Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08RANGOON185
2008-03-10 10:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

GAMBARI'S OUTBRIEF TO THE DIP CORPS: NO GOOD NEWS

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM BM 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000185 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM
SUBJECT: GAMBARI'S OUTBRIEF TO THE DIP CORPS: NO GOOD NEWS

RANGOON 00000185 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000185

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM
SUBJECT: GAMBARI'S OUTBRIEF TO THE DIP CORPS: NO GOOD NEWS

RANGOON 00000185 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) Summary: Gambari briefed the dip corps before
departing Burma, but declined to give a substantive readout
of his conversations before he briefed UNSYG Ban Ki Moon in
Dhaka. He discussed the conditions of the referendum with
the GOB and offered technical assistance and international
monitors, but indicated there had been no agreement on key
issues. He recounted GOB complaints that each time Gambari
visited Burma, additional international sanctions followed,
so the regime no longer saw the benefits of cooperating with
him. The regime also declined Gambari's request to establish
an "economic forum" to relieve poverty, citing the futility
of doing so as long as sanctions were in place. He noted
that, based on reports he was receiving, the dialogue with
ASSK did not seem to be moving substantively forward. End
Summary.


2. (C) UN Special Envoy Gambari briefed the dip corps on
March 10 at the conclusion of his March visit to Burma.
Gambari opened the meeting by reminding the dip corps of the
principles guiding his mission: that his visits were part of
a process rather than a single event; his engagement must be
comprehensive and span groups from both the opposition and
the Burmese government; his mission should deliver tangible
results; and that those who should participate in the process
should be free to do so. He urged the dip corps against
drawing any conclusions because discussions were ongoing. He
would meet again with the regime's Spokes Authoritative Team
and Aung San Suu Kyi he notified attendees, then he would fly
to Dhaka that day to brief UNSYG Ban Ki Moon on the details
of his discussions before he would discuss the details of his
visit more widely.


3. (C) Gambari asserted that he had clearly articulated the
international community's concerns and that the GOB had
articulated their position just as frankly. He added that,
in addition to the formal meetings he had with the Minister
of Culture, Minister of Planning, and the Chairman of the

Referendum Committee, there had been several informal
discussions as well during evening events. He described his
discussions as extremely frank, sometimes too frank. In the
spirit of transparency, Gambari qualified, there had been no
agreement between himself and the GOB on the key issues.


4. (C) Gambari pointed out that the text of his conversation
with the Spokes Authoritative Team, published March 8 in the
regime's mouthpiece daily "The New Light of Myanmar," did not
include the many points he had made during the meeting,
contrary to what he had been informed. He noted that
sanctions have become a "deal breaker" for the regime, which
complained that each time they cooperated with his visits,
more international sanctions quickly followed so they no
longer saw the benefits of cooperating with Gambari. Gambari
told the ministers that the resolution to this problem was
more cooperation rather than less. He also reported that the
GOB rejected the utility of Gambari's suggested "economic
forum" to address poverty as long as international sanctions
remained in place. Gambari urged the GOB to keep the issue
of sanctions separate from the economic forum and to instead
look at the benefits the forum could bring the country's
population. Gambari concluded his opening remarks by
emphasizing that as long as he had minimal cooperation from
the GOB, he would continue his mission.


5. (C) The Pakistani Ambassador asked what Aung San Suu Kyi
had said during his March 8 meeting with her. Gambari
responded that his conversations with ASSK were ongoing, and
he would meet her again before departing Rangoon. He
acknowledged her as the leader of the NLD and said she stood
behind her party's positions. He declined to elaborate
further.


6. (C) The Australian Ambassador noted that the GOB's
accusation that Gambari was biased toward the West and their
attack against sanctions were unwarranted, in as much as the
GOB had not made progress meeting the demands of the
international community, but had rather gone backwards.

RANGOON 00000185 002.2 OF 002


Gambari responded to a question from the UK Ambassador that
he had not been able to meet with any of the ethnic
minorities but one group we know to be close to the regime.
Charge d'Affaires pointed out that Gambari had not met with
anyone from the senior leadership, which appeared as less
cooperation with the UN's good offices than previously.
Gambari expressed disappointment because he had a message
from Ban Ki Moon to Than Shwe that he had been instructed to
personally deliver. He explained that the Spokes
Authoritative Team had been given "full power to engage with
him on all issues and communicate upward."


7. (C) The Sri Lankan Ambassador jumped to the regime's
defense and advocated that their cooperation with the UN so
far should be recognized, describing the referendum and
upcoming election as " good first steps" in the context of
Burma's complicated history. Gambari responded that the UN
had recognized that the Burmese had finally set a timeline.
That said, Gambari qualified, the continued lack of
inclusiveness of the roadmap diminished this positive step.
The Singaporean Ambassador pointed out that the GOB had made
clear at the November ASEAN Summit that their preferred
interlocutor was the UN. He encouraged the GOB to bring all
the stakeholders into a dialogue leading to national
reconciliation.


8. (C) The French Ambassador requested Gambari elaborate on
the points he had made during his meeting with the Spokes
Authoritative Team that the regime had omitted in the
transcript they published. Gambari declined to do so. The
French Ambassador asked if Gambari had raised free access to
the media for all; Charge d'Affaires expanded the question to
inquire if Gambari had discussed the lifting of criminal
penalties, which the regime was using to imprison over 2,000
people for voicing their opposition to the roadmap. Gambari
responded that in regards to the referendum, he had offered
technical assistance and international monitors. He asserted
he had raised free access to the media and urged the regime
not to engage in actions that limited free expressions and
views. He noted that it was a pity that at a time when there
was so much international support to provide such assistance,
the regime had rejected it. He also clarified that the
referendum would take place over the course of one day
scheduled 21 days in advance, and would be by secret ballot.


9. (C) Asked by the Philippine Ambassador the minimum level
of tangible results Gambari would need to consider his
mission a success, Gambari replied, "an inclusive,
time-bound, substantive dialogue." Gambari concluded that
from the reports he was receiving, it did not seem as if the
dialogue was moving forward substantively. Gambari concluded
by emphasizing that the UN had made several suggestions to
the regime on how they could enhance the credibility of their
referendum, but it remained to be seen if they would take the
UN up on them. Finally, he added, the regime must address
the roots of socio-economic discontent in Burma.


10. (C) Comment: Gambari appears to have obtained nothing
but rejection of all of his suggestions. This included his
pet proposal on poverty alleviation, which he had been urged
by diplomats and the UN Country Team to drop in order to
focus on the credibility of the referendum. Once Than Shwe
realized that Gambari could not deliver anything on
sanctions, he relegated Gambari to lower level officials who
have no negotiating authority. Than Shwe never had any
intention of opening his directed transition to impartial
outside scrutiny. This is very disappointing but should not
come as a surprise. End comment.
VILLAROSA