KOSOVO: BELGRADE AND NORTHERN HARDLINERS RATCHET

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000046

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE
NSC FOR BRAUN
USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL SOCI KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: BELGRADE AND NORTHERN HARDLINERS RATCHET
UP THE PRESSURE


Classified By: COM Tina S. Kaidanow for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Indications are growing that Belgrade and
the hard-line Kosovo Serb leadership in the north are
increasing the pace of plans to expand and strengthen
parallel government structures for Kosovo Serbs in the event
of Kosovo's independence. Although UNMIK appointed Serbs to
the municipal assemblies of the mixed southern municipalities
of Novo Brdo and Strpce after the Belgrade-ordered boycott of
the November 17 elections, most of the appointees have yet to
take their seats. There is strong evidence that pressure
from Belgrade is the primary reason. Serbian Minister for
Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic, visiting several southern Serb
enclaves in Kosovo on January 18, pressured Serb politicians
from both Novo Brdo and Strpce to form parallel governments
which would remain separate from UNMIK or the Kosovo
government. In addition, on January 21, the E.O.-listed
Milan Ivanovic, leader of the hard-line Serb National Council
(SNC) in the Serb-majority north, said in blunt terms that
existing parallel structures would be "cemented" and that any
future EU-led mission in northern Kosovo would be met with
resistance "by all possible means." Though not surprising,
these developments are troubling and potentially foreshadow
even more provocative actions the Ministry for Kosovo could
take when Kosovo becomes independent. END SUMMARY.

Problems remain in Strpce and Novo Brdo


2. (C) Following the near-total Kosovo Serb boycott of the
November 17 elections, SRSG Ruecker appointed a majority of
Serbs to the assemblies of the mixed municipalities of Strpce
and Novo Brdo, in an attempt to maintain Serb participation
in local government. In Novo Brdo, due to the almost even
demographic split between Serbs and Albanians, Ruecker
allowed the top Albanian vote-getter to take office as mayor,
displacing moderate Serb mayor Petar Vasic. In Strpce, Serbs
comprise a clear majority of the population, and based on
this fact, Ruecker re-appointed sitting mayor Stanko
Jakovljevic.


3. (C) Despite these appointments, a majority of Kosovo Serb
municipal assembly members in Strpce have yet to take the
oath of office and assume their duties, and the 10 Serb
members in Novo Brdo have, thus far, completely boycotted the
assembly. The deadline for taking office was January 18th.

Samardzic comes calling


4. (C) While internal Serb political squabbling has in some
instances contributed to delays in their taking up positions
in local government, it is equally clear that increasing
pressure from Belgrade could well keep Serbs out of local
government entirely. On January 18, Serbian Minister for
Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic, accompanied by the Minister for
Energy Aleksandar Popovic, visited several southern Serb
enclaves. In addition to opening new Serbian
government-funded facilities in Ranilug and Vrbovac,
Samardzic met former Novo Brdo mayor Vasic during his visit
to Ranilug. Vasic told International Civilian Office
Preparation Team (ICOPT) staffer and local Kosovo Serb Sasa
Stamenkovic (a former employee of his) that Samardzic told
him that he (Samardzic) would soon ask the SRSG to remove all
Albanian officials from the Novo Brdo municipal building,
since it was built with CCK funds. If the SRSG refused,
Samardzic indicated he would instruct all Serbs working in
the municipal administration to leave and form a parallel
government only for Serb residents of the municipality, and
that current Serb municipal employees would forego their PISG
salaries and be added to the CCK payroll. (Note: Perhaps
feeling pressured by Samardzic's actions, Vasic entered the
Novo Brdo municipal building on January 24, proclaiming to
the Kosovo Albanian mayor that he was now "the president of
the municipality for the Kosovo Serb community." The mayor
took no action and Vasic did not return the next day. End
Note.)


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5. (C) In Strpce, Samardzic and Popovic met a large number
of CCK coordinators from across Kosovo and members of Serbian
Prime Minister Kostunica's DSS party, of which both ministers
are members. UNMIK sources told us that after local
residents complained about Jakovljevic (who also serves as
Strpce CCK coordinator),alleging that he was corrupt and
that he had misused funds, Samardzic took the floor.
Samardzic first said that "it was a huge and unforgivable
mistake" for any Serbs to have participated in the November
17 elections, and then went on to say that as far as the
Serbian government is concerned, the election results were
null and void. Samardzic and Popovic then interrogated
Jakovljevic, who was present, demanding that he explain why
he had taken the oath of office, which assumes allegiance to
UNMIK. Jakovljevic attempted to avoid the question, but
after being pressed further, he said that Goran Bogdanovic (a
former Kosovo MP and member of Serbian President Boris
Tadic's DS party) had consulted Tadic and subsequently told
Jakovljevic to go ahead and take the oath of office, a
message that the latter then passed on to other Kosovo Serb
municipal officials. Samardzic, who received applause from
the audience, heatedly responded that "I am the first, last,
and ultimate authority for Kosovo. No decision can be handed
down to you by any party official because I am the ultimate
authority. I am the Minister for Kosovo and Metohija and you
should strictly abide by my orders."


