KOSOVO: DEMARCHE TO KOSOVO LEADERSHIP DELIVERED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000056

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW
SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: DEMARCHE TO KOSOVO LEADERSHIP DELIVERED

REF: A. STATE 6162

B. PRISTINA 24

C. PRISTINA 28

D. PRISTINA 34

E. PRISTINA 36

F. PRISTINA 37

G. PRISTINA 38

H. PRISTINA 40

I. PRISTINA 55

Classified By: COM TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) COM delivered reftel A points in a series of meetings
with President Sejdiu, Prime Minister Thaci, Finance Minister
Ahmet Shala, and other Kosovo interlocutors, including
opposition figures, Kosovo Protection Corps leaders, and
minority (Serb as well as non-Serb) representatives, as
appropriate.


2. (C) In repeated meetings with the President and PM, COM
stressed the urgent need for outreach to Serb communities,
including visible and active measures to improve the lives of
Serb community members, with real budgetary support. Both
the President and the PM have made several stops in Serb
enclaves, the latest being a February 5 visit by PM Thaci to
a Serb returnee family in Ljipjan (central Kosovo). PM Thaci
conducted a press conference in the Serb-majority village of
Caglavica shortly after his government was formed; despite a
curious and occasionally hostile Serb press reaction, the
message was one of regard for Serb concerns.


3. (C) USOP is working with the government to finalize a set
of Serb-oriented proposals that can be unveiled quickly, and
Finance Minister Shala has indicated to COM and to USAID
director that a budget line in the newly reconfigured 2008
budget will be devoted to such projects. One factor that
must be taken into account in such planning is increased
pressure from Belgrade on local Serb officials to sever all
contacts with the Kosovo government; this makes it necessary
to find third party intermediaries, possibly including USAID
and other donors, to deliver programs and assistance funded
by the government. Initial contacts with Serb NGOs has
indicated that some number of them might be willing to accept
such assistance, provided the Kosovo government did not seek
too overt a role. The PM is also discussing with USOP his
ideas regarding the establishment of an Office for
Communities, which would likely have both programmatic
responsibilities and an advocacy role for Serbs and other
communities.


4. (C) Messages on the need for restraint and preventing all
violence directed against minority communities have been
delivered continuously by COM and other USOP officers to the
PM, President, KPC leadership, war veterans, and opposition
party representatives. COM has emphasized repeatedly that
whatever provocations emanate from Serbia or from hardline
Serb local officials, no/no retaliatory action or violence
against Serb communities in Kosovo will be tolerated. In
addition, USOP has been actively working through its
Strategic Communications Group (reftels D and I) to ensure
these messages reach the broadest possible spectrum of Kosovo
citizens via local officials, the police, the KPC, KFOR
liaison teams, NGOs and other networks. We have received
unequivocal understanding of this message across the board;
though no one precludes the possibility of incidents directed
at minorities, there is an active commitment on the part of
key Kosovar interlocutors to try and prevent or isolate such
incidents should they occur. The fruits of this outreach are
already visible in joint public appearances by mayors and
local police station commanders urging public responsibility
during the coming weeks. Kosovo Protection Corps leaders
were especially vehement with COM that they understand their
role in encouraging restraint; KFOR has recently been working
with KPC in Albanian-majority areas near Serb enclaves to
ensure that KPC -- with the wide respect it enjoys among
Albanians -- is proactively getting out the message of
restraint. COM has also held a number of off-the-record
sessions (two to three hours long each) with Kosovo print and

PRISTINA 00000056 002 OF 002


broadcast editors to underscore their responsibility in
maintaining a secure environment.


5. (C) USOP has been working quietly with the President and
PM to help craft appropriate Declaration Day messages and
ceremonial events that will reflect Kosovo's intention to
look toward the future and to preserve its multi-ethnic
character. These discussions will be ongoing in the next
days. While Kosovo's new flag will not be officially chosen
by the Assembly until Declaration Day or shortly thereafter,
there are efforts underway to unofficially pre-select an
appropriate flag and use these in government-sponsored
celebrations on the day (assuming enough time is available),
though private citizens are unlikely to be dissuaded from
bringing out the ethnic Albanian flag and -- very likely --
the U.S. flag. Pictures of such flags or the euphoric and
emotional reaction Kosovars will display upon the day of
independence (which will undoubtedly be featured by some of
the international media poised to descend upon Kosovo) should
not take away from the determined effort being made by
Kosovo's leadership to say and do the right things at this
crucial moment in their history. They have shown fairly
remarkable patience and restraint to this point, and we are
encouraging them to show the same maturity as Kosovo enters a
new and very challenging phase.
KAIDANOW