KOSOVO: VISIT OF EUR A/S FRIED NOVEMBER 17-18

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000582

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE,
NSC FOR HELGERSON
USUN FOR GEE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: VISIT OF EUR A/S FRIED NOVEMBER 17-18

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.
4(b)(d)


1. (C) Summary. Over the course of two days in Pristina
November 17-18, 2008, EUR A/S Daniel Fried engaged the
Government of Kosovo (GOK) leadership on establishing
conditions for the full deployment of the EU's rule of law
mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Discussions were difficult and
held in a tense political atmosphere, with the political
opposition seeking opportunities to weaken the government and
civil society poised to demonstrate widely in protest of the
"six-point" paper negotiated between the UN and Serbia. A/S
Fried's message to Kosovo leaders was blunt: EULEX deployment
to all of Kosovo had to proceed promptly; whatever concerns
the Kosovars had with the "six-points," they must commit to
working with the U.S. and the EU in implementing EULEX
arrangements, including elements of the "six-points"; and, if
they agreed to work with us, we could in turn work with the
UN and EU to give the Kosovars commitments that the process
of UN "reconfiguration" to EULEX would proceed in close
consultation and coordination with them. In line with an
agreed approach worked out with A/S Fried, the GOK publicly
committed to support EULEX deployment according to its EU
mandate of February 4 and formally rejected the "six-points,"
but nevertheless agreed to cooperate with the UN and EU in
the transition process and in implementing the EULEX mandate.
End Summary.


2. (C) In his first meeting with President Sejdiu, Prime
Minister Thaci, Foreign Minister Hyseni and Deputy Prime
Minister Kuci, A/S Fried, joined by the Ambassasdor and Maj.
General Paul Schafer (Director of Strategy, Policy, and
Assessments, U.S. European Comman) laid down the clear marker
that together we needed to find a way for the EU's rule of
law mission (EULEX) to deploy throughout Kosovo, including --
signally -- in the north. A/S Fried emphasized that he was
not in Kosovo to force the GOK to accept the "six-points,"
but he needed the GOK to trust the U.S., as they have in the
past, on difficult compromises that would ultimately benefit
Kosovo and its people. President Sejdiu and PM Thaci
reiterated their firm commitment to the deployment of EULEX
and their absolute rejection of the "six-points," arguing
repeatedly that Kosovo had never been adequately consulted in
the negotiation process, only presented with a "fait
accomplis." Even two weeks ago, Thaci suggested, there was
still room for discussion. Now, given the political climate
in Kosovo, the public outcry against the "six-points," and
the popular belief that the UN drafted this document
deliberately to undermine Kosovo's sovereignty, the
government had to remain firm in its repudiation.


3. (C) Explaining that there was no chance of opening the
"six-points" to further negotiation because the Quint had
agreed to them, A/S Fried presented the GOK with several
formulations of language for possible inclusion in the UNSYG
report. The language, he noted, would make clear Kosovo's
rejection of the "six-points" and present the UN with the
imperative of consulting closely with Kosovo authorities on
their implementation. In essence, Fried explained, the
"six-point" language would no longer be fully controlling but
would be "filtered and bracketed," and ultimately interim in
nature in any case.


4. (C) After more than an hour of discussion which included a
20 minute break for the GOK to consult privately, the GOK
objections to the inclusion of the "six-points" in the UNSYG
report remained unchanged. The bottom line for the GOK was
its fear that the "six-points" represented a new mandate for
EULEX, separate and distinct from what was described in the
European Council's joint action of February 4, 2008, and that
such a mandate would permit Belgrade a level of involvement
in Kosovo's affairs that it had not enjoyed even prior to
independence. Unless they could be assured that inclusion of
the GOK's explicit rejection of the "six-points" negated
their operative nature, the Kosovars noted, they could not
allow even the suggestion that the GOK tacitly or otherwise
accepted that language.

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5. (C) Wanting desperately to avoid a scenario in front of
the press in which President Sejdiu and Prime Minister Thaci
would be seen as saying "no" to the U.S. and more importantly
to Dan Fried personally, they agreed to meet with A/S Fried
again the next morning to continue looking for a solution.
In remarks to the press following the meeting, A/S Fried
stressed that the U.S. continued its strong support for
Kosovo as a sovereign nation; that as such, Kosovo had the
right to its position on the "six-points," though the U.S.
felt that the document had been misinterpreted and was not
harmful to Kosovo; and that constructive discussions with the
Kosovo government would continue in an effort to find a way
forward.

Meeting with Quint, EULEX and ICO
--------------


6. (C) Following the meeting, A/S Fried, Ambassador, ICO/EUSR
Feith and British Ambassador Andy Sparkes discussed possible
language for inclusion in the UNSYG report that would address
Kosovo's concerns on sovereignty and its fear about the
implementation of the six points. Feith also agreed to join
A/S Fried and the Ambassador in the meeting the following day
with Sejdiu and Thaci as a representative of the EU. The
small group agreed that anything they would be able to get
from the GOK would be taken directly by Fried to UN
Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Alain Le Roy, who was outside
Geneva at a retreat for UN officials. During a dinner
session with the above participants as well as local Quint
reps and EULEX Head of Mission Yves de Kermabon, de Kermabon
told the group that he was against a partial deployment of
EULEX, especially if there were any sort of continuing UNMIK
presence which would confuse the lines of authority in
police, justice and customs. He expressed his own concerns
about the "six-points," wondering whether a sunset clause
would be built in, and he said he planned to visit UN DPKO
the following week to lay down his conditions for EULEX
deployment.


