VAN ECK SAYS FNL-SAG TIES IMPROVED, PROGRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRETORIA 000448

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/C, AF/S

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PINR SF BY
SUBJECT: VAN ECK SAYS FNL-SAG TIES IMPROVED, PROGRESS
POSSIBLE IN PEACE TALKS WITH GOB

REF: A. PRETORIA 428


B. PRETORIA 250

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Don Teitelbaum. Reasons 1.4(b)
and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Relations between the South African
Facilitation and the Burundi rebel movement the
Palipehutu-FNL are improved, albeit fragile, according to
South African-based Burundi analyst and informal FNL advisor
Jan van Eck. Although the FNL is the only rebel group
outside the peace process, it believes time is on its side,
as the lack of peace only undermines support for the
CNDD-FDD-led government. Van Eck argues that the alleged FNL
dissidents in camps in Burundi are not actually FNL, and that
Agathon Rwasa retains the support of the combatants in the
field. Per van Eck, for the FNL leadership to return to
Burundi, the Facilitation and GOB must address the core FNL
demands on security, immunity, and food for combatants. To
conclude the peace process, the FNL needs to feel that its
positions are taken seriously, including on key issues such
as creating jobs for them in government and allowing the
party to retain its name. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) DAS Swan and PolOff met independent analyst Jan van
Eck in Cape Town February 23, on the margins of the
DFA-sponsored seminar in Burundi (ref A). Van Eck, a former
South African Member of Parliament and long-time Burundi
watcher, remains in close contact with the senior leadership
of the Palipehutu-FNL (FNL). Many in the international
community, including in the South African Government (SAG),
regard van Eck as biased toward the FNL, a charge he denies.

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FNL and Facilitation Ties "Restored"
--------------


3. (SBU) Van Eck, who traveled to Dar es Salaam in
mid-February to meet with the FNL leadership, said that the
relationship between the FNL and the South African
Facilitation had been "restored" following the complete
rupture in late 2007, although the link remained "fragile."
The FNL remains committed to the documents it signed,
including the September 2006 Ceasefire Agreement, but argues
the "implementation" of these agreements requires further
discussion.

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FNL In No Rush
--------------


4. (C) According to van Eck, the FNL believes that the longer
the crisis drags on, the more they benefit. They surmise
that the prolonged instability undermines the CNDD-FDD-led
government's ability to deliver on economic development and
improved services. The support for the CNDD-FDD has already
dropped to 40 percent, and will continue to decline, which
will only benefit the FNL in the next elections. DAS Swan
noted that there is a danger that the FNL will itself lose
support - or even be completely frozen out of the upcoming
elections - unless it joins the peace process.

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Alleged Dissidents Not FNL
--------------


5. (SBU) Asked about the alleged FNL dissidents who are in
camps in Burundi, van Eck argued that very few were actually
FNL. He suggested that the groups have "no leader" and "no
platform," unlike previous FNL break-away groups. The
"moderates" who want to join the peace process remain in the
field and are led by Agathon Rwasa, who has been criticized
by militants for signing the Ceasefire Agreement.

--------------
Q --------------
What FNL Needs to Return to Burundi
--------------


6. (SBU) On the practical elements that would be required for
the FNL leadership to return to Bujumbura, van Eck outlined
three key issues:

-- Security of their participants in the JVMM: Van Eck
believes this is easily solved and requires little more than
clarification of issues. Ambassador Bah, the AU
Representative, should lead those discussions.

-- Immunity: The FNL does not believe that its leaders have
legal immunity since the immunity law did not specify the
party by name. They question whether the Presidential
statement, which clarified their status, is binding.

-- Food: The FNL must feed its combatants who remain in the
field. The leadership cannot move to Bujumbura and eat well,
while the combatants struggle, van Eck argued. Van Eck
suggested that the GOB should provide the FNL combatants with
food as a gesture of goodwill. Although ready to accept food
from the GOB, the FNL combatants are not yet prepared to
canton in assembly points and disarm; there is not yet enough
trust for that.


7. (SBU) More broadly, van Eck argued that the FNL must feel
that its policy positions are taken seriously. The FNL has
suffered through 28 years of neglect and abuse. It trusts no
one. The FNL is not loyal to a constitution it had no role
in negotiating. In van Eck's opinion, the GOB must be open
to constitutional changes on issues such as governmental
positions for the FNL and the name of the party.
"Compromises are possible," van Eck said, but there must be a
"positive environment of trust." The FNL must have something
"concrete" to show their supporters.

-------------- --
Rwasa and Nkurunziza Relationship; FNL Dynamics
-------------- --


9. (SBU) Asked why the June 2007 face-to-face meeting between
Rwasa and President Nkurunziza did not produce more positive
results, van Eck said that expectations were too high. In
addition, there was no follow-up, and limited goodwill. As
far as van Eck knows, the two have not spoken since the
meeting. "You can take horses to water," van Eck observed,
"but can't make them drink."


10. (SBU) Concluding, van Eck said that Rwasa remains firmly
in control of the FNL. He said that Rwasa is the
"intellectual, substantive" leader, while spokesman Pasteur
Habimana is more "emotional and propagandistic." Rwasa is
the leader, but decision-making is collective. Rwasa
constantly worries about the FNL delegates in Dar es Salaam
losing touch with the grassroots, and returns to the field
from time to time to "refresh" his mandate.

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Comment
--------------


11. (C) As with the FNL, South African Government officials
have had a rocky relationship with van Eck, reportedly one of
the FNL's closest outside advisors. SAG Special Envoy for
the Great Lakes Mamabolo has told us in the past that he
regards van Eck as an impediment to peace (ref B),alleging
that van Eck pushes the FNL into hardline positions. That
said, in recent weeks, as the SAG developed its new FNL peace
plan (ref A),Mamabolo has reached out to van Eck to seek his
advice on bringing the FNL into the peace process. On the
sidelines of the Burundi seminar in Cape Town, Mamabolo met
van Eck several times, and van Eck tells us they talk almost
daily. This increased dialogue between Mamabolo and van Eck
(and indirectly between the FNL and SAG) can only aid the
prospects for peace -- although the real test will come in
Qprospects for peace -- although the real test will come in
the weeks ahead when the FNL is asked to make concrete
compromises on returning to Bujumbura and implementing the
Ceasefire Agreement.
BOST