KOSOVO: SERBS CONTINUE TO LEAVE KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000276

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SERBS CONTINUE TO LEAVE KOSOVO
INSTITUTIONS ON INSTRUCTION FROM BELGRADE

Classified By: Chief of Mission Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b),(
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. As the political parties in Belgrade
continue to maneuver to form the next government, Serbian
Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic is still pursuing the
twin goals of strengthening parallel institutions and
compelling Serbs to leave Kosovo institutions. Regarding the
first goal, on May 26, he announced that the May 11 parallel
elections would yield local assemblies that would be
constituted in the near future. He continues to meet with
success on the second goal, as well; Serb municipal employees
in Strpce, along with prison guards in Lipljan, recently
resigned from their positions in the Kosovo system. The
experience of a Kosovo Serb judge compelled to resign from
her job in the Kosovo justice system provides a detailed
illustration of how such hardline pressure works. While some
moderate Serbs have voiced displeasure at Samardzic's
policies, others admit that until or unless forces gathered
around the Democratic Party (DS) form a government in
Belgrade, they will have to remain silent to avoid being
outflanked by hardline forces on the Kosovo issue. We will
continue to ensure that the Kosovo government does not play
into Samardzic's hands by, for example, firing outright the
many Serbs in the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) who abandoned
their jobs at Belgrade's behest. END SUMMARY.

Samardzic pursues strategy of separation


2. (C) As the process of government formation in Belgrade
continues,
Serbian Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic continues to
pursue a policy of strengthening parallel structures and
compelling Serbs to leave Kosovo institutions. On May 26,
Belgrade radio B92 and Tanjug reported Samardzic as saying
that "local assemblies in Kosovo will be constituted within
the legal limit of 15 days after publication of official
election results." The minister also claimed that the
Serbian electoral commission had already issued instructions
for the formation of (parallel) local governments. His words
were echoed by northern hardline leader Marko Jaksic. On May
28, Samardzic also announced that he had spoken with
representatives of the Kosovo Serb police officers who
abandoned their jobs (at his "order") after independence in
February. He said that a "systematic solution" for their
problems would be found "sometime in the beginning of June,"
which would involve putting them on the Serbian Ministry of
Interior Affairs (MUP) payroll.

3. (C) Despite previously-reported problems in following up
promises of aid with concrete results, Samardzic and the
Ministry continue to be successful at compelling Kosovo Serbs
to separate themselves from Kosovo institutions. On May 23,
40 municipal Serb workers in Strpce, led by CEO Radica Grbic,
formally resigned from their jobs. Grbic -- known to us as a
moderate -- told us May 26 that they would only continue
working "under international control." On May 25, the same
day that Samardzic made his latest visit to Kosovo, a group
of 60 Serb guards at the Lipljan prison handed in their
resignations, as well. The leader of the group, Boban
Petrovic, told Radio KiM that the Serbian government had
promised the group it would fund their salaries from the
Serbian budget. (Note: Petrovic previously led the group on
a multi-week set of demonstrations in Gracanica, protesting
that the prison guards quit their jobs at the insistence of
Samardzic but had not been paid.)

One Serb judge's story of intimidation


4. (C) As an illustration of the pressure Serbs in Kosovo
institutions have come under to comply with Samardzic's
policy, we recently received an inside view of how a Kosovo
Serb judge was forced to leave her job in the Kosovo judicial
system. Judge Jelena Krivokapic from Mitrovica, who has
worked closely with USAID over the past several years,
described to us how, soon after Kosovo's independence on
February 17, she was approached by Branka Semenov, a Serb
judge in the parallel court system operating in northern

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Kosovo. Semenov implicitly threatened Krivokapic's safety
and that of her child if she continued to work in the Kosovo
judicial system. According to Krivokapic, Semenov was the
official who ordered former employees of the (Serbian) court
system to protest in front of the courthouse in northern
Mitrovica.


