CZECH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: NO ONE WINS, AND NO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 000088

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL EZ
SUBJECT: CZECH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: NO ONE WINS, AND NO
ONE COMES OUT LOOKING GOOD

REF: PRAGUE 78

Classified By: POLEC COUNSELOR MICHAEL DODMAN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Czech parliament failed on February 8-9
to elect a president. Both candidates, current Czech
President Vaclav Klaus and Czech-American economist Jan
Svejnar, did not have sufficient support to be elected in the
three rounds of the election. The only party that can claim
its strategy was successful were the Communists (KSCM),who
succeeded in forcing a second election. The Czech parliament
will meet again on Friday February 15 for another election.
President Klaus will again be the nominee of the center-right
Civic Democrats (ODS) and remains the favorite. Although
Svejnar has declared he wants to run again, he continues to
lack the support of the KSCM. The February 8-9 election was
not the dignified event all political leaders promised but a
theater full of grandstanding, backstage dealing, and
pressure tactics that resulted in as many as three
parliamentarians' hospitalization. While we do not expect
any immediate political fallout from the election, the
presidential contest is straining PM Topolanek's coalition
and especially ODS-Green Party relations. END SUMMARY.

THE FIGHT OVER PROCEDURES: KEEP THE LIGHTS ON
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2. (C) The February 8-9 election began tamely enough with
each of the candidates delivering his address to the joint
session of the parliament, assembled in the gilded Spanish
Hall of the Prague Castle. FM Schwarzenberg, who was caught
on camera napping during the speeches, stated that he fell
asleep "with all due respect." The events that followed,
however, were far from sleep inducing. Leaders of the
political parties and other prominent members of parliament
took to the podium to extol or criticize each of the
candidates. Unfortunately for Svejnar, even those who were
supposed to support his candidacy spent most of the time
criticizing Klaus, rather than focusing on what Svejnar could
do for the country.


3. (C) Then the time came for the parliament to vote on what
would become the most contentious issue of the election:
whether the vote would be secret or open. In an atmosphere
where no one was quite certain of which parliamentary
procedures should govern the joint session of the parliament,
Chairman of the Lower Chamber Miloslav Vlcek (CSSD) quickly
lost control of the proceedings. ODS was the only party
opposed to an open vote because by its calculations Klaus had
the best shot at reelection in a secret vote. ODS therefore
looked for every possible way to preserve the secret vote,
which has been the tradition of all Czech presidential
elections since the first republic. Even though DPM Martin
Bursik of the Green Party told us that he considered the
secret vote as "more democratic," he nevertheless withstood

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the pressure from the ODS, his coalition partner, and
continued to press for an open vote to "keep the lights on in
the room" to lower the possibility of secret political deals.
After hours of delays, ODS relented and the parliament voted
against a secret vote. By default the vote would be open,
i.e. a show of hands.

THREE ROUNDS OF VOTING ARE NOT ENOUGH
--------------


4. (C) Ten hours after the joint session convened, the
voting began and moved very quickly. In the first round,
Klaus received 47 votes in the Senate and 92 votes in the
Chamber, for a total of 139. Svejnar received 32 votes in
the Senate and 106 votes in the Chamber, for a total of 138.
With no one candidate winning in both chambers, both
candidates advanced into the second round. Although the
second round voting took place before 9 PM of February 8, the
official results were not announced because the parliament
had voted earlier to break at 9 PM. According to unofficial
results which were available almost immediately, Klaus won a
total of 142 votes, which would have been sufficient for
victory in the third round. ODS therefore pressed to
continue beyond 9 PM and hold the third round, but CSSD,
sensing that ODS was surging, resisted.


5. (C) The headlines on February 9 were already forecasting
a Klaus win in the third round based on the unofficial
results of the second round. When the joint session
reconvened, the official results of the second round were
announced: Klaus received 48 votes in the Senate and 94 in
the Chamber, for a total of 142; Svejnar received 31 votes in
the Senate and 104 in the Chamber, for a total of 135.
Immediately following the announcement, a recess was

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announced. As we found out later, CSSD Chairman presented
evidence challenging the results of the second round.
Although officially, the results remained as they were
announced, one ODS deputy who serves on the election
conference committee confirmed that two pro-Klaus votes in
the Chamber were in question. Since the voting was by a show
of hands, it was apparently as chaotic as it appeared. For
the third round of voting, the election conference committee
had on hand additional vote certifiers from each of the
parties to ensure no further challenges.


