SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL WARD TO

S E C R E T RABAT 000489

SIPDIS

TUNIS PLS PASS GENERAL WARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2018
TAGS: OVIP WARD WILLIAM MARR PREL PTER MO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL WARD TO
MOROCCO

Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: General Ward, we are looking forward to
your visit to Morocco. Since your last visit in February
2007, our governments have become even closer. Continuing
close military-to-military cooperation, with a flourishing
training/exercise program, was highlighted by Morocco,s
agreement to purchase 24 F-16s and other U.S. equipment,
which will tie us closely for another generation. We are
working on Acquisition and Cross Serving (ACSA) and Status of
Forces (SOFA) Agreements and would appreciate your mentioning
them. Foreign Military Financing (FMF),however, remains
under threat. On the economic side, we have doubled
bilateral trade and signed a Millennium Challenge Account
Compact--promising almost USD 700 million for development
projects over the next five years. Politically, the U.S.
strongly endorsed the Moroccan autonomy proposal to resolve
the Western Sahara dispute in the ongoing UN-sponsored talks.
This support on their number one international issue was
much appreciated by the Government of Morocco (GOM),and
helped embolden them to extend a hand to rival Algeria and to
propose opening their closed border. We are now asking them
to take some concrete measures to build confidence.


2. (C) The GOM was initially skeptical about AFRICOM. In
recent months, it has been coming to terms with AFRICOM,s
establishment but remains concerned about any physical
presence in Africa. It will be useful for you to reassure
them that there are no plans to move AFRICOM out of Stuttgart
in the near term, while stressing the advantages the
increased focus of AFRICOM could bring on the bilateral
front. One area of sensitivity is counterterrorism. The GOM
has a good handle on both enforcement and efforts to counter
extremism and, unlike others, keep its own military far from
the issue. It would be best to avoid pushing a U.S. military
role on this in Morocco. In contrast, there may be scope to
enhance Morocco,s role in international peacekeeping. End
summary.

United States-Moroccan Military Relationship
--------------


3. (C) U.S. Military Engagement: Military cooperation
between the USG and GOM is improving. In addition to joint
training and exercises, such as the annual "African Lion"
exercise, PHOENIX EXPRESS, and a handful of JCETs, both
foreign affairs and military officials recently signaled a
desire for strengthening military relations. The Royal
Moroccan Air Force has requested the revival of MAJESTIC
EAGLE, an annual air exercise that the U.S. suspended due to
OIF and OEF commitments in 2003. Morocco has indicated it
would participate in Operation Active Endeavor--although
substantial engagement in the operation may take years.
According to a senior military advisor in the MFA, the GOM
wants to improve its relations with NATO and pursue a NATO
Individual Cooperation Program. In addition to its
peacekeeping deployments in Africa, Morocco has under NATO
hats, more than 200 troops deployed in Kosovo with KFOR. Any
contribution AFRICOM could make to this effort might be well
received. We could also consider how to encourage an
increase in Moroccan peacekeeping capacity and engagement.


4. (C) Inspector General of the Armed Forces General Bennani
(who serves as the CHOD, with the King as formal Commander in
Chief) recently pledged to sign the Acquisition and Cross
Service Agreement (ACSA) with the USG on or before the
Defense Consultative Committee meeting in mid-June in Rabat.
In addition, the Embassy has tabled a draft Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) but has not yet received any comments. We
would appreciate your underscoring our interest:

-- in finalizing the ACSA, which would facilitate their
pending purchases and

-- in receiving their comments on the draft SOFA. Washington
is ready to send a high-level team to review the draft with
them and hold preliminary discussions. (We are prepared for
negotiations, but Washington sees no need to push them far at
this stage.)


5. (SBU) Recent Military Purchases: Morocco's thriving
security relationship with the U.S. has also been reflected
by Morocco's September decision to purchase 24 F-16 fighters,

over French Rafael aircraft, for USD 2.1 billion--the single
largest bilateral military purchase by the GOM from the
United States. In addition, Morocco has recently agreed to
purchase 24 T-6 trainer aircraft from the U.S. for an
additional USD 200 million. It is also looking at armor and
other materiel, principally through Excess Defense Articles
(EDA). The Moroccans may express their concern at declining
levels of FMF, which has declined from approximately USD 15
million in FY05 to a USD 3.6 million request for FY 08. In
the past much of the FMF was used to supplement or finance
EDA transfers.

