MOROCCO CONCERNED BUT CAUTIOUS IN RESPONSE TO COUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000736

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MO MR
SUBJECT: MOROCCO CONCERNED BUT CAUTIOUS IN RESPONSE TO COUP
IN MAURITANIA

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 00412 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) On August 7, A/PolCouns met with Moroccan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Chief of Staff Nassar Bourita to express the
United States' strong condemnation of the August 6 coup in
Mauritania and to request that the Government of Morocco
(GOM) issue a statement condemning it. Bourita replied that
while the GOM was concerned about events in Mauritania, and
was closely monitoring the situation, it was unwilling to
issue a statement condemning the coup at this time. Bourita
said that while the GOM opposes the military takeover of any
democratically elected government, the GOM's first priority
concerning Mauritania was stability. As a country targeted
by extremists, especially al Qa'ida in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb, Mauritania represents for Morocco a key
counterterrorism partner. The GOM wants to minimize the
ability of Islamic extremists to exploit the current
political fragility in Mauritania, explained Bourita.
Although it had not anticipated the timing of the action, the
GOM had known that political tensions in Mauritania had been
running high for at least the last six months, and that such
an outcome was anticipated. Bourita said that the GOM was
using indirect channels--what we took to mean Moroccan
intelligence--to communicate with the military junta.


2. (C) An August 7 front-page editorial entitled "Preserving
Mauritanian Stability," in Le Matin -- a pro-Palace daily in
Morocco known to be an unofficial voice of the GOM -- was
highly critical of President Sidi Mohamed Abdallahi and his
wife, accusing the detained President of emollience,
indecision, nepotism, blindness, and plutocracy. A factual,
companion article emphasized the junta's establishment of a
"State Council" (Ref B) and the cancellation of Abdallahi's
recent decision to dismiss several top military generals.
The article noted that the coup supported parliamentarians
and had been followed by pro-coup demonstrations.


3. (C) The Counselor to the Secretary General of the Arab
Maghreb Union (AMU),Saida Mendili, told us on August 6 that
the AMU knew nothing more than was on the news and had no
comment as yet. Libyan Leader Mohammar Qadafi, who currently
holds the AMU presidency, has asked AMU Secretary General
Habib Benyahia to go to Mauritania to assess and report on
the situation. The body will make no formal statement until
after his trip. Our visit yesterday to the French Embassy's
acting 1st Secretary for External Affairs David Portal also
yielded no additional insights into the coup but he agreed to
keep us apprised of significant changes not reported in the
press.


4. (C) Comment: The GOM has long been concerned about
terrorism and instability in Mauritania. More recently, it
has worried about Abdallahi's outreach to pro-Taya and
Islamist elements. The GOM did not publicly condemn the coup
in Mauritania in 2005, and we anticipate that it will take a
similarly cautious approach to the current events. Having
seen many coups in West Africa, the Moroccans instinctive
reflex is pragmatic: diplomatically, but not publicly,
condemning the coup, opening communications with the junta to
encourage stabilization of the situation, and, eventually,
quietly encouraging the coup plotters to restore democracy at
some point in the future.


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Riley