Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PRISTINA359
2008-07-09 11:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: INTER-ETHNIC INCIDENTS SPRING UP; ALL

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL KV UNMIK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHPS #0359/01 1911121
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091121Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8338
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1042
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1502
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUZEJAA/USNIC PRISTINA SR PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000359 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE
NSC FOR HELGERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: INTER-ETHNIC INCIDENTS SPRING UP; ALL
SIDES WAITING FOR SIGNS OF NEW BELGRADE GOVERNMENT APPROACH
TO KOSOVO

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b),
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000359

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE
NSC FOR HELGERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: INTER-ETHNIC INCIDENTS SPRING UP; ALL
SIDES WAITING FOR SIGNS OF NEW BELGRADE GOVERNMENT APPROACH
TO KOSOVO

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b),
(d).


1. (C) Summary. The formation of a pro-European government
coalition in Belgrade has already sparked hope among some in
the Kosovo Serb community that things may change for the
better. Moderates among the Kosovo Serbs plan to lobby
Serbian President Tadic to formulate a policy towards Kosovo
which would take better account of the needs of Kosovo Serbs,
which includes being allowed to engage with the International
Civilian Office (ICO). There are some initial signs that the
pressure previously brought to bear on Kosovo Serb moderates
may abate and they feel more empowered to act as they wish,
including more public contact with the international
community. Despite this, interethnic problems in Kosovo --
some sparked by the Serbs, others by Albanians -- remain a
challenge to stability, and the absence of UNMIK's
overarching executive power (coupled with Serbs' refusal to
acknowledge ICO as a legitimate interlocutor) makes it harder
to deal with these issues than in the past. In northern
Mitrovica, Serbs and Albanians have clashed over a water
project, while the construction of a mosque in a mixed
village in Kamenica has also caused controversy. The most
dangerous recent incident - the takeover of the municipal
building and government by Serb parallel structures in Strpce
- has not become violent, but does pose a challenge to the
Kosovo Government. End Summary.

New government, new hope


2. (C) After long weeks of negotiation, the formation of a
new, pro-European government in Belgrade and the appointment
of relative moderate Goran Bogdanovic (DS) to lead the Kosovo
Ministry has given some hope to moderate Serbs throughout
Kosovo that a more pragmatic and helpful policy will soon be
forthcoming from Belgrade. Bishop Teodosije Sibalic and
Father Sava Janjic of the Visoki Decani monastery, both of
whom are influential moderate figures among Kosovo Serbs,
told Charge July 7 that they hoped to see a more constructive

Kosovo policy from Serbian President Tadic. Their view --
shared by all but the most hardline Kosovo Serbs -- is that
the public anti-independence rhetoric Tadic is compelled to
use should be matched by a policy that provides maximum
possible benefit to Serbs actually living in Kosovo.
Teodosije said he will travel to Belgrade during the week of
July 7, where he hopes to speak directly to Tadic and
advocate a more pragmatic policy, in addition to warning of
the dangers that partition would pose to Kosovo Serbs south
of the Ibar river. (Note: In recent weeks, Kosovo Serbs from
the south have been reporting to us and others in the
international community that they still fear the Serbian
government will eventually propose partition of Kosovo.)
Another change Teodosije would like to see from Tadic is an
easing of restrictions on contact with the ICO, though he
acknowledges that walking back earlier pronouncements from
Tadic on the illegitimacy of EU-led institutions in Kosovo
will be difficult.

Other small encouraging signs


2. (C) There are other noticeable, if small, signs that
moderates are feeling more empowered in the new political
environment. In the past few weeks, moderate leader Rada
Trajkovic from Gracanica has visited the ICO building in
Pristina (though without publicity or fanfare) after
insisting on lower-profile contacts before the May 11
elections; similarly, Randjel Nojkic (a moderate leader in
Gracanica and member of Vuk Draskovic's SPO party) was also
willing to increase the profile of his contacts with ICO.
Nojkic appeared with ICO officers at a media event July 8 in
the Serb village of Caglavica to discuss decentralization.
Even more boldly, Gracanica's regional CCK coordinator, Goran
Arsic, prevented the parallel Serb authority elected on May
11 from taking control of the municipal building. These
steps are tentative but important, and are an indication that
-- if given enough breathing room from Belgrade -- moderate

PRISTINA 00000359 002 OF 003


Kosovo Serb leaders may begin to engage more actively with
the international community and the Kosovo Government.

But not all is well....


3. (C) Despite the welcome changes that may be blossoming in
enclave Serb communities, problems have sprung up, some
provoked by Serb action and some engendered by local Albanian
intransigence. Perhaps the most troubling issue has emerged
in the Serb-majority municipality of Strpce, where on July 2,
Mayor Stanko Jakovljevic, a member of Serbian President Boris
Tadic's Democratic Party (DS),was pressured to hand over the
keys of the municipal building to the parallel government
elected in May 11 illegal elections. The parallel "mayor,"
Zvonko Mihailjovic, is a member of the Serbian Radical Party
(SRS),the most popular Serbian party in Kosovo among Kosovo
Serbs. The move has enraged local Albanians and has
attracted the attention of Kosovo's opposition parties and
others, who view this as a dangerous encroachment on Kosovo's
sovereignty.


