Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08RABAT683
2008-07-22 19:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:  

MOROCCO: STRENGTHENED RIGHTS DIALOGUE AND A TOUCH

Tags:  PHUM PREL PBTS WI MO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0683/01 2041923
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221923Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8878
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 4842
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2399
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3644
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 6016
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 3780
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 5074
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 9672
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 4210
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0838
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1079
C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000683 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, DRL FOR NEA/SA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2018
TAGS: PHUM PREL PBTS WI MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO: STRENGTHENED RIGHTS DIALOGUE AND A TOUCH
OF PIQUE ON SAHARA

REF: A. RABAT 0570

B. RABAT 579

C. RABAT 623

D. RABAT 0645

E. STATE 75910

F. JULY 10 DESK/EMBASSY EMAIL EXCHANGE

Classified By: PolCouns Craig Karp for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000683

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, DRL FOR NEA/SA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2018
TAGS: PHUM PREL PBTS WI MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO: STRENGTHENED RIGHTS DIALOGUE AND A TOUCH
OF PIQUE ON SAHARA

REF: A. RABAT 0570

B. RABAT 579

C. RABAT 623

D. RABAT 0645

E. STATE 75910

F. JULY 10 DESK/EMBASSY EMAIL EXCHANGE

Classified By: PolCouns Craig Karp for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Senior Moroccan Interior and Foreign Affairs
officials praised, with some reservations, the Department's
2007 Human Rights Report and the Government of Morocco
(GOM)/Embassy dialogue that informs it. They agreed to a
schedule and framework to govern the next cycle of discussion
and asked to expand the process to include other
congressionally-mandated rights reports. While acknowledging
that reform is not a straight-line process, they cautioned us
against characterizing 2008 as a year of regression for
Morocco, insisting that the Kingdom's decision to choose the
path of progress is "irreversible."


2. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Chief of Staff
complained that the separate Morocco and Western Sahara human
rights reports were inconsistent with other Department
documents which combine the two geographic regions under one
heading. He also asked the USG to implement assistance
projects in the disputed territory. We reminded him that
although the USG supports Morocco's autonomy initiative, only
a negotiated agreement would lead to international
recognition of Moroccan sovereignty. End Summary.

--------------
Institutionalizing the Human Rights Dialogue
--------------


3. (C) During a July 15 planning meeting to discuss the 2008
cycle of the joint Morocco/Mission human rights dialogue, GOM
representatives included Ministry of Interior (MOI) Director
General Mohiddine Amzazi (Undersecretary equivalent),
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chief of Staff Nasser Bourita,
and the MOI's and MFA's DRL Office Director equivalents.
PolCouns, Human Rights PolOff and Casablanca-resident
LabOff/PolOff attended for the Embassy. Amzazi and Bourita
both noted that the 2007 Human Rights Report was balanced and
"good" because the dialogue allowed the Government of
Morocco (GOM) to make its case. The process was important to

help both sides "find the truth."


4. (C) Amzazi added that the GOM had decided to establish a
standing working group of personnel from the MFA, MOI and
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) to focus on human rights questions.
Amzazi expressed hope for the creation of a permanent
channel and structure for the dialogue. He proposed
broadening it to include all congressionally-mandated rights
reports and requested a master schedule to govern the new and
wider process. The GOM officials accepted the following
Embassy proposed timeline for the 2008 human rights dialogue
(Ref B):

-August 15: Begin working level consultations at relevant
Ministries and submit list of questions.

-October 15: Embassy receives the GOM's response to questions
and incorporates into Human Rights Report Draft.

-Mid November: Full meeting of the Human Rights Dialogue
prior to the Human Rights Report's submission to Washington,
followed by working level follow-up as needed.

-December 2: Embassy receives final and answers to all
questions and issues related to the Human Rights Report.

-Mid January: Begin separate and similar process for
Trafficking in Persons Report

--------------

TIP Plan of Action Highlighted
--------------


5. (C) LabOff stressed the need for Morocco to draft anti-TIP
specific legislation, prosecute and report on the sentencing
of traffickers of forced child labor, and to create a formal
legal procedure to identify and protect victims of
trafficking in order for Morocco to be returned to Tier 1
status (Ref E). PolCouns outlined a USG offer of assistance
to build the GOM's judicial statistical reporting capacity
which has already been presented to the MOJ. Finally, copies
of the TIP Plan of Action were passed to the Moroccan
officials.

--------------
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back
--------------


6. (C) PolCouns concurred that the dialogue not only helped
to inform the Human Rights Reports but also appeared to have
had some positive effects on the human rights situation in
general, particularly in the Western Sahara. He encouraged
the GOM to continue making improvements. Although he
understood that reform involved both forward and backward
movement, he expressed concern over some reverses in the
early part of 2008, especially in the areas of freedom of
expression and press, the subtle tightening of political
space around the (Islamist) opposition Party of Justice and
Development (PJD),as well as strong security reaction to
protests over joblessness and price increases. He noted that
the GOM itself admitted that abuses had occurred during the
legitimate dispersal of a protest blockading the port town of
Sidi Ifni (Ref A).

-------------- --------------
There is Freedom Within, There is Freedom Without
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Amzazi disagreed with the contention that 2008 marked
a year of regression for Morocco in the area of human rights
(Refs A and C). He admitted that there were some missteps
early in the year but said that every instance of "tension"
should not be construed as wholesale backsliding. Amzazi
added that Morocco's decision to move forward on the path of
progress was "irreversible." He pointed to the recent
appointment of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry to
investigate police behavior during recent riots in Sidi Ifni
(Ref A) as an example of Parliament flexing its
constitutional muscle and the willingness of sovereign
ministries (i.e. those under direct royal control) to submit
themselves to scrutiny for the first time in recent history.


