Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08RANGOON38
2008-01-17 09:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

BURMA: KEY ETHNIC CEASE-FIRE GROUP TALKS

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM BM 
pdf how-to read a cable
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O 170949Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7036
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0836
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4382
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7927
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5488
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1335
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1276
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000038 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: KEY ETHNIC CEASE-FIRE GROUP TALKS

REF: A. 06 RANGOON 1129

B. O6 RANGOON 1119

C. 06 RANGOON 875

RANGOON 00000038 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000038

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: KEY ETHNIC CEASE-FIRE GROUP TALKS

REF: A. 06 RANGOON 1129

B. O6 RANGOON 1119

C. 06 RANGOON 875

RANGOON 00000038 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) Summary: Top KIO officials told us they were pleased
with Aung San Suu Kyi's recent statement, and confirmed that
the hard-line Culture Minister had visited them in an effort
to convince the KIO to condemn it. The KIO views its
relationship with the NLD as a friendship rather than an
alliance, and emphasized it has goals beyond the NLD's, such
as preserving their ethnic culture and language. They
criticized the NLD's inaction and recommended the party
become more active, flexible, and willing to engage with the
regime. KIO officials explained that their organization
supports the roadmap because they see it as the only way of
moving forward currently available, but also believe each
step must be implemented fairly. End summary.


2. (C) During a recent trip to Myitkyina, pol/econ chief met
with Dr. Tu Jar and Dr. La Jar, brothers who are Vice
Chairman and General Secretary of the Kachin Independence
Organization (KIO). The KIO is the political wing of the
Kachin Independence Army (KIA),a key ethnic cease-fire group
whose representatives participated in the National
Convention. Tu Jar and La Jar are both medical doctors who
left their professions to join the KIA's armed insurgency
against the Burma Army. Both came off as articulate and
impressive spokesmen for the KIO, who spoke frankly about the
KIO's views of the regime's roadmap process, the NLD, and
Aung San Suu Kyi's recent statement.

--------------
What the Minister of Culture Said
--------------


3. (C) Asked about the KIO's view of the recent statement
Aung San Suu Kyi released through UN Special Envoy Gambari,
La Jar replied that though the KIO had chosen not to respond,
they liked the statement very much and appreciated her
singling out the importance of the interests and opinions of
the ethnic nationality races. Tu Jar confirmed that
hard-line Minister of Culture Khin Aung Myint visited the KIO

leadership after the statement was released and asked them to
publicly condemn it. (Note: Khin Aung Myint is reportedly
close to Than Shwe and participated in the June 2004 Beijing
talks between the regime and the U.S., end note.) Tu Jar
said Khin Aung Myint explained the regime irritation with the
statement on the grounds that they had not been warned in
advance of its release, and because it had been released from
outside of Burma. In addition, the Minister claimed ASSK was
using a trick to open the regime's dialogue with ASSK to the
ethnic nationalities and organize them to be on her side.
Only the military government could ask others to join the
dialogue, the Minister asserted. Tu Jar continued that Khin
Aung Myint insisted to them that the KIO was already firmly
on the regime's side because it had participated in its
National Convention. When the KIO's offices were raided and
its cell phones confiscated shortly after Khin Aung Myint
departed Myitkyina, they assumed it was in retaliation for
not agreeing to denounce ASSK's statement (ref B).


4. (C) The KIO elaborated that the cease-fire groups have
their own position, apart from both the regime and the NLD:
they will support the GOB if they guarantee the Kachin ethnic
group certain rights, but they do not oppose the
pro-democracy opposition either. Tu Jar told us that if the
opposition came into power and offered to give them the
protections and benefits they have requested from the regime
they would cooperate with them also. Tu Jar emphasized that
the ethnic nationalities share the common goal of democracy
with the Burman-dominated NLD, but they have additional
concerns beyond the NLD's objectives concerning autonomy,
national language, and preserving ethnic culture.


5. (C) Regarding the peaceful demonstrations in September,
Tu Jar stated that the KIO supported the monks and those who

RANGOON 00000038 002.2 OF 003


marched with them, but did not participate in the
demonstrations. He strongly condemned the regime's violent
crackdown.

