Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PRISTINA51
2008-01-30 18:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: BELGRADE-ALIGNED GORANI ETHNIC GROUP POSES

Tags:  KDEM PGOV PINR SOCI KV UNMIK 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000051 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2018
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR SOCI KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: BELGRADE-ALIGNED GORANI ETHNIC GROUP POSES
CHALLENGES FOR KOSOVO

Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000051

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NSC FOR BRAUN
USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI
EUR/ACE FOR DMAYHEW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2018
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR SOCI KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: BELGRADE-ALIGNED GORANI ETHNIC GROUP POSES
CHALLENGES FOR KOSOVO

Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. The Gorani, a small Slavic Muslim community
that resides in the isolated mountains of southern Kosovo's
Dragash municipality, retain close ties with the Serbian
government. Serbian funding for a parallel education system
is one such strong link, as are subsidies, jobs, and pensions
paid for by Belgrade's Coordination Center for Kosovo (CCK).
As a quid pro quo, perhaps, the CCK apparatus has been
increasing pressure on Goranis to toe Belgrade's line and
draw back from its already limited cooperation with the
Kosovo government and the international community. The
Gorani are also bitterly opposed by the Bosniak community in
Kosovo, a key ally in Kosovo's independence drive; Bosniaks
view Goranis as "Bosniaks under Serbian control" and have
fought to deny them special language or other rights. While
overall tensions in Dragash are low, a recent bombing at a
Serbian bank, which is the main transfer point for funds from
Belgrade, could presage trouble in the future. END SUMMARY.


Who Are The Gorani?


2. (C) Currently numbering around 5,000 (from a pre-1999
estimate of 16,000) the Gorani community is a Slavic Muslim
group residing in the southernmost tip of Kosovo, in Dragash
municipality. The Gorani, former Orthodox Serbs living in
mountainous areas ("Gora" means "mountain" in old Serbian),
were compelled to convert to Islam in exchange for accepting
assistance from their Ottoman rulers in times of drought and
crop shortfall. While maintaining a unique identity, the
Gorani have always spoken Serbian and have chosen to retain
close ties to Belgrade. This in turn has become a continual
source of friction with neighboring Kosovo Albanian and
Bosniak communities in Dragash. Adding to the potential
frictions, hardline elements from both inside and outside the
Gorani community are pushing its members to toe the Serbian

government line even more closely than in the past. Recent
developments illustrate the pressures faced by the Gorani -
some as a result of their own choices - as they await the
final determination of Kosovo's status.

Education a Key Link


3. (C) The chief tie the Gorani maintain with Belgrade is
related to education. The Serbian government plays a
central and growing role in providing this community with
educational materials, curricula, textbooks, teacher
salaries, and even school buildings. (Note: The Gorani have
consistently preferred to accept this assistance rather than
integrate more closely into the PISG-based educational
system.) As we have seen with almost all Serbian government
assistance in Kosovo, education assistance to the Gorani has
become more politicized in recent months. On October 10,
2007, State Secretary in the Serbian Ministry for Kosovo
Dusan Prorokovic visited Dragash, delivering schoolbooks for
Gorani students. Reacting to this, on October 11, Dragash
Municipal Director of Education Xhemi Iliazi (ethnic
Albanian) announced that he planned to shut down the high
school in the Gorani village of Mlike unless it began using
the Kosovo government curriculum.


4. (C) Iliazi told us privately he had been pressured to do
so by local Kosovo Bosniak politicians, who, as another
Slavic-Muslim community in Kosovo, but one with no ties to
Belgrade, have been trying to compel the Gorani to identify
themselves as Bosniaks, with the presumed goal of having
greater political clout. The tensions between Bosniaks and
Gorani has led in effect to the complete parallelization of
the Gorani education system. The Gorani have, for the most
part, accepted this outcome without making any attempt to
accommodate PISG concerns. A new parallel high school has
opened in the village of Mlike, and there are three parallel
elementary schools for Gorani in Dragash. All use the
Serbian curriculum only.

PRISTINA 00000051 002 OF 003



CCK: Increasing Activity


5. (C) The Gorani community is alone among non-Serb
minorities in Kosovo in having its own representative from
the CCK. Local CCK representative Abdyl Alija has cut a
higher profile in recent weeks, moving operations from an
internet cafe (which he owns) to a rented house in the
village of Vraniste. On January 11 visit to the office, we
met with a small group of local CCK employees, and our
discussions revealed the Goranis' conundrum regarding their
ties to Belgrade. The CCK officials were happy to show us
lists of Gorani getting child-welfare payments from the
Serbian government and to detail their own role in
facilitating applications for Serbian pensions, passports,
and other documents. Depicting their activities as essential
services for their isolated community, the CCK workers also
decried the community's near-total dependence on Belgrade for
survival, with one of them telling us "every Gorani gets a
pension or a job paid for by Belgrade. Everyone else is
living abroad."


