LATVIA, BUCHAREST AND ISAF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIGA 000144

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2018
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL NATO AF LG
SUBJECT: LATVIA, BUCHAREST AND ISAF

REF: STATE 19516

Classified By: Ambassador Charles W. Larson, Jr. Reason: 1.4 (d)


1. (C) Summary: We assess that it is unlikely that the
Latvian government will make significant new contribution to
ISAF at Bucharest. Military op tempo, an unsure defense
minister, and funding concerns all contribute to the reasons
this is unlikely. Latvia is likely to continue with
participation in the Norwegian PRT in Maymana and an OMLT in
Mazar in partnership with the Michigan National Guard. Our
best bets for additional Latvian contributions in Afghanistan
are contributions to QRF,s, SF units to work with Lithuanian
counterparts and a possible additional OMLT in 2009. End
summary.


2. (C) We have been actively engaged with the Latvian
government on its involvement in Afghanistan across all
agencies and at all levels. USG assistance in facilitating
President Zatlers, trip to Afghanistan last September has
provided strong support for Latvian participation in ISAF at
the highest levels of the GOL. But, getting the Latvians to
give more in Afghanistan faces a number of very real
obstacles.


3. (C) The biggest obstacle is that the op tempo of the
Latvian military is at such a level that it will be difficult
to increase. Overseas service remains voluntary within the
Latvian military and it is getting harder to find new people
willing to serve while the others need r&r and training
before redeploying. Already, the press is running reports of
soldiers being "pressured" to accept overseas service. Trying
to add two additional OMLTS and participation in a PRT as
suggested reftel would greatly strain the Latvian military.
The Latvians currently have only one infantry battalion fully
staffed, with a second partially staffed. The OMLT
requirement, while small in numbers, requires many officers
to fill. The current effort to build an OMLT is, in essence,
stripping the best officers from the existing battalion
staff. While this was a conscious decision by the Chief of
Defense made to give his best officers combat experience, it
is about as big of contribution of officers that Latvia can
make.


4. (C) Additionally, we have a new and inexperienced defense
minister, Vinets Veldre, who has been an obstacle to even
planned deploymens. In February, following a visit to
Afghanistan, Veldre made public statements that the OMLT
deployment shouldn,t go forward because he was concerned
that the troops lacked properly armored vehicles. We were
able to walk him back and get the OMLT back on track, but not
without having to call in support from most of the other
senior officials in the GOL. US and NATO officials need to
engage Veldre directly to build his understanding of and
support for the ISAF mission. We also need to think
creatively about how to get other Latvian political leaders
to Afghanistan to build broader support for the operation.
This will take time and cannot be done before the summit.


5. (C) We also need to be conscious of the very real
budgetary constraints faced by the GOL. With growth likely to
be cut in half (or more) this year and inflation over 15 %,
Latvia is under huge pressure to maintain a budget surplus to
calm the economic waters. While it has been able to retain
defense spending at 2 % pf GDP, much of that money is used by
costs for existing or planned deployments and funding
increased deployments would be difficult. The tight budget
already caused challenges in sending police to the EU mission
in Afghanistan and necessitated a reduction in planned
development assistance for Afghanistan.


6. (C) Looking ahead, we recommend that the USG and NATO
focus on small steps with the Latvians. They are willing to
deploy and to do so without caveats. So, we should explore
the possibility of getting them to contribute further to the
QRF, including to one in RC-South. We understand that the
Latvians are exploring this already. Also, once they get
their first OMLT on the ground later this year, we should
begin discussions on contributing future ones. But asking a
new and inexperienced force to take on more of these before
they have even tried one will not work. We also see value in
getting the Latvians to look at a different PRT from Maymana,
but we don,t think they have the ability to contribute to
two PRTs simultaneously. We suggest that at Bucharest, USG
officials press the Latvian Minister of Defense to provide
Special Forces soldiers to assist the Lithuanian SF group in
Kabul. We know that Lithhuania has recently extended their
commitment there for one year and our DATT has agreed with
the US DATT in Vilinius that Latvia could substantially ease
the manpower burden on Lithuania by making a contribution to
this team. The two special forces groups work closely

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together regionally and enjoy a particularly close
relationship.We know that there is desire for "big things"
for Bucharest, but for a country like Latvia small steps are
much more realistic.
LARSON