--------------
Relationship with the NLD
--------------


6. (C) Tu Jar and La Jar told us the KIO viewed its
relationship with the NLD as a "friendship" rather than an
"alliance." Tu Jar explained that the difference between the
ethnic nationalities and the NLD was that ASSK and her party
want total regime change and see the current situation in
"black and white" terms. The ethnic nationalities not only
suffer from lack of freedom and democracy, but also face an
eradication of their national cultures. Because of this,
they see a more urgent need to solve the political crisis.
Accordingly, the KIO chose to participate in the regime's
seven step roadmap to bring about step-by-step progress,
rather than wait indefinitely, Tu Jar added. He believed
that the regime and the NLD were equally stubborn: the regime
tightly focused on its roadmap, refusing to alter the
process, while the NLD held equally tightly to the results of
the 1990 elections, which it continues to demand the regime
honor. Without compromise and flexibility from both sides,
Burma's political and economic problems will never be solved,
Tu Jar concluded.


7. (C) Tu Jar and La Jar also criticized the NLD's inaction
and recommended that if ASSK wanted to stand as a symbol of
the regime's repression this was fine, but in the meantime,
her party should actively work for change in Burma, take a
more flexible stance, and be willing to negotiate with the
regime.

--------------
On the Roadmap
--------------


8. (C) Asked about their views on the next steps of the
regime's roadmap process, Tu Jar and La Jar explained that
the KIO formally supported the roadmap because they saw it as
the only practical way of moving forward currently. They
also insisted each step must be implemented as fairly as
possible. The KIO had a wait-and-see approach in terms of
the constitution, La Jar continued. While the KIO and other
cease-fire groups demanded full autonomy and democracy, the
regime only offered partial fulfillment of these demands.
For that reason, the KIO had submitted their "19 points" at
the national convention (ref C),and the KIO would withhold
judgment on the constitution until after it examined the
final draft. The KIO would wait to see how many of the 19
points were included in the final draft of the constitution
before deciding whether to support it in a national
referendum. A redline for the KIO was disarmament, Tu Jar
asserted. Not only the KIO, but all cease-fire groups would
never accept unconditional
disarmament. This is not what had been agreed upon with
ousted PM Khin Nyunt, who brokered the cease-fires. The KIO
expected an outcome that incorporated give-and-take which
left the ethnic nationalities' dignity intact, he explained.
Tu Jar and La Jar acknowledged the regime was not currently
pushing the disarmament issue with the cease-fire groups.
The regime had given tacit permission for them to keep their
weapons as long as the insurgent armies were peaceful.


9. (C) Another reason the KIO supported the roadmap, Tu Jar
explained, was their desire to gain control over Kachin
State's natural resources. Regime cronies and the regional
commander were plundering the State's valuable jade and teak
resources. A constitution and legal government would
establish laws to more fairly govern the distribution of
local jade and teak concessions with tax revenues accruing to
the State, Tu Jar hoped. Tu Jar continued that a new
constitution and legislature would at least increase
discussion and negotiation between the central government,
which would give the States more influence and control.


RANGOON 00000038 003.2 OF 003


--------------
China's Role
--------------


10. (C) Asked if there was any basis for rumors that the PRC
had held meetings with Burma's cease-fire groups in China, Tu
Jar and La Jar vehemently denied this was true. They related
that the KIO had heard the same rumor and immediately
approached the Wa, Kokang, and Shan cease-fire groups, who
also denied any such meeting took place. Tu Jar claimed that
the Chinese want change in Burma, but are afraid of any
instability that would threaten business and commercial
interests here. Most of all, Tu Jar added, they do not want
to see war on their Southern border. In order to ensure
this, Tu Jar said the Chinese had encouraged the regime to
meet some of the cease-fire groups' demands and to deal
peacefully with them.


11. (C) Tu Jar concluded by expressing his appreciation for
the U.S. role in trying to bring change to Burma, and
expressed the KIO's support for Special Envoy Gambari's
efforts to initiate a dialogue between the regime and the
opposition. He cautioned that great patience and tact was
required to deal with the generals.

--------------
Comment:
--------------


12. (C) By participating in the regime's roadmap, the KIO
believes it has chosen a more pragmatic and practical route
than the NLD to bring political reform to Burma. We agree
that both sides need to be more willing to compromise to find
a way forward, but the roadmap, in its current form, is
unlikely to bring the stability and rule of the law to Burma.
None of the KIO's 19 points were accepted at the National
Convention and there is no reason to believe the regime will
incorporate them into the constitution its hand-picked
committee is now drafting. Aung San Suu Kyi's statement
clearly spooked the regime, which has done little to meet the
key demands of the cease-fire groups. The regime's
predictable response demonstrated how determined they are to
forge ahead a roadmap designed to keep the military in
perpetual control. They have no interest in revising the
roadmap to incorporate provisions designed to give more
rights and protections to the diverse people of Burma, which
would bring stability. End comment.
VILLAROSA