue from the
strictly commercial realm to being viewed as a vital
political and security imperative. Combined with this,
efforts to promote alternative energy in Latvia and to
involve U.S. companies in Latvia's energy plant construction
plans should be enhanced.

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Integration of ethnic Russians
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10. (C) To promote the stability of Latvian society, and to
remove a possible excuse for Russian meddling, new
possibilities should be explored on how to integrate ethnic
Russians into Latvian society, with the goal being that those
communities would think of themselves as Latvian/European
first, rather than letting their Russian cultural affinities

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define their political allegiances.


11. (C) The existence of two separate media spheres, one
Latvian, one Russian, is a major roadblock in attaining this
goal. The Department should review what means are available
to increase the amount of Western-origin, Russian-language
programming and literature in Latvia. Key aspects of such a
review would be to increase the amount of non-Moscow-origin
Russian language news programming, as well as to assess what
capabilities exist to translate and place Western political
commentaries and news features into Russian language media.
LARSON