6. (C) Since neither candidate received the sufficient
number of votes to win in the second round, both advanced
into the third round. With the results of the second round
challenged, Klaus' victory was no longer certain. A number
of deputies and senators told us that Klaus was short one
vote. Despite ODS' furious efforts and less than admirable
tactics, the party was unable to find that one vote. With
139 votes, Klaus fell one vote short of the 140 needed.
Note: By the time the third round was held, three
parliamentarians had left -- some were hospitalized -- so the
quorum was 278, rather than 281. End Note. Svejnar gained a
total of 113 votes in the third round, losing the support of
the KSCM. The KSCM, as it had announced late on February 7,
succeeded in its strategy to help Svejnar into the third
round so that Klaus would not be running unopposed, but then
vote for neither candidate and force another election.

ROUND TWO: KLAUS VS. ???
--------------


7. (C) The parliamentary parties agreed to hold another
election on Friday, February 15. All candidates must be
officially nominated by midnight of February 12. It is clear
that Klaus will again be nominated by ODS. The Greens
continue to back Svejnar, but clearly Svejnar will need much
more than the 6 Green votes. Paroubek has stated in the
press that he was 99 percent certain his party would also
support Svejnar. That one percent of uncertainty is due to
the KSCM, which must support Svejnar in order for him to have
a chance, but which has already announced its own list of
potential nominees about whom the party wants to negotiate
with Paroubek. The list may simply be a negotiating tactic
of the KSCM to make further gains in its quest for political
power. The tactic is already working. Paroubek announced
that if the KSCM supports Svejnar, the CSSD would consider
KSCM as a viable coalition partner in regional governments
following the upcoming fall elections. This is a significant
concession on the part of CSSD, which until now has adhered
to the party's policy of not forming coalitions with KSCM on
regional and national levels. Some KSCM-CSSD deal is likely,
as it would ensure that the left would not be split by
multiple candidates who would be not be able to advance into
the second and third round of the election, which would give
undue advantage to Klaus.


8. (C) Another matter that will be subject to intense
negotiation this week is whether the second election will
again proceed as an open vote or in secret. The February 8-9
election showed that no one was fully prepared for an open
vote and its consequences. A top lawyer for the Lower
Chamber told us that the presidential election procedures are
written with the presumption that the voting will be secret.
Although open voting is not precluded by the procedures, the
process is not clearly developed. For example, in an open,
show-of-hands vote, it is possible for the senators and
deputies to vote for both candidates. It could therefore be
theoretically possible for the parliament to elect two
presidents, if both received the same number of votes and the
minimum number of votes needed in a particular round. ODS
will continue to push for a secret vote to maximize Klaus'
chances at reelection. Paroubek, who views the open vote not
only as a victory against PM Topolanek but also as a useful
way to police the CSSD rank and file, will likely continue to
press for an open vote. The position of the Greens and KSCM
will again be decisive. The Christian-Democrats (KDU-CSL)
are said to be leaning toward a secret vote.

A DIFFERENT LIGHT IS NEEDED
--------------


9. (C) The tide may be turning in the secret vs. open ballot
fight because the process was far from transparent in spite
of the open balloting on February 8-9. While the lights were
kept on in the Spanish Hall where the voting took place,
rumors of secret deals, threats, and pressure tactics
abounded. Ironically, the open voting may have contributed
to these shenanigans. As one deputy told us, those who
abstained in the first or second round revealed they were
undecided and were subsequently exposed to even more pressure

