CZECHS AGREE TO TEXT OF DHS SECURITY MOU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000082

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DHS FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BARTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2018
TAGS: CVIS PREL CMGT EZ EUR
SUBJECT: CZECHS AGREE TO TEXT OF DHS SECURITY MOU


Classified By: ADCM Stuart Hatcher for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

(C) 1. SUMMARY
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Czech negotiators from the Ministries of Interior and Foreign
Affairs reached tentative agreement February 6 with DHS
negotiators on the language of a security memorandum of
understanding. The MOU is required as part of the process
for DHS to exercise its authority to waive the 3 percent
refusal rate requirement for participation in the Visa Waiver
Program. Both sides were hopeful the agreement would be
ready to sign when Czech Prime Minister Topolanek visits
Washington on February 26 - 27. During working-level
meetings in the morning, as well as calls on the Foreign
Minister, Interior Minister, and Deputy Prime Minister, the
Czechs expressed their readiness to move forward on the MOU
despite concerns raised by the EC. That said, they did
request, in our press statement, a nod to Brussels as
political cover. They were also eager for similar progress
in Tallinn for the safety in numbers that would provide. See
action request paragraph 3. End Summary.

(SBU) 2. DHS AND CZECHS REACH AGREEMENT
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DHS Assistant Secretary for Policy Richard Barth and Visa
Waiver Program Office Director Marc Frey visited Prague on
February 6 to negotiate the terms of a security Memorandum of
Understanding, and to have several political-level meetings
to ensure political support for this project. They were
accompanied by a representative from the DHS legal advisor,s
office, and representatives from CA/VO and EUR/PGI. DHS
shared the draft MOU with the Czechs prior to the visit, and
the Czechs replied with a marked-up copy and a list of
questions. (Note: This early leg work by both sides was
crucial to the success of the February 6 negotiations. End
note.) Czech negotiations were led by Ministry of the
Interior Director for Asylum and Migration Policy Tomas
Heisman and Foreign Ministry Director General for Consular
and Legal Affairs Jaroslav Horak. During the morning, each
side surprised the other with its flexibility in
negotiations, with the result that by the end of the day the
two sides had an agreed upon text we expect to be fully
cleared within the next week. With regard to their
motivation, the Czechs remarked that the U.S. and the Czech
Republic had been working for a long time for Czech
participation in the Visa Waiver Program. They also sensed a
window of opportunity that could soon close if they did not
take advantage of it. Finally, they were hopeful they could
have a document to sign when Prime Minister Topolanek visits
Washington.

(SBU) 3. MOU Signing at the White House? Action Request
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During his visit to Washington, Prime Minister Topolanek is
scheduled to meet with DHS Secretary Chertoff on February 26
and President Bush on February 27. The Czechs want to sign
the MOU during this visit. The Czechs suggest that it would
be appropriate for Minister of Interior Langer and Secretary
Chertoff to sign the MOU, and that this might be done during
the White House visit. Post requests desk, NSC and DHS to
work together to form an appropriate ceremony to accomplish
this signing during the prime minister,s visit, accompanied
by suitable references to the MOU during public remarks at
the White House.

(C) 4. Implementing Arrangements
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At each meeting A/S Barth stressed that the MOU was only a
first step, and that it would have to followed up by
implementing arrangements. One example was the HSPD-6
agreement ) referred to with the Czechs as the Terrorist
Screening Center agreement. The Ministry of the Interior
noted that they viewed this agreement favorably. The MOI is
trying to figure out how the agreeement could implemented,
and hopes to present it to the cabinet for approval next
month. A/S Barth also said that not all implementing
arrangements need to be formal; pre-existing informal
information-sharing arrangements may suffice, but this would
have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Additionally,
not all information requested needs to be immediately
available; it can be useful to start at a less than optimum
level and move up incrementally.


(U) 5. Barth and the Press
--------------
A/S Barth did two press events involving live television.
The visit was covered widely despite the looming February 8
presidential elections. A full transcript of his afternoon

PRAGUE 00000082 002 OF 002


press event can be found on the Embassy,s public website
(www.prague.usembassy.gov). The main points were:

-- The United States and the Czech government made
"excellent progress" on negotiations that hopefully will lead
to visa waiver in 2008.

-- Electronic Travel Authorization must be up and running
before the Czech Republic can enter visa waiver. It has been
fully funded and could be in effect in the August-September
timeframe.

-- The Czech Republic has indicated to us their need to
maintain their obligations within the EU and we certainly
respect that. We expect that all agreements will be
consistent with existing obligations that the Czech Republic
has to the EU.

(C) 6. Ministerial Visits a Victory Lap
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A/S Barth called on Interior Minister Langer, Deputy Prime
Minister Vondra and Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg after the
morning session. In addition, during lunch, he met with new
Deputy Foreign Minister Kohout and MFA Political Director
Poveijsil. All interlocutors at the political level
expressed a determination to make the process succeed. All
also mentioned that a displeased EU was a significant hurdle
they had overcome. They noted in particular that Justice and
Home Affairs deputies had met on February 1, and the Czechs
claimed to be the only ones to speak up in favor of
negotiating bilaterally (they specifically said that the
Greeks, Hungarians, and Estonians were silent). The Czechs
said they were pulled in two directions, by their desire to
reach agreement with the U.S. on the one hand, and their
desire not to anger the EU on the other. They said they were
"dancing on eggshells" with the EU, but in the end they were
prepared to defy EU wishes in favor of the MOU. As the day
wore on and it became clear that we would reach agreement on
the MOU, and that we would make some public statement
referencing the EU to give them "political cover", they
became visibly more comfortable with their decision, and
almost proud that they had decided to stand up to Brussels.
They are also hopeful that things will go well in Tallinn so
they are not alone. They don,t want to be "100% black
sheep." As Interior Minister Langer put it, "once we make a
hole in the dam, the rest of Europe will flow through. If
bilateral agreements are signed, the shouting in Brussels
will die down." A/S Barth assured them that DHS would work
with current VWP members as well, and hoped to have MOUs
signed in those countries by October 2