KOSOVO: SOUTHERN MODERATES FIND VOICE AS BELGRADE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 00200

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SOUTHERN MODERATES FIND VOICE AS BELGRADE
POLITICAL DIVISIONS SHARPEN

Classified By: Chief of Mission Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b),(
d).


1. (C) Summary. Political differences in Belgrade between
Serbian President Boris Tadic's Democratic Serbia (DS) and
Prime Minster Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)
are beginning to have an effect upon Kosovo Serbs in the
enclaves south of the Ibar River. Many are beginning to
voice discontent with the Serbian government's conduct of its
policy towards Kosovo. Increasingly, their complaints are
coalescing around Serbian Minister for Kosovo Slobodan
Samardzic, who got a rough reception in the south during his
March 30-31 visit to Kosovo. Moderate Kosovo Serb leaders
have expressed some unhappiness with plans for local
elections and their probable manipulation by the DSS,
although they acknowledge them as an inevitability. Serbian
Economy Minister and G17 party leader Mladjan Dinkic visited
Kosovo April 16, in an effort to convince local Serbs that
there was little alternative to cooperation with the
international community (and that those in Belgrade promising
them aid may not be telling the truth). In the final
analysis, both we and our moderate Serb contacts consider the
results of the Serbian parliamentary elections as the
decisive factor in determining the future course of the
Kosovo Serb community in the south. End Summary.

A Bit of Space


2. (C) A wide range of moderate Kosovo Serb contacts with
whom we have spoken in recent weeks have pointed to
publicly-aired differences between the DS and DSS over Kosovo
policy. Since it is clear to them that the Serbian
government's "action plan" for Kosovo was not endorsed by the
DS party or the entire government, Serbs in the south of
Kosovo have become more open with their discontent, with some
who were instructed by Belgrade to leave their jobs in Kosovo
institutions protesting over the lack of corresponding help
from the Serbian government. The focal point for their
complaints is Serbian Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic,
whose recently-announced plan calling for "functional
separation" of Kosovo's Serb- and Albanian-majority areas has
come under heavy fire from the southern Serbs. Expressing a
view held by all moderates we speak with, on March 28,
Bogoljub Milosevic, a former Kosovo MP from Kamenica, called
the plan an "apartheid system."

No Help from Belgrade


3. (C) Another common complaint has been lack of financial
support from Serbia. Samardzic's most recent visit to Kosovo
(March 30-31) became rocky when he traveled in the south.
Zoran Krcmarevic, a member of the DS party who serves in the
Serbian Ministry for Kosovo's Coordination Center for Kosovo
(CCK) in Viti/Vitina municipality, gave us a readout of
Samardzic's meeting in Laplje Selo March 31, at which former
Kosovo MP Randjel Nojkic, a member of the Serbian Renewal
Movement (SPO) party, and Dragan Velic, a senior board member
of the Serb National Council (SNC) Gracanica, both accused
Samardzic of "deceiving people with false promises."


4. (C) A group of Serb KPS officers, suspended from their
jobs since February 29, told us April 3 that they had no
faith in the still-unkept promises of Slobodan Samardzic to
provide them with salaries from Serbia. They claim that
suspended Serb KPS officers are continuing to maintain order
in their communities. In spite of this, security conditions
in Gracanica and other enclaves were "getting worse," due in
part to discontent among local Serbs with the Serbian
government and in part to a shortage of KPS officers.


5. (C) In a separate development, 87 Serb guards from the
Dubrava prison (Lipljan),who heeded Samardzic's call to
leave their jobs on February 17, began a "blockade" protest
of the Gracanica CCK office on April 1, demanding salaries
and/or compensation from Serbia to replace the income lost
when they left Kosovo institutions (see Pristina Bullets from
April 2). The protesters have been joined by other Serbs who

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also quit Kosovo government jobs. According to Boban
Petrovic, who is leading this protest, CCK Regional
Coordinator for Pristina (and DS member) Goran Arsic met with
the group and told them that Samardzic is indeed to blame for
their predicament, despite the fact that Arsic himself is
employed by the very ministry Samardzic heads. On April 5,
Petrovic said that the protesters would soon bring their
families to join them in protest and might organize transport
for the entire group to go to Belgrade and block government
offices there.


6. (C) Also on April 1, a group of youths in the Serb enclave
of Gorazdevac (Peja/Pec municipality) protested in front of
the CCK office there, demanding both employment opportunities
from the Serbian government and to see the list of Serbs in
the Pec region receiving the "Kosovo addition" to their
salaries. Radio KiM, a local Serb outlet, reported that the
group demanded the list because of their suspicion that many
on it do not actually live in Kosovo but receive the money
anyway because of political connections with the DSS party.
Pec regional CCK coordinator Radojko Dunic (DSS) reportedly
told the group that the list was in Belgrade and could not be
publicly revealed. (Note: Dunic was the author of the
"blacklist" of the 17 Serbs who voted in the November 2007
Kosovo elections, and the alleged organizer of the December 8
protest/scuffle in Gorazdevac when SRSG Ruecker and COMKFOR
visited the enclave. End Note.)

CCK Moderates Also Unhappy with Samardzic


7. (C) CCK officials from the DS and its ally, Serbian
Economy Minister Mladjan Dinkic's G17 party, have their own
complaints about Samardzic's management of the CCK itself.
On March 31, Belgrade radio station B92 reported that Goran
Bogdanovic, a member of the Serbian Parliament and senior DS
figure in Kosovo, accused Samardzic of leading a "one party
policy" within the CCK which only favors his fellow DSS party
members and bypasses CCK officials from other parties. This
is a very common complaint from non-DSS CCK coordinators from
the DS and G17, who have been complaining to us privately
about this for months. In opening a conversation on April 7,
Srboljub Djokic, CCK coordinator for Kamenica (G17) joked
that "you (poloff) obviously already know how bad our
relations are with our own ministry."

Moderates Unhappy with Local Elections


8. (C) Although acknowledging that they will occur, many
officials within the CCK are generally unhappy with the
prospect of local elections in Kosovo. Goran Arsic, Predrag
Stojkovic (CCK Municipal Coordinator for Gnjilane/Gjilan/DS),
Srboljub Djokic (CCK Municipal Coordinator for Kamenica/G17),
and others all said on April 7 that they have heard
little-to-nothing from the Ministry for Kosovo or the Serbian
elections commission (RIK) about the details of organizing
local elections, which leaves them worried that the DSS will
manipulate the voting to its own ends. Goran Bogdanovic, a
Kosovo Serb who is a DS member of the Serbian Parliament and
a senior party figure in Kosovo, said April 9 that the
combination of outdated voter lists and IDP voting would
allow the DSS to mobilize support among displaced Kosovo
Serbs living in Serbia to vote in "municipal" elections in
municipalities where a) they do not live, and/or b) to which
they will not return. This would only "worsen" the plight of
Serbs in enclaves by leading to more confusion.


9. (C) Outside the CCK, other Kosovo Serb moderates are in
general agreement on the need for alternative political
options for Kosovo Serbs. However, they also think that such
options will not be found through the May 11 local elections.
Dragomir Mikic, a member of former Serbian Foreign Minister
Vuk Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) party and the
appointed Serb Deputy Mayor of Kamenica municipality, told us
March 28 that while the DS/G17/SPO coalition might do well in
the May 11 Serbian parliamentary elections, the corresponding
local elections were a concern for moderates, as the DSS has
a better infrastructure in Kosovo (his opinion is widely


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