8. (C) Amzazi said the MOI would accept and abide by the
Commission's findings and recommendations. He also insisted
that political freedoms in Morocco were not tightening,
despite recent incidents in which the PJD was denied
permission to hold events. He noted that the PJD
participated on an equal footing with all other parties in
the 2007 parliamentary elections cycle, and some of its
members currently serve on the Sidi Ifni Commission of
Inquiry.


9. (C) Amzazi strongly rejected any suggestion that the
recent imposition on Al Jazeera's Rabat Bureau Chief of a USD
7,000 fine and the sentencing of a human rights activist to
six months in prison for spreading false information about
deaths in Sidi Ifni represented an attack on press freedom
and freedom of expression (Ref C). He characterized their
crime as incitement (Note: Although both men subsequently
apologized for disseminating mistaken information received as
events were unfolding, it would be difficult to dispute
Amzazi's contention that rumors of rapes and deaths could
have sparked broader violent demonstrations and actual
deaths. End note) and said that he personally had hoped for a
stronger sentence for both.


10. (C) Amzazi complained that Al Jazeera showed little
gratitude to Morocco, one of the only Arab countries to allow
it to open a bureau, and the channel consistently and
unfairly criticized the Government. He encouraged us to "go

walk the ground" in Sidi Ifni and "see a different reality"
than has been reported.

--------------
Western Sahara: Don't Bust My Chops
--------------


11. (C) Both Amzazi and the MFA's Bourita dug in their heels
on the issue of the Western Sahara. In response to an
inquiry about measures taken against officers frequently
cited for abusive or improper behavior in Western Sahara,
Amzazi insisted that there was no difference between the
situation in "southern Morocco" and the rest of the country
saying, "We are not out of control." He added that internal
investigative mechanisms were robust, effective, and were
used to uphold standards of behavior (Comment: This does not
square with the evidence on the lack of real judicial
investigation of abuses committed by officers. End Comment).
Somewhat testily, Amzazi denied any linkage between the
recent transfers of two officers out of the territory and
their being named in the last session of the dialogue,
insisting that the move was part of the standard police
five-year rotation cycle (Note: Even though the officers had
been there longer than five years. End Note.)


12. (C) Bourita disagreed that allowing more space for civil
society in the territory would either help build trust in the
Manhasset process or promote reconciliation. In contrast to
assertions by the Moroccan Embassy in Washington (Ref F),
both Bourita and Amzazi categorically denied any intention or
possibility of allowing independent human rights NGOs in the
territory to legally register saying, "We will not allow
organizations run by separatists to operate legally, it's
against the law and the Constitution, although they are
allowed to function." In the case of the Sahrawi Association
of Human Rights Violations Victims (ASVDH),this is in spite
of a court decision ordering the Government to approve its
registration application.

--------------
MFA: We Need Another Hug
--------------


13. (C) Bourita argued that Morocco had extended its hand to
Algeria and the Polisario on several levels and in different
ways, only to pull it back empty. He griped that Algeria and
the Polisario prefer the status quo to progress and that they
were using UN. mechanisms such as Manhasset and the Security
Council to prevent breakthroughs. Bourita wondered why UN
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and the USG did not take
concrete steps to signal displeasure with the "other side's"
delaying tactics. He suggested that the Secretary General
ask the Security Council to issue a clear resolution in favor
of the Moroccan proposal, and lay out what it believes should
be the next steps in moving towards a solution.


14. (C) Continuing, Bourita complained that the separate
Morocco and Western Sahara Human Rights Reports were
inconsistent with other State Department documents such as
the International Religious Freedom and Trafficking in
Persons reports, which combine the two geographic areas under
one heading. He was particularly miffed that, this year, the
two Human Rights Reports were initially posted on the
Department's website as one document and then split into two
after three days and reposted.


15. (C) Bourita requested a concrete symbol of the USG's
commitment to the Moroccan autonomy proposal such as the
construction of a school or hospital in the disputed
territory using USG funds. He complained that the USG spends
large amounts of money on humanitarian assistance in Tindouf
and asked "Don't Moroccan school children deserve new books
as well?"


16. (C) In response, we observed that minor details such as
report structures were technical and should not be construed
as signaling change in long-standing US policy one way or
another. The USG's very real and strong support for the
Moroccan autonomy proposal does not alter the fact that,
until an agreement is reached, the international community

will not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the territory.
This should encourage the GOM to make conditions on the
ground as favorable as possible to win an accord.

--------------
Comment
--------------


17. (C) Amzazi's support for the dialogue and the three
ministries' willingness to institutionalize the human rights
dialogue process is a sign of the GOM's commitment at the
highest levels to discussing and operationalizing human
rights concepts. This would seem to validate our strategy of
conducting strong and frank behind-the-scenes advocacy
coupled with encouragement, and balancing accurate and
sometimes critical reporting with expressions of support for
progress. This has produced concrete improvements (Ref A).
We will continue to engage privately with the GOM and to
reach out to human rights activists in Western Sahara and
Morocco proper. As previously noted, brick and mortar
projects in the territory would not be productive (Ref D).
End Comment.


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Riley