Second Round with GOK
--------------


7. (C) In the second meeting with the GOK on November 18,
A/S Fried was joined by ICR/EUSR Pieter Feith for the EU.
The meeting, scheduled for one hour, lasted for over three.
Picking up where they left off the day before, A/S Fried told
the GOK that a stalemate was not an acceptable outcome for
these talks. Stalemate would ensure the failure of the EULEX
mission and would lead to Kosovo's isolation from the EU and
the U.S. He reiterated that he needed to have an agreement
for deployment of EULEX throughout Kosovo. Making it clear
that he could not control the contents of the UNSYG's Report,
he laid out the elements that would make the report workable
for all parties: Kosovo's explicit acceptance of EULEX; the
"six-points" in some form; Kosovo's explicit rejection of the
"six-points"; language acceptable to both the EU and UN which
would indicate implementation of the "six-points" would be on
the basis of consultation and coordination with Kosovo.


8. (C) Feith supported A/S Fried's position, saying the GOK
needed to shift the focus of its discussion away from the
"six-points" to the common interest of full deployment of
EULEX. He assured the GOK that the mandate of EULEX was
based on the February 4, 2008 joint action by the European
Council, and that it could not change without another such
agreement. Feith also confirmed that part of the EULEX
mandate was to implement the Ahtisaari Plan, despite the lack
of overt reference to the Plan in the Council's Joint Action.


9. (C) After nearly three hours of discussion, A/S Fried told
Sejdiu and Thaci that continuing to say "no" was not an
acceptable response to the favorable language and many
assurances offered by the U.S. and EU on the "six-points" and
deployment of EULEX. The GOK had to give the U.S. and EU
something to work with when talking to the UN. Again, the

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fear of angering the U.S. and the risk of isolation from the
EU forced the GOK to lean forward. After reiterating their
concern that the "six-points" opened a door for future
interference in Kosovo's sovereign issues by Belgrade, and
worrying about how they would present the outcome of the
report to the Kosovo public in a way that does not end in a
political firestorm or worse, Sejdiu and Thaci asked whether
Kosovo would be permitted to insert its position into the
report. After a 15 minute consultation, the GOK came back
with four points representing its position on EULEX
deployment. Before facing the press, Thaci asked whether
there were any way to remove the "six-points" entirely from
the text of the UNSYG report, which would be their strong
preference, though he did not propose to say this publicly.
A/S Fried said he would faithfully convey the request to the
UN, though he could not make assurances in this regard.
After expressing the Kosovars' continuing deep confidence in
U.S. support for Kosovo, Thaci reiterated his support for
EULEX and commitment to doing what was necessary to get it
deployed throughout Kosovo.


10. (C) A/S Fried promised to take the results of these
discussion directly to UN U/S Alain Le Roy in Montreux that
day and work to have the report reflect unambiguously
Kosovo's position and the fact that any implementation of the
"six-points" would happen only with close and continuous
cooperation and consultation with the GOK.

The Four Points
--------------


11. The four points offered by the Government of Kosovo in
the press statement following their meeting with A/S Fried on
November 17:

-- 1)The GOK supports the early deployment of EULEX
throughout the entire territory of Kosovo based on the
mandate as stipulated by:
---the European Council Joint Action of February 4, 2008
---the Ahtisaari Plan
---the Declaration of Independence
---invitations signed by the President on February 17, 2008
and August 8, 2008 for EULEX to deploy
---the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo
---laws of the Republic of Kosovo

-- 2) Institutions of the Republic of Kosovo refuse in its
entirety the "six-points" document.

-- 3) Institutions of the Republic of Kosovo will cooperate
with EULEX in its deployment throughout the territory of
Kosovo based on the mandate as outlined in point 1 above,
while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Republic of Kosovo.

-- 4)Institutions of the Republic of Kosovo, as always, will
continue close cooperation with the US, EU and NATO.


Meeting with Political Leaders
--------------


12. (C) Following the final press statement with the
President and Prime Minister, A/S Fried met briefly with 15
leaders of the political parties represented in the Assembly.
Included in the meeting were Assembly President Jacob
Krasniqi, Bajram Rexhepi, Enver Hohxaj (all PDK),Lutfi
Haziri, Eqrem Kreziu, Sabri Hamiti (all LDK),Ibrahim
Makolli, Ibrahim Gashi (both AKR),Nexhat Daci, Lulzim
Zeneli, Besa Gaxherri (all LDD),and Ramush Haradinaj, Ardian
Gjini, Ahmet Isufi, Gylnaze Syla (all AAK).


13. (C) A/S Fried appealed to the assembled leaders for
support in the deployment of EULEX and to help calm the
tensions which have risen recently over the "six-points." He
reiterrated the U.S.'s support for Kosovo, which has been
unwavering, respect for Kosovo's sovereignty, and

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acknowledgement of Kosovo's rejection of the "six-points."
He asked them to have confidence in the U.S. and EU's support
for Kosovo's sovereignty and territorial integrity.


14. (C) PDK and LDK representatives both expressed their
support for the deployment of EULEX while maintaining their
staunch rejection of the "six-points." Ramush Haradinaj
(AAK) asked pointedly whether the "six-points" would be
included in the UNSYG Report and if there was a timetable for
their implementation. In response, A/S Fried reiterated that
the "six-points" would not be a new mandate for EULEX and
that Kosovo's rejection of the points would also be part of
the record. As for a timeline, Fried said the sooner EULEX
deployed, the sooner the "six-points" would disappear.


15. (U) A/S Fried cleared this cable.
KAIDANOW