6. (C) Alija was scheduled to meet us in Vraniste, but as
with other recent meetings we have set with CCK officials, he
was "called away at the last minute" for a meeting in
Mitrovica. While Alija has generally been open in speaking
with us, more moderate Gorani contacts report that Alija's
behavior has become more hardline of late. CCK-affiliated
types have sat in front of the entrance to GIG party (the
Citizens' Initiative of Gora, the sole Gorani party willing
to deal with the PISG, which is now represented by a single
parliamentarian in the Kosovo Assembly) headquarters in
Dragash, intimidating visitors. In addition, Alija conducted
a campaign ahead of the November 17 Kosovo elections,
threatening GIG members and other Gorani in general that
there would be "consequences" if they voted. While GIG
leader Murselj Halili said he received assurances from other
officials in Belgrade that there would be no retribution
against those choosing to vote, he told us he is concerned
that Alija and the CCK may have collected lists of those who
dared to do so. He also corroborated reports we have heard
elsewhere that the hardline northern Serb leadership now
exercises increased influence over CCK operations. Halili
explained that before Alija's appointment, GIG had put
forward a more moderate candidate to Belgrade for the local
CCK position, but that Alija decided to suggest himself
instead. Halili alleged that, as with many other CCK
coordinators throughout Kosovo, Alija is deeply corrupt.

Bank Bomb


7. (C) Another recent incident adding to the general
uncertainty in the Gorani community was the January 1
explosion at the offices of Komercialna Banka in the town of
Dragash. Komercialna Banka is the only Serbian-government
owned institution allowed by UNMIK to operate inside Kosovo,
serving as the main conduit for Serbian government pensions,
subsidies, and financial transfers to both individual Gorani
and the CCK. Both Alija and Halili told us that they
considered the blast to have been directed at the Gorani by
actors unhappy with the community's ties to Belgrade.
However, lower-ranking CCK employees from the Vraniste office
told us that organized crime was most likely behind the
blast. (Note: This same Dragash bank branch was also bombed
in February 2006. We heard on January 30 from COMKFOR POLAD
Romauld Pichard that his sources told him the real target of
the blast was not the bank but another office adjacent to it,
which the CCK had planned to turn into a new "Ministry for
Kosovo" office. Romuald claimed that the perpetrators may
have been trying to send a signal to the CCK that although
the Ministry for Kosovo opened an office in Mitrovica
December 10, such an office would not be welcome in Dragash.
End Note.).

A Moderate Voice - But Not in the Majority

PRISTINA 00000051 003 OF 003




8. (C) For his part, Halili, a longtime USOP contact, told
us that his GIG party is interested in participating in
Kosovo institutions, and he claims that the party's
acceptance by both Pristina and Belgrade makes it the best
representative for the Gorani community. (Comment: While
certainly the Kosovo Government is interested in supporting
the moderate Halili, it is very doubtful he has Belgrade's
support.) In the new Kosovo Assembly, Halili has aligned
himself with the moderate Kosovo Serb Independent Liberal
Party (SLS),which is part of the governing coalition - the
first time GIG has joined a local Serb political grouping.
However, while Halili intends to look for ways the Gorani can
benefit from participation in government, he admits that
Alija and the CCK have much more to offer the Gorani
community than the PISG in terms of financial incentive.

Comment


9. (C) As has long been the case, the Gorani continue to
rely on more powerful patrons for support. The current
iteration of this relationship, however, puts them in danger
of further isolation and conflict with neighboring Albanians
and Bosniaks, who frequently voice their displeasure at the
Goranis' links to Belgrade. Traditionally, the strained ties
between the Gorani and the PISG, as well as with the Bosniak
community, have left the government with few viable options
in trying to integrate them into Kosovo institutions. On the
other hand, increased pressure from the CCK to toe the
Belgrade line is consistent with pressure we have seen
directed against Serbs elsewhere in Kosovo. As we move
towards independence, it is almost certain that this pressure
will increase and that moderate Gorani leaders like Halili
will find themselves squeezed. The decentralization
provisions of the Ahtisaari plan are tailor-made for the
Gorani: they can maintain all transparent links to Belgrade
-- including in education -- and have increased roles in
local governance. Whether they choose or are allowed by
Belgrade to take this route, however, remains to be seen.
KAIDANOW