4. (C) Initial reaction from Kosovo Serb leaders, including
Goran Bogdanovic and his probable deputy in the Kosovo
Ministry, Oliver Ivanovic (a moderate G-17 member from north
Mitrovica),was disappointing. Bogdanovic told us bluntly
that he advised Jakovljevic to hand the keys over to prevent
a fight among Strpce's Serbs. Ivanovic advocated increased
engagement by UNMIK to mediate the problem, which he said
must include UNMIK recognition of the May 11 elections.
Neither seemed inclined to use their new positions to deal
with the matter in a constructive way, although both
acknowledged that they would be faced with such thorny issues
when they assumed their full responsibilities.


5. (C) For the time being, the situation in Stprce is calm,
and the new "mayor" has not removed or threatened Albanian
municipal workers. Serb KPS officers in Strpce have remained
on the job since independence, and on July 3 they confirmed
to USKFOR that they would continue to do so. Mihailjovic met
a USKFOR team on July 2, asserting that he was the new leader
of the municipality, something the team told him was
unacceptable. The Embassy and KFOR have also been in close
contact with Stprce's Albanian minority, urging restraint.
On July 3, Embassy and ICO officers worked with the
government to produce an order signed by PM Thaci extending
the UNMIK Executive Decisions (EDs) prolonging the terms of
the mayors of Strpce, Zubin Potok, Zvecan, and Leposavic,
which were issued in the wake of the Serb boycott of the Nov.
17, 2007 Kosovo elections. The order is designed to provide
an official Kosovo government position reaffirming its
authority and reminding the parallel governments in
Serb-majority areas that they cannot turn to UNMIK or any
other actor to legitimize their position.

Mitrovica still a potential flashpoint


6. (C) In the ethnically-mixed northern Mitrovica
neighborhoods of Three Towers and Suvi Do/Suhadoll, clashes
between Serbs and Albanians took place on July 4, with
further violence occurring on July 7. The Three Towers
incident involved Serb youths throwing stones at an Albanian
taxi, while the Suvi Do/Suhadoll incident started when local
Serbs protested the construction of a water project through a
Serb neighborhood to service an Albanian area. According to
UNMIK Police, KFOR, and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS),the
clashes involved rock throwing and fistfights, along with
reports of gunfire. The July 4 incident in Suvi Do/Suhadoll
resulted in a few people sustaining light injuries (including
a Serb KPS officer),but the July 7 incident at the same
location led to one Serb suffering serious injury. UNMIK and
KFOR continue to monitor the situation closely to prevent
further outbreaks of violence. Again, heavy doses of
pressure from the Embassy has kept the violence from
spreading or being used for political purposes by Kosovo's
opposition.


PRISTINA 00000359 003 OF 003


Albanians intransigent in Kamenica


7. (C) Another issue has sprung up in the ethnically-mixed
village of Berivojce, in the northeastern municipality of
Kamenica. Plans to construct a mosque in the village were
adopted in October 2007 by the previous municipal assembly at
the urging of the former mayor, who ignored a recommendation
by the legally-mandated "municipal communities council" that
the village's Serb community be consulted before final
approval of the proposed site. The site is currently used by
the village's Serbs as a playground and gathering spot on
holidays. Once donors were found to fund construction of the
mosque, work began on June 26. Clashes broke out between
Serbs, who had blocked the road adjacent to the mosque in
protest, and Albanians, who had gathered for the
groundbreaking ceremony. Similar to the incidents in
Mitrovica, the clashes involved fistfights and stone throwing.


8. (C) On June 30, Poloff, accompanied by an ICO policy
officer, visited Kamenica mayor Bagzad Sinani (an Albanian)
and deputy mayor Gradimir Mikic (a Serb) to discuss the issue
and urge a delay in construction until a compromise solution
could be reached. Both agreed, and subsequently generated
proposals for a new site, but direct discussions have yet to
begin. On the morning of July 8, after telling the Embassy
(and Mikic) the previous day that he was still committed to
dialogue, the mayor abruptly called us and announced
construction would resume. He compared the controversy over
the mosque with the ongoing problems in Suvi Do/Suhadoll as
examples of Serb misbehavior in Kosovo. At COM's request, PM
Thaci, leader of the ruling PDK party (of which Sinani is a
member) called Sinani, telling him to delay construction
until all parties could agree on the location. Embassy and
ICO plan to follow up with mediation and continued discussion
between Albanian and Serb interlocutors.

Comment


9. (C) It is perhaps not surprising that the months after
independence has seen an uptick in the number of inter-ethnic
conflicts, as some of the focused restraint demonstrated by
ethnic Albanians around the independence period is now giving
way to frustration in the wake of Serb hardline provocations.
The imperative to control these conflicts and prevent any
escalation is not lost on Kosovo leaders; they recognize that
any perception of Albanian action against the Serb minority
would cost them dearly in the international arena and breach
their Ahtisaari obligations. Still, in the aftermath of the
illicit Serb elections on May 11 and continued provocative
behavior from Serb hardliners like the takeover of the
municipal building in Strpce, we will find it difficult to
suppress Albanian anger and frustration unless some concrete
signs of a modified approach emerge from Belgrade soon. Even
small actions taken by the new government in Belgrade -- for
example tacitly encouraging or simply not preventing Kosovo
Serbs from going back to their jobs in the Kosovo Police
force or municipal administrations -- would help ease Kosovar
fears of continued erosion of their sovereignty. The next
few weeks and months will tell if these changes are in the
offing or not; we will continue to engage with all sides to
encourage moderation, restraint and creative solutions to
lingering problems. End comment.
KAIDANOW