AFRICOM
--------------


6. (C) After initial resistance, Morocco has begun to accept
the formation of a regional command for Africa. Overall, the
tone from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the
Ministry of Defense on AFRICOM basing in Africa has been, at
best, cautious, given strong popular disapproval of the U.S.
presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current Moroccan
posture appears to be a reflection of the GOM's desire to
accommodate U.S. policy--in keeping with Morocco's excellent
military cooperation in most other areas--and a need to not
move too far beyond Moroccan public opinion. Even our
military interlocutors have recently said that given the
negative image of the United States because of its policies
in the region, Morocco will have to wait until after the U.S.
presidential elections before considering hosting any kind of
AFRICOM element. We have also heard criticism from Moroccan
diplomatic and military leaders of AFRICOM's planned
sub-regional orientation. An MFA official who attended the
African dialogue conference in March of this year opined that
most African countries believed AFRICOM should remain
off-continent and emphasize bilateral relations with
countries, not sub-regional African groups.

On AFRICOM you could productively:

-- reassure Moroccans that the headquarters will remain in
Germany through at least the next year.

-- focus on concrete efforts AFRICOM could take in the
bilateral relationship, including enhanced engagement and
technical assistance, including for their efforts to engage
with NATO.


7. (S) Moroccan Relations with Africa: Morocco has been
engaged in its foreign relations on the African continent in
terms of supplying peacekeepers, supporting diplomatic
initiatives and providing developmental assistance. Much of
these efforts are directed at gaining African support on the
Western Sahara dispute. Morocco currently has over 1,500
troops deployed to UN operations in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and Cote d,Ivoire and historically has been a
significant contributor of forces for UN operations on the
continent. Morocco has also played a significant role in
bringing together leaders of the Mano River region, i.e.,
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, to discuss
cooperation and border security. Recently, the GOM reached
out to Zimbabwe,s opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai.
Lastly, Morocco touts its support to African countries
through a range of modest assistance programs.

Regional and International Issues
--------------


8. (C) Border Troubles with Algeria: The Moroccan
relationship with Algeria remains tense and the border
between the two countries remains closed. Although
possessing common languages and some ethno-cultural roots,
the two countries have evolved in politically divergent
directions. Territorial tensions began shortly after
Algerian independence, when a dispute over the demarcation of
the border between the two countries in 1963 led to a brief
period of hostilities known as the Desert (or Sand) War. For
the last 30 years, a major bone of contention has been the
Western Sahara issue and Algerian support for the self
-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and its
political and military leadership, the POLISARIO Front. The
Moroccan purchase of F-16's was apparently motivated by the
sense of threat from a previous Algerian purchase of advanced
aircraft from Russia. In March, Morocco publicly proposed

opening the border between the two countries, which was
quickly rebuffed by the Government of Algeria (GOA). Morocco
subsequently made a second private, then public proposal to
upgrade bilateral dialogue, to which there has not yet been a
public response from Algeria. In the interim, the two Prime
Ministers met, in their role as leaders of the parties that
took the North African states to independence, the highest
level encounter in years, but with little broader impact.


9. (SBU) Western Sahara: Moroccan foreign policy is
dominated by defending and seeking political recognition of
its sovereignty claims over Western Sahara. The issue
remains the most visible source of tension with Algeria,
which has historically supported the POLISARIO's quest
efforts for independence by way of a UN-sponsored referendum.
The issue provoked Morocco to leave the African Union and
helped block regional integration through the Arab Maghreb
Union. Approximately one year ago, Morocco proposed a new
autonomy plan for Western Sahara, and a series of
UN-sponsored negotiations with the POLISARIO began in
Manhasset, New York. This proposal, deemed "serious and
credible" by the USG, would provide Sahrawis--indigenous
people of Western Sahara--autonomy in administering local
affairs while respecting Moroccan sovereignty over the
territory. After the recent renewal of the mandate of the UN
peacekeeping mission, the U.S. announced we considered the
independence option for the territory, "not realistic," which
was appreciated by the GOM.

