SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF KOSOVO PRESIDENT AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRISTINA 000360

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S, P, EUR (FRIED, DICARLO)
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO NSC (HELGERSON)
FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY FROM THE CHIEF OF MISSION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNMIK KV
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF KOSOVO PRESIDENT AND
PRIME MINISTER TO WASHINGTON JULY 18-21

Classified By: CDA TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Mr. President, Madame Secretary: It has been a
difficult but in many ways successful five months since
Kosovo declared its independence on February 17. Though we
spent much time planning for the possibility of large-scale
population flows after the declaration and took precautions
lest the independence move sparked outright conflict between
Kosovo and Serbia, none of this has taken place. Instead,
with our strong support and encouragement, Kosovo has
weathered a series of provocative and sometimes violent
actions taken by Serb hardliners, demonstrating through
patience and restraint that it is a responsible member of the
international community and an eager aspirant for eventual
inclusion in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Acknowledging
Kosovo's achievements, 43 of the most important countries in
Europe and elsewhere have recognized Kosovo, at a pace that
is thus far satisfactory in comparison with other countries
born under similar circumstances, but would undoubtedly
benefit from continued pressure on allies and friends in the
Middle East, Latin America and Asia.


2. (C) Kosovo's temperate line is in many ways due to the
leadership of President Sejdiu and Prime Minister Thaci, two
men of very different backgrounds and political sentiment who
have chosen to make common cause at a critical time for
Kosovo. The two formed a coalition government just prior to
independence, an arrangement that has held steady despite
historical animosities and lingering mistrust between their
two parties. This visit and your visible endorsement of
Kosovo's moderate approach will help fend off growing
domestic criticism -- from dissatisfied members of their own
governing coalition and from the vocal opposition -- that
Kosovo leaders have not been assertive enough in establishing
control over Kosovo's rebellious Serb-majority north or
fending off Serbian encroachments on Kosovo sovereignty.


3. (C) And those encroachments may well persist, even under
what we hope will be a new, pro-European government in
Belgrade. The outgoing Serbian government under Prime
Minister Kostunica has underwritten a policy of full ethnic
separation in Kosovo, physically intimidating local Serbs
into abandoning jobs in Kosovo's once multi-ethnic police
force and municipal administrations. Serbia held its own
illegal municipal elections in Kosovo despite warnings from
the UN that such a move violated UNSCR 1244 and has moved
rapidly to emplace parallel institutions in Serb-majority
areas throughout Kosovo. Serbia has also backed open
violence by the thuggish and criminalized Serb leadership in
Kosovo's north, which ordered the destruction of two northern
border gates and the subsequent March 17 attack on UN and
KFOR peacekeepers.


4. (C) It is unclear to what extent a Tadic-led democratic
government in Serbia will be able or even willing to walk
back some of these measures, but we and the Kosovo government
are prepared to engage in quiet diplomacy should the
opportunity present itself. Kosovo has held open those
positions in the police and public sector that were once
occupied by local Serbs in anticipation of any signal from
Belgrade to the Kosovo Serb community that they are free to
resume a more collaborative approach. You should impress
upon Sejdiu and Thaci the imperative to maintain outreach to
their minority communities and implement fully those
obligations they undertook to the Serb population under the
plan developed by UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari.


5. (C) Kosovo's challenges are not limited to the political
and security realm, of course. Sejdiu and Thaci are anxious
that the July 11 Donors' Conference, at which donors are
expected to pledge over a billion dollars worth of
assistance, demonstrate to their people that Kosovo's
restraint has measurable benefits. But the momentum of
Kosovo's economic development and its attractiveness to
international investors -- particularly in the energy field,
where Kosovo's huge lignite coal deposits can be transformed
over the next decade into a reliable domestic supply of
electricity as well as an export commodity -- will ultimately
depend not on the largesse of donors but on the government's
own intelligent pursuit of its economic objectives, something

you can stress in your discussions with them. They will also
need to avoid the serious pitfalls of cronyism, corruption
and political patronage in appointments to key public
institutions (including the heads of the new intelligence
agency and Kosovo Security Force ministry) and the boards of
major public companies, thereby raising the level of
accountability and transparency in government action.


6. (C) Mr. President, Madame Secretary, you will hardly find
a more grateful and pro-American set of interlocutors
anywhere in the world than these two men. Sejdiu and Thaci
will listen intently for your guidance and they will express
to you their belief that only the United States can provide
the kind of lasting leadership in Kosovo and the region that
is necessary for prolonged stability. Frankly, we agree.
While many in the EU and most notably the "Quint" countries
have been active and vigorous in pushing through Kosovo's
independence, the intensified problems we predict over the
next few months -- especially those surrounding Kosovo's
north, where Serb extremists could try to block the
deployment of EU police scheduled for this fall -- may easily
lead some queasy Europeans to back away from their
commitments and settle for a partition-like outcome that has
been adamantly opposed by Kosovars of all political
persuasions. The United Nations, as well, though agreeing to
"reconfigure" and downsize its presence here, has shown a
negative tendency to retain certain important authorities,
under severe pressure from the Russians in support of
Belgrade. If Kosovo is to succeed as a long-term proposition
-- and it most certainly can -- our sustained engagement is
necessary to bolster European resolve and take a firm line
with the UN on reducing its presence in Kosovo. These
meetings with you will help reinforce the sense that Kosovo
is moving forward and imbue Kosovo's leadership with a
renewed sense of confidence as they prepare to face the many
challenges ahead.
KAIDANOW