6. (C) Samardzic went on to emphasize that all Serb
municipal officials who recently pledged allegiance to SRSG
Ruecker and the PISG had "behaved badly." He then repeated
his earlier message to Vasic, saying that all Kosovo Serbs on
PISG payrolls would be ordered to withdraw from UNMIK/PISG
structures and placed on the Ministry for Kosovo payroll.
(Comment: This would, in effect, mean that Belgrade would
dismiss Serb municipal officials in Novo Brdo and Strpce and
then replace them with its own appointees. End Comment.)
Samardzic closed by saying that the Serbian government would
hold its own municipal elections in all Serb-inhabited areas
throughout Kosovo in May.

CCK Infighting


7. (C) On January 23, we spoke with Zoran Krcmarevic, CCK
coordinator for Vitina municipality, about Samardzic's stop
there. Krcmarevic is a member of the DS party who was
recently appointed to his CCK post as part of a wider
reallocation of CCK jobs agreed to by the Serbian parties,
DSS, DS, and G17 Plus. Krcmarevic corroborated other reports
we have received that despite Samardzic's initial agreement
to these new appointments, he has now rejected them and
continues to regard former (largely DSS) CCK coordinators as
the legitimate representatives of the Ministry for Kosovo in
their respective areas. He told us that Samardzic had
completely ignored him during his visit to Vitina, and met
instead with the former coordinator, a DSS party member.

No new office...for now


8. (C) We spoke also with Strpce regional CCK coordinator
Sokol Djordjevic on January 23 to inquire about rumors that a
new Serbian Ministry for Kosovo office had been opened there.
He told us that no new office had been opened, but claimed
that the Ministry would do so "very soon."

Meanwhile, in Mitrovica...


9. (C) Simultaneous with these developments in southern
Kosovo, there are also signs of growing aggressiveness on the
part of the hard-line Serb leadership in the north. ICOPT
Mitrovica Office international staffer James Nunan reported
on January 21 that Serb National Council leader Milan
Ivanovic (E.O.-listed) told him that any new EU-led mission
in northern Kosovo would be completely unacceptable to Serbs
there, who would resist with all possible means. Ivanovic
made no distinction between the ICO and ESDP missions, and
when pressed, said while he personally did not want to see

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any violence, repeated his warning that there would be a
violent reception for the new mission. He then explained
that after Kosovo declared independence, the northern
municipalities would "cement" all parallel structures now in
place and separate themselves from the rest of Kosovo.


10. (C) Addressing the future of the Kosovo Police Service
(KPS) in the north, Ivanovic said that after Kosovo's
declaration of independence, the Serb-majority KPS north of
the Ibar river would stop operating as part of the overall
KPS, and indicated that Serb officers in the north might
begin wearing some sort of insignia to differentiate
themselves. In addition, he openly told Nunan that he had
spoken with the landlord of the ICOPT's office building in an
attempt to persuade him to stop renting to the ICOPT. (Note:
Nunan later told us that the landlord resisted this pressure,
but on January 28, Nunan then reported that an unknown
assailant threw a rock through the windshield of the
landlord's car on January 25. The KPS is investigating. End
Note.) Ivanovic ended the meeting by agreeing to stay in
contact in the upcoming period, which is consistent with what
he has told us at recent meetings.

Comment


11. (C) Belgrade's stepped up pressure on Kosovo Serbs in the
run-up to Kosovo independence comes as no surprise but is
nonetheless troubling. Samardzic's invective, directed at
Kosovo Serb politicians, is an indication of the actions the
Ministry for Kosovo is likely to take in the future.
Establishment of a fully parallel Kosovo Serb municipal
government, especially in the southern Serb enclaves, would
be a bold provocation for Kosovo Albanians as well as an open
challenge to UNMIK's authority.


12. (C) UNMIK has indicated that it will, in response to
Samardzic's actions during this last visit, likely prohibit
him from entering Kosovo again, a move we should support.
Piecemeal responses, however, are unlikely in the extreme to
dissuade Belgrade from pursuing its overall strategy, and
consideration will need to be given to more direct measures
and messages aimed at Belgrade, in tandem with our European
partners. Even the Russians, at least in conversations on
the ground with USOP COM, understand the highly provocative
quality of some actions currently being contemplated by
Belgrade and Kosovo's northern hardliners; while the Russians
may use some of their influence to try and prevent actions
that could lead to open conflict, they too are unlikely to
get a full hearing in Belgrade at a time when the Serbian
government appears bent on pursuing a strategy of political
confrontation. End comment.
KAIDANOW