Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PRISTINA393
2008-07-25 10:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND UN

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL UNMIK PREF KV 
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1049
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000393 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL UNMIK PREF KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND UN
AGENCIES OVER RETURNS POINTS TO NEED FOR CHANGED APPROACH

Classified By: Ambassador Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000393

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE
NSC FOR HELGERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL UNMIK PREF KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND UN
AGENCIES OVER RETURNS POINTS TO NEED FOR CHANGED APPROACH

Classified By: Ambassador Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary: Due to many factors over the past several
months, the pace of Serb returns to Kosovo has slowed. There
have also been growing problems between Kosovo Minister of
Returns Boban Stankovic, an ethnic Serb, and the UN agencies
chiefly responsible for returns in Kosovo -- the UN
Development Program (UNDP) and the UN High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR). The disputes stem from disagreements
between Stankovic and UNDP over who should control the budget
of the Ministry for Communities and Returns (MCR),in
addition to UNDP allegations of corruption and inexperience
at the Ministry. For his part, Stankovic alleges conflicts
of interest at UNDP and charges the agency with "obstruction"
of his policies at the ministry. Communication between
Stankovic and UNDP has been strained over the past three
weeks, and the controversy has, unfortunately, spilled into
the press. Our assessment of the situation is that while
Stankovic does not always exhibit the best behavior, some of
the points he makes on returns policy and the role of UNDP
are well-taken. We also believe that UNDP, which in turn has
not behaved well towards Stankovic, should adjust to new
realities on the ground in Kosovo and take on an advisory
rather than a management role in dealing with returns. We
are working to try to salvage the relationship between the
Ministry and UNDP, but the personalities involved make this
challenging. End Summary.

Slow Progress on Returns


2. (SBU) UNHCR official statistics show 215 returnees (49 of
them Serbs) to Kosovo as of May 2008. This is well behind
the pace of 2007, when 1799 people returned (including 277
Serbs) over the entire year. Most observers consider
Kosovo's independence on February 17 and the resulting
political tension as one cause of this drop. Other, more
long-standing factors continue to apply, such as overall
security concerns (some germane and some more perceptual),

decreased donor funding to supplement limited government
resources for returns, and lack of economic opportunity for
returnees once they have come back. While this year's slow
progress on returns was widely expected in the international
community, given the politically tumultuous situation, other
problems have emerged. The strained relationship between the
Kosovo Minister for Returns and the UN agencies in Kosovo
chiefly responsible for oversight and implementation - the UN
Development Program (UNDP) and UNCHR -- has further slowed
approval and implementation of returns programs.


3. (C) A dispute between Stankovic and the UN agencies has
been brewing for several months. Complaints of UNDP, UNHCR,
and certain UNMIK officials center around the Kosovo
government's adjustment of the pre-independence budgeting
policy at the MCR - a system in which UNDP had a considerable
amount of authority to direct policy and spending at the
Ministry. They have also complained to us privately that
Stankovic is "rude" to them, routinely declines to appear at
working group meetings with them, and generally resists their
attempts to advise him. UNDP sources, including Kosovo
mission head Frode Mauring, have alleged that Stankovic's
behavior is indicative of corruption, although they have not
provided any compelling evidence of this. For his part,
Stankovic has strongly denied allegations of corruption while
frequently complaining to us (most recently on July 1) about
UNDP's heavy-handed control of his ministry. The previous
budgeting system at the MCR required UNDP and UNHCR approval
of ministry spending. This meant that UNDP allocated funding
and, in many cases, implemented projects as well. Stankovic
and his advisors from the Kosovo Serb Independent Liberal
Party (SLS) have been consistently unhappy with the
UN-formulated rules and standards applying to return
projects, rules that only UNDP- or UNHCR-linked projects were
able to conform with, in most cases. Stankovic has termed
this a "conflict of interest," an assessment with which many
other observers agree. (Note: These rules on the MCR budget
were put in place after the first head of the MCR, Slavisa
Petkovic, was dismissed on corruption charges at the end of

PRISTINA 00000393 002.2 OF 004



2006. End Note.).


4. (C) Another complaint from UNDP has been about the
minister's lack of "qualification and experience" for the
job, which, in addition to concerns about corruption, in
their view, necessitates close supervision and involvement
from international agencies. UNDP has taken these views to
the press in the past, contributing to the deterioration of
their relationship with Stankovic. Stankovic maintains that
his lack of experience is not necessarily a problem; he says
that, as Kosovo Serbs, he and other SLS members are
better-placed to determine the best interests of their
community. He also alleges that as an "outsider" not
dependent on the UN system, he is better able to both reduce
the cost of MCR projects and avoid failed returns projects.
Stankovic often refers to expensive organized return projects
from recent years (in which entire villages returned en
masse) which have not met with lasting success, as the
returnees often failed to stay in their rebuilt homes. In
his estimation, UNDP overspends on returns projects and
should concentrate on (more sustainable) individual returns
instead. Other observers, including UNDP official Kim
Vetting, have told us and the ICO that UNDP operating costs
are often well above what is necessary. Vetting also
considers Stankovic to have "good ideas" about adjusting
policy direction on returns.


