Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PRISTINA348
2008-07-05 11:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: HANDOVER PLANNING FOR THE POLICE MISSION

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL EAID KV UNMIK 
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O 051112Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8321
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1037
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1497
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUZEJAA/USNIC PRISTINA SR PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000348 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR INL, EUR/SCE, S/CRS, EUR/ACE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL EAID KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: HANDOVER PLANNING FOR THE POLICE MISSION
PROGRESSING, BUT THE NORTH REMAINS A CONCERN

PRISTINA 00000348 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Chief of Mission Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b),(
d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000348

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR INL, EUR/SCE, S/CRS, EUR/ACE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL EAID KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: HANDOVER PLANNING FOR THE POLICE MISSION
PROGRESSING, BUT THE NORTH REMAINS A CONCERN

PRISTINA 00000348 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Chief of Mission Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b),(
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: CDA met with European Union Planning Team
(EUPT) Head Roy Reeve on June 27 to discuss the evolution of
plans for UNMIK's handover to the EU Rule of Law Mission
(EULEX). Reeve noted that the UN's instruction cable of June
24 to UNMIK enabled handover planning to move forward. He
said UNMIK and EULEX officials held an initial strategic
planning meeting a day later and are close to signing a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the transfer of assets
and equipment. Reeve shared the EU's projected handover date
of October 15, 2008, and the latest numbers for its mission.


2. (C) SUMMARY (cont'd): Reeve maintained that the EU is
actively planning for deployment in northern Kosovo, albeit
as unobtrusively as possible prior to its assumption of
executive authority, and he noted that at least a handful of
EU officers in plainclothes were already shadowing their
UNMIK counterparts in the north. He acknowledged, however,
that it will be a challenge for the EU to deploy fully in the
north, given continuing Kosovo Serb and Belgrade resistance
to the mission. Reeve and the Charge also discussed UNMIK's
assertion that notwithstanding the order to "reconfigure,"
the UN planned to retain unspecified executive authorities,
possibly on the assumption that EULEX would fail to deploy
and that UNMIK would continue to play a law enforcement role
in the north and in Serb-majority areas beyond the projected
October handover date. CDA urged that EULEX deploy
Kosovo-wide as quickly and efficiently as possible,
cautioning that Kosovars would view a failure of EULEX to
deploy in the north as the road to partition, putting at risk
the overall success of the EULEX mission. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) CDA met with European Union Planning Team (EUPT) Head
Roy Reeve on June 27 to discuss plans for UNMIK's handover to
the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). Reeve noted that the

UN's June 24 instruction cable to UNMIK enabled UNMIK
officials to go forward with handover planning and that
cooperation had been good so far. Reeve also mentioned that
EULEX Head Yves de Kermabon, new SRSG Lamberto Zannier, and
other key UNMIK and EULEX officials held an initial strategic
planning meeting on June 25, and plan to hold another soon.
According to Reeve, planning for the transfer of assets and
operational aspects is proceeding and EULEX and UNMIK are
likely to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on these
matters soon.

General EULEX Plans


4. (C) Reeve said the EU hopes to be fully operational and
assume executive authority on or about October 15, 2008. The
mission currently plans to have about 1,800 internationals
throughout Kosovo; roughly 1,400 will be police and 400 will
be customs, administrative and justice employees. Reeve also
noted that the EU is likely to authorize an additional
short-term contingency force of 350 international police
officers (IPOs) this week (see para six below). (Note: By
comparison, UNMIK maintains a force of roughly 2,035 police
officers throughout Kosovo, though many of these have moved
to exclusively monitoring and mentoring roles.) Reeve said
368 European UNMIK officers will transfer to EULEX upon the
official date of the handover.

