ADVISOR SHAIK SAYS ZUMA NOT SUPPORTED BY PARTY;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 000527

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/S

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SF
SUBJECT: ADVISOR SHAIK SAYS ZUMA NOT SUPPORTED BY PARTY;
WILL DRAG OUT TRIAL

REF: A. PRETORIA 330 AND PREVIOUS


B. 07 PRETORIA 3917

C. 07 PRETORIA 4218

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Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Bost. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Recently-elected ANC President Jacob Zuma is
not receiving support from the party, according to informal
Zuma advisor Moe Shaik. Mbeki "cleared out" the ANC
headquarters, leaving the "exhausted" Zuma with little
support staff. The top six ANC leaders are not working "in
harmony," Shaik claimed. On Zuma's impending corruption
trial, his legal team will fight every procedural issue, as
well as make a broader constitutional claim that Zuma cannot
receive a fair trial due to the State's biased handling of
the case. While Zuma is off to a rocky start as ANC
president, he is the ultimate survivor. It would be a
mistake to underestimate his ability to weather the political
(and legal) storms ahead. END SUMMARY.

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Zuma Exhausted; Not Supported
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2. (C) Moe Shaik, informal Zuma advisor, former diplomat, and
brother of convicted fraudster Schabir Shaik, told PolOffs 08
March that African National Congress (ANC) President Jacob
Zuma is "running himself ragged," with little support from
the party. Shaik, who described himself as a "Jacob Zuma
acolyte who loves (Zuma) despite his faults," visited the
exhausted Zuma at his house the previous night. Shaik
recounted how Zuma was meeting with a long string of
visitors, each with requests and demands. No one screened
the visitors or protected Zuma's private time.


3. (C) Shaik complained that former ANC President Thabo Mbeki
"cleaned out" Luthuli House (the ANC headquarters) after
losing at the ANC conference in Polokwane in December. In
the office of the ANC President, Zuma sits with only two
secretaries, and no support structure. Shaik believes Mbeki

SIPDIS
is setting Zuma up for failure, describing Mbeki as
"vengeful."


4. (C) The top six ANC office bearers -- Zuma, Deputy
President Motlanthe, Chairman Mbete, Secretary-General
Mantashe, Deputy Secretary-General Modise, and Treasurer
Phosa -- are not "working in harmony," Shaik said. Despite
the fact that the six were elected on the "Zuma ticket," they
do not know each other well. Shaik noted that the ANC
leadership is not as focused on helping Jacob Zuma as Shaik
would hope. (COMMENT: It is possible that some of the top
six, such as Motlanthe and Phosa, are secretly hoping Zuma
will fail to enhance their own chances at the national
presidency. END COMMENT.)

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Court Case Strategy: Delay, Delay
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5. (C) According to Shaik, the Zuma camp has two strategies
for fighting his impending corruption trial (ref A),and
neither one involves proving Zuma's innocence. First, Zuma's
legal team is trying to stop the case on procedural grounds.
The Constitutional Court heard Zuma's arguments 11 and 12
March in a last-ditch attempt to challenge the validity of
search and seizure warrants in the Zuma case. The ANC
President's legal team argued that the warrants were overly
broad, and therefore violated Zuma's constitutional right to
privacy. Zuma is also challenging the South African request
to Mauritius to send evidence implicating Zuma in the
corruption scandal. Should the Constitutional Court reverse
the Supreme Court of Appeal's November rejection of these
Qthe Supreme Court of Appeal's November rejection of these
arguments (ref B),the State's ability to introduce key
evidence against Zuma would be undermined.


6. (C) Second, Zuma will make a broader constitutional
argument that his right to a fair trial has already been
violated since he was not tried with Schabir Shaik. The
legal team's argument will be that the State has stretched
out the case for years, and Zuma has already been "tried" in
the court of public opinion, making a fair trial impossible.


7. (C) Zuma may try to convince Mbeki, through the ANC, to
delay the 2009 elections to give Zuma more time to conclude
his case, Shaik suggested. (NOTE AND COMMENT: Under Article
49 of the South African Constitution, an election must be

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held within 90 days of the date the five-year term of the
National Assembly expires. The National Assembly was last
elected on April 14, 2004, so the election must be held no
later than July 14, 2009. The President proclaims the date
for the election. At this point, we consider it unlikely
that Mbeki would delay the election to help his rival Zuma.
END NOTE AND COMMENT.)

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Looking Forward
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8. (C) Turning to Zuma's plans if he becomes national
President, Shaik has suggested to Zuma that he create a
"super-ministry for planning" to ensure that his programs are
implemented, similar to what PM Blair established in the
United Kingdom following his first election. This new
ministry would take budgeting power away from Treasury, which
until now has held the purse strings. (COMMENT: We take
Shaik's bureaucratic advice with a grain of salt, as it is
not clear whether Zuma would listen to him in organizing his
government. END COMMENT.) According to Shaik, Zuma's
administration would focus on domestic issues first, and
would be much more selective than Mbeki in choosing his
international interventions. (NOTE: See ref C for Post's
speculation on what South Africa's foreign policy might look
like under Zuma. END NOTE.) Shaik, a former ANC
intelligence official, said the SAG intelligence structures
are a "mess" and even suggested dismantling the intelligence
services, placing core functions in other departments like
Foreign Affairs.

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Comment
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9. (C) Zuma is off to a rocky start as ANC President. He has
made a number of high-profile public gaffes on issues as
varied as affirmative action, the death penalty, labor laws,
and Mbeki's powers (septel),to the dismay of several core
ANC constituencies. The defeated Mbeki has little incentive
to help Zuma settle into the role of ANC President, and the
reported lack of unity among the ANC leadership, if true, is
problematic for Zuma. Moreover, Zuma's impending corruption
trial, scheduled to begin in August, remains an albatross
around Zuma's neck, with no obvious resolution in sight.
Despite these numerous challenges, Zuma remains popular with
grassroots ANC supporters, who were fully aware of his legal
difficulties when they elected him. Zuma is the ultimate
survivor. Zuma's term as ANC President has only just begun,
and we should not underestimate his ability to weather these
storms and emerge as South Africa's next president.
BOST