Terrorism and Extremism
--------------


10. (S) Terrorism: The Moroccan public shares broader Arab
frustrations, magnified by pan-Arab satellite channels, over
continued violence in the Israeli-Palestinian theater and
Iraq. These frustrations have helped fuel a terrorist threat
in Morocco, manifested in failed suicide bombings that shook
Casablanca in May 2003 and targeted the U.S. Consulate in
Casablanca and the private American Language Center in April

2007. Nonetheless, the Moroccans have been relatively
successful at containing this threat to stability.
U.S.-Morocco counterterrorism cooperation is robust and has
led to tangible successes in preempting attacks and shutting
down cells. Morocco has been pursuing an interdisciplinary
approach in confronting the terror threat. In addition to
pursuing vigorous law enforcement and intelligence operations
against known and suspected terrorists, the GOM has worked
with some success to disrupt radical recruitment by
encouraging tolerant and moderating precepts of Islam and
diminishing economic and social marginalization through a
robust economic development policy. Existing U.S. engagement
in cooperative efforts in these areas will continue, and we
are seeking additional funding to support counter extremism
and deradicalization programs, including through Section 1210
and the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP),
to include a program directed at radicalization in prisons.


11. (C) It is important to note, however, that partly due to
the monarchy's longstanding suspicions of the military and
tight controls on it, the armed forces here have no real
counterterrorism role. As a result, U.S. military engagement
on this issue is not viewed with enthusiasm, whether on
enforcement or counter extremism. Moroccan units that have
trained with U.S. Special Forces during JCETs have indicated
that there is a proposal to grant the military some role in
counterterrorism operations. It would be beneficial if you
asked General Bennani about the military,s intentions to
assume this type of mission.

Moroccan Government, Politics, and Economics
--------------


12. (SBU) Governance: King Mohammed VI rules as well as
reigns. Morocco's Constitution and reality ascribe to the
Palace the balance of political power. The King has made
significant political reforms, including relative freedom of
expression, advances on human rights, and enhanced legal
protections for women, particularly through bold revisions to
the family law code in 2004, which are controversial with
conservative Islamists. Partly as a result of this reform
record, public support for the King and his reform agenda is
generally solid.


13. (SBU) Parliament and Political Reform: The September
2007 legislative elections were certified as free and
transparent by a team of international monitors (funded by
the USG). In the elections, the Islamists performed below
expectations but lead the opposition as the second largest
bloc in parliament. The elections were marred by a record
low turnout, broadly seen as a reflection of low public
confidence in the Parliament and political parties. To
address this, for the past few years, the USG has been
funding capacity building programs for the Parliament and
parties.


14. (SBU) Economics and Trade: The economy is relatively
robust with growing foreign investment and remittances,
increasing tourism and a booming stock market, marred by
increasing disparities in wealth. Since implementation of
our Free Trade Agreement on January 1, 2006, bilateral
commerce has roughly doubled, Moroccan exports to the U.S.
have increased 38 percent, and U.S. exports to Morocco have
increased 155 percent. However, Morocco still looks
economically to Europe first. Agriculture remains the sector
that determines whether GDP rises or falls. In 2007,
drought and a small crop limited economic growth to only 2.3
percent, but better, if still below average rain and crops
this year should revive growth. Rising food prices have
quickly become a principal domestic issue for Morocco,
sparking sporadic protests. The Government will continue to
subsidize basic goods, remembering the food price riots of
the 80's and 90's that threatened the stability of the nation.


15. (SBU) U.S. Assistance: We are focusing our assistance
to Morocco on four priorities: counterterrorism, economic
growth, democracy and governance, and supporting quality
education. One of the many tools to be used will be the
Millennium Challenge Account Compact with Morocco wherein USD
697.5 million will be provided over the next five years to
support economic growth and reduce poverty.


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