5. (C) Krivokapic sought assistance from the Serbian Ministry
of Justice, controlled by the DS party; she was told she did
not have to abandon her job, but she did not draw any comfort
from this because the ministry could not protect her from
Semenov's threats. Eventually, Semenov came to her and
insisted that she formally resign from her job in the Kosovo
system via a letter to SRSG Ruecker, in addition to closing
the bank account by which she received her salary from the
Kosovo Ministry of Justice. Krivokapic did so, but then
secretly opened another account so she could continue to
receive her Kosovo salary. Her letter to the SRSG noted that
she could not continue to work under current circumstances,
but did not articulate a formal resignation. By our informal
count, of 13 Serb judges and 2 prosecutors appointed by the
SRSG to work in the UNMIK/Kosovo system, none currently
remain on the job, although only one has submitted a formal
letter of resignation. USAID has learned that 6 of the
judges have been transferred to the Serb parallel court
system in the north without being asked.


6. (C) Some Serbs from the Democratic Party (DS) continue to
insist that Samardzic cannot back his words with action, but
they acknowledge that he is pursuing his objectives with
greater focus and clarity than the central DS party
hierarchy. The Ministry for Kosovo's Coordinator for the
Pristina region (central Kosovo),Goran Arsic (a DS member),
told us May 28 that Samardzic, during his recent visit,
largely ignored DS complaints that the Ministry should
refrain from forming local governments in Kosovo and wait
until a new government is formed in Belgrade. Arsic also
reported that the Government of Serbia issued a decision on
April 17 assigning former Serb employees of Kosovo
institutions to various Serbian government ministries, which
would then be responsible for paying their salaries. To
date, however, only the Serbian Ministry of Justice,
responsible for prisons, has fulfilled its obligations under
this decision, paying the Lipljan prison guards.

DS and other moderate Serbs sidelined for the time being


7. (C) Dragan Mikic, deputy mayor of Kamenica municipality,
who has remained in the legal municipal government, told us
May 29 that, in his opinion, Samardzic is simply "doing all
he can until his time runs out."
Mikic, a member of former Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk
Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) party, said that
Draskovic has continually given him support for his decision
to stay in Kosovo institutions. Mikic claimed that the
promises of Belgrade-based officials in the Ministry for
Kosovo are not taken seriously by Serbs in the enclaves, who
are well aware that any parallel municipal governments will
not be able to function properly or provide for them.


8. (C) While figures such as Arsic and Mikic have been vocal
in their criticism of Samardzic, others in the DS coalition
have admitted that until (or unless) their party forms the
next Serbian government, they will have to refrain from
appearing "soft" on Kosovo, and from overt cooperation with
the international community. Vesna Jovanovic, a member of
the G17 Plus party who ran successfully in the local
elections in Gnjilane/Gjilan municipality, told us May 28
that she had to delay a decision to meet with ICR Peter Feith
after being "politely asked" by influential local Serbs not
to do so. "We don't know what the Radical party and (Serbian
Prime Minister Kostunica's) DSS will use against us in this
post-election period," Jovanovic concluded.

Comment


9. (C) Samardzic's strategy has - in some respects - been

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successful. The vast majority of Serbs in Kosovo
institutions have left their jobs and not returned, and we
now see an increasing number of formal resignations, closing
off the possibility of an eventual rapprochement. One
outcome of this strategy has been the increase of tension in
the enclaves, where, in the absence of Serb policemen,
routine interactions between Serbs and Albanian policemen
have the potential to become violent. We are engaging with
UN CIVPOL and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) to ensure that
extra care is taken in these sensitive cases. We have also
encouraged the efforts of the KPS and the Kosovo Ministry of
Justice to bring back some Serbs to the force.
Notwithstanding some confusion on May 29 about the suspension
of Serb KPS officers, we have been reassured by UNMIK, the
KPS, and the Ministry of the Interior that all decisions will
be vetted with us and, most critically, that the door will be
left open for Serbs to return to the force. The relevant
actors in Pristina understand that firing Serb KPS officers
merely plays into Samardzic's hands and invites the
introduction of the MUP in Serb-majority areas, especially in
the north.


10. (C) (comment, cont'd). It is not surprising that Kosovo
Serb moderates in the DS are privately professing a softer
approach but keeping a low profile in public. Their
opponents in the DSS are very influential in Kosovo Serb
politics, especially in the Serb-majority north, and will
continue to use every bit of leverage they can find to
maintain control over affairs here for as long as they can.
While we (and the moderates) hope for a new approach to
Kosovo from a DS-led government in Belgrade, the current
maneuvering by the Ministry for Kosovo may leave structures
and commitments in place that the incoming Serbian government
will not easily be able to change. END COMMENT.
KAIDANOW