5. (C) Even before the issue hit the press (see para 6),
Stankovic had decided in mid-June to cut off communication
with UNDP and UNHCR. When asked by poloff July 1 whether
future communication with the UN agencies would be possible,
Stankovic replied that he would be open to it, "as long as
they understand their roles" (i.e., that he now controls his
own budget). UNDP and UNHCR have told us they are
particularly nervous about a large amount of funding (3.7
million Euro, or approx. USD 5.8 million) allocated by the
European Commission and UNDP for the Returns and
Reintegration to Kosovo program in 2008, which will be spent
through the MCR with its cooperation. Stankovic eventually
signed the necessary MOU releasing these funds for use on
July 7, although it is not clear he will agree to allow UNDP
a high degree of control over them. The UNDP-sponsored
"Spark PLUS" program also awaits Stankovic's approval; this
would provide 1.8 million Euro (USD 2.8 million) for
reconstruction of returnee homes. As of July 21, Stankovic
had not signed the Spark PLUS MOU.

Media Battles


6. (SBU) Further aggravating the situation, articles
appeared July 13 in the Serbia-based dailies Blic and Kurir
describing friction between Stankovic and the UN agencies.
Under the headline "Kosovo government preventing return of
the displaced," Blic quotes UNDP's Kim Vetting as saying that
many factors - fear of independence, lack of funds, and
"unpreparedness of those competent" for returns in the Kosovo
government (i.e., MCR officials) - were contributing to the
negligible number of Serbs returning to Kosovo in 2008. The
Kurir article focused on Stankovic, under the headline
"Thaci's Minister," a reference to the fact the Stankovic, a
Serb, serves in the Kosovo government of PM Hashim Thaci.
The minister openly discussed the fact that he had convinced
Thaci to change MCR budget procedures and eliminate UNDP's
role in controlling the budget, adding that UNDP had only
"obstructed" his work with numerous rules and guidelines that
the average returnee could not be expected to fulfill.
Despite reacting angrily to the appearance of the media
articles, Stankovic on July 16 accompanied UNDP and UNMIK to
an event in Klina, and appeared ready to repair the frayed
relationship.

7. (C) We asked Stankovic on July 14 what his plans were for
the Ministry, excluding funds linked to cooperation with the
UN agencies.
He told us that the MCR's 2008 budget was 7.1 million Euro
(USD 11.1 million). This, however, includes the 1.8 million
devoted to Spark PLUS. Stankovic said the MCR would be able
to support a total of 150 IDP families with the current

PRISTINA 00000393 003.2 OF 004


budget. During a lengthier conversation on July 1, Stankovic
described a 60-family returns project in the village of
Laplje Selo near Pristina, which will cost approximately 2
million Euro (USD 3.1 million). He also discussed a
20-family project in Novo Brdo and another 18-family effort
in Istog/Istok. Two million Euro of the MCR budget will be
spent on community-related projects (vice being spent
strictly on returnees). The MCR has received 330
applications for such projects from Kosovo municipalities and
has selected 65 for implementation.

Comment: New Approach Needed


8. (C) Despite his intentions, Minister Stankovic cannot
hope to manage the MCR without assistance from the UN
agencies, which possess the experience and technical
knowledge necessary to pursue a successful returns policy.
Improving on the disappointingly low number of Serb returns
to Kosovo since 1999 requires cooperation with the UN and
other international organizations. Although we have not seen
evidence of corruption in the Ministry, Stankovic's sudden
throwing off of international supervision is not reassuring
to a donor community that watched the first two heads of the
MCR - Slavisa Petkovic and Branislav Grbic - preside over an
openly corrupt and ineffective institution. The Embassy,
ICO, and others have urged Stankovic to use his ministerial
position to help convince skeptical Kosovo Serbs that he and
his SLS colleagues in the Kosovo government can help them.
However, he has thus far not done so in any significant way.
His decision to appear at the July 16 event in Klina with
UNDP is a welcome step towards repairing that relationship.
We will work to convince Stankovic to be more cooperative
with his international partners, for the sake of Kosovo Serbs
and for the benefit of his political party.


9. (C) The conduct of UNDP and other actors has also been
far from exemplary. In speaking with the ICO, Department
subject-matter experts in PRM, the NGO community, and others,
we consistently hear that UNDP took the wrong approach with
Stankovic from the start. There are few Kosovo Serbs who
could walk into the complicated maze of international
organizations, rules, and procedures surrounding returns in
Kosovo and be expected to quickly understand them, or be
truly effective without any significant control over the
budget. UNDP's current plight (the delay and possible hiatus
of the Spark PLUS program) is in part due to its early
high-handedness with Stankovic and its assumption that it
would continue to exercise control the MCR budget
indefinitely. In our conversations with UNDP Kosovo head
Frode Mauring, he has shown little inclination to adjust his
approach, which essentially involves directing a government
minister on how to spend his budget. UNDP's apparent
proclivity towards using the media also inflames a sensitive
(but vital) relationship it can ill-afford to lose. The UN
agencies should adjust to a changing environment in which
they no longer can play the lead role in the MCR. As donors,
we will encourage them to modify their approach.

10. (C) Finally, some re-thinking of returns in general might
benefit all stakeholders involved. Stankovic's point about
the poor track record of organized returns is well-taken; USG
assistance for Kosovo returns (through PRM) goes almost
exclusively to individual returns, precisely because they
have proven far more sustainable. Most observers we speak
with outside UNDP and UNHCR agree that a change in focus
might help make the limited funds available to help returns
go farther and have a greater impact. We have found
Stankovic to be knowledgeable about his ministry and project
proposals, indicating that he has the potential to work
fruitfully with international partners in reversing the
negative trend in Serb returns. We are in close touch with
both sides in this dispute and will continue to urge them to
work together to find a new middle ground that would allow
the returns process to move forward. We have also brought
additional important stakeholders into the discussion, such
as the ICO, OSCE, and other donor-country embassies, who
concur with our conclusions on this issue and who are now
working with us towards the same goal.

PRISTINA 00000393 004.2 OF 004


KAIDANOW