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than would have otherwise been the case. Apparently, one
favored tactic by the two major parties, ODS and CSSD, was to
promise senators running for reelection in the fall not to
field a challenger against them. A senator, who has been a
good contact of the embassy, confirmed to us that the ODS
made such an offer to him. We also heard rumors of promised
ambassadorships and witnessed Senator Jana Jurencakova being
cornered by three Klaus "vote hunters," including the current
Mayor of Prague, Pavel Bem, and the disgraced former
Minister of Justice, Pavel Nemec. Note: Nemec has been
rumored to have engineered the questionable end of the
corruption case against former DPM Jiri Cunek. End Note.
This ODS posse refused to leave her side, and Svejnar at one
point complained to us that he could not even speak with her.
In the end, Jurencakova voted for Klaus. Some reports of
strong arming are even more troubling. Three
parliamentarians (two senators and one deputy) eventually
left the castle and were hospitalized. All three claimed
their health problems were induced by the pressure and
threats to which they were subject.

IMPACT ON THE COALITION
--------------


10. (C) The election appears to have frayed the coalition,
especially the relations between ODS and the Greens.
Although the KDU-CSL were by no means united in their support
of Klaus and some opposed the secret ballot, the ODS is
primarily blaming the Greens for the failed presidential
election and for going too far in their opposition to Klaus.
In ODS' eyes, the Greens' transgressions are threefold: 1)
The Greens recruited Svejnar to run against Klaus. 2) Last
week, the Greens unexpectedly changed their stance and threw
their support behind an open voting system. As a result, ODS
was the only party supporting a secret ballot. 3) During the
election, DPM Bursik and Katerina Jacques, the Greens'
parliamentary caucus chair, sharply criticized Klaus in their
speeches. A number of ODS deputies took offense at these
personal attacks.


11. (C) The Greens have defended themselves by arguing that
the coalition agreement does not cover the presidential
election, but ODS rank and file are becoming less and less
receptive to these arguments. Should Klaus get reelected in
the next election, Topolanek would probably be able to calm
the situation both within his party and within the coalition.
If the election impasse continues, Topolanek will be under
increasing pressure from within the ODS to assert control
over his smaller coalition partners. Minister Cyril Svoboda
(KDU-CSL) told Ambassador Graber that the ODS would try to
force the Greens to support a secret vote in the February 15
election by making it a condition for the Greens to stay in
the coalition. If Topolanek really goes so far as to make
such a demand, it is unclear how the Greens would react. The
open voting they supported showed itself to be an inadequate
guard against the strong-arming and secret deals they had
hoped to expose, but an about-face at this stage would raise
questions about their commitment to a transparent process.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) The inconclusive election must have reminded many of
the previous presidential vote in 2003, when Klaus was
finally elected in the third round of the third election.
This time, no one but the KSCM thought a second election
would be necessary, given Klaus' favorite status. KSCM and
CSSD used the uncertainty regarding the parliamentary
procedures to their maximum advantage and by forcing through
the open balot, embarrassed Klaus, Topolanek, and the ODS.
Before the election, DPM Alexandr Vondra told Ambassador
Graber that for CSSD, this election was not about the
candidates, but about humiliating the coalition and
Topolanek. In that, they succeeded. For KSCM, the election
was also not about the candidates, both of whom are too far
to the right in their views, but about gaining as many
concessions as possible. In that, they too may succeed if
they reach an agreement with CSSD about increased
cooperation, especially on the regional level.


13. (C) While the Topolanek coalition has been shaken up, we
do not think it has been irretrievably damaged. The three
coalition parties have shown in their first year that they
could work well together even on the most politically
sensitive matters. The coalition has also survived its share
of challenges, including the Cunek corruption scandal and the
firing of former Minister of Education Dana Kuchtova. The
current situation is certainly more acrimonious. Topolanek,
Bursik, Schwarzenberg, Vondra, and some of the other more
level-headed coalition leaders should be able to seal the

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cracks that have appeared over the past few weeks, but only
if Topolanek is able to rein in the anti-Green sentiments
within the ODS. For many in the ODS and for Klaus, this
fight has become personal. In a January interview, Topolanek
predicted that the coalition would not be destroyed by
disputes among the three parties. It remains to be seen
whether disputes within his own ODS could be the culprit.
Graber