EULEX in northern Kosovo


5. (C) Reeve maintained that EULEX is actively planning for
full deployment in the north, but will gradually build up its
presence as unobtrusively as possible, thus not carrying
weapons or wearing uniforms until EULEX becomes fully
operational and assumes executive authority. He noted that a
handful of EU police officers were already in the north
shadowing their UNMIK counterparts, with thus far good
cooperation from the UN. Reeve also told the CDA that EULEX
planned to utilize the former UN Pillar IV building in
Mitrovica north, which would become vacant upon closure of
Pillar IV by the EU in early July. (Note: This building is

PRISTINA 00000348 002.2 OF 003


in the courthouse complex, which KFOR has been guarding since
March 17, when northern Serb hardliners violently attacked
UNMIK and KFOR troops. Charge urged Reeve to ensure that any
occupancy of this building be fully coordinated with KFOR,
and he agreed. End Note.)


6. (C) EULEX planning calls for 54 EULEX IPOs in the north,
not counting border police and integrated police units
(IPUs),which are primarily responsible for crowd and riot
control (CRC). This is smaller than UNMIK's current force of
roughly 170 regular police officers, i.e., 37 IPOs and 133
enhancement force officers (taken on a rotational basis from
elsewhere in Kosovo) who may operate in Mitrovica north or
south depending on the UNMIK Police regional commanders'
needs. (Note: Prior to the pre-independence surge in IPOs
in northern Kosovo, UNMIK had only six IPOs in Mitrovica
North Station and two each in Zvecan, Zubin Potok and
Leposavic stations.) In addition to the 54 IPOs, Reeve said
EULEX plans to have two IPUs of roughly 110 to 112 officers
each on Gates 1 and 31 (on Kosovo's northern border with
Serbia) to replace the UNMIK Police IPUs currently stationed
there. EULEX also plans to have two IPUs of the same size
based out of Pristina which can be deployed in the north or
elsewhere, as needed. Reeve also informed us that the EU's
PSC was expected to authorize a short-term additional force
of 350 IPOs, which could be used to further bolster the
contingent in the north if necessary. However, he
acknowledged that it would be difficult for the EU to recruit
and deploy the additional officers by October 15 and that
there was the possibility of member states placing caveats on
their use.


7. (C) Reeve and the Charge discussed UNMIK's approach and
its apparent orders from New York, despite the instruction to
"reconfigure" and downsize its presence in Kosovo, to retain
certain executive authorities of an unspecified nature,
likely on the assumption that EULEX will be unable to deploy
effectively in the north and thus de facto responsibility for
law enforcement and justice might remain entirely with UNMIK.
UNMIK post-transition plans for its own police (a draft copy
obtained confidentially and provided to EUR/SCE) call for the
retention of 150 officers in the north and 20 in the south,
positing an arrangement in which the UN continues to exercise
law enforcement authority north of the Ibar. CDA noted that
Kosovars would view a failure of EULEX to deploy fully in the
north as tantamount to partition, putting at risk the overall
success of the EULEX mission and Kosovo's willingness to
maintain such an arrangement. She urged Reeve to ensure that
plans for deployment to the north were kept on track and that
operational plans were sufficiently robust to ensure success
from the outset.


8. (C) Comment: We are pleased to see that discussions
appear to be proceeding between UNMIK and EULEX on the
handover of assets and the details of deployment between now
and the time that the EU assumes full executive authority for
law enforcement and justice, hopefully no later than October.
Kosovars will be watching carefully to see that the EU meets
its commitments, most particularly with regard to deployment
in the north.


9. (C) Comment, cont. We see two things that concern us,
however: one, UNMIK actions under instructions from DPKO to
retain certain unspecified authorities and review/reassess
plans crafted under the previous Ruecker/Rossin leadership
which brought the UN presence in Kosovo down to negligible
numbers in support of severely limited residual
responsibilities; and two, the possibility that some nervous
Europeans will back away from their commitment to deploy
throughout Kosovo should the obstacles and particularly the
signals from Serb hardliners and Belgrade prove too ominous.
Failing to meet the EU's commitment in Kosovo would spark
anxiety and tension among ethnic Albanians as the first step
in a partition scenario. Strong coordination between
NATO/KFOR and EU/EULEX, as well as cooperation from the UN,
would help to plan for a robust response should the Serbs
prove initially recalcitrant; continued stability in Kosovo

PRISTINA 00000348 003.3 OF 003


-- of interest and concern to all relevant security actors --
will rest on the visible deployment of EU in the north,
supported by KFOR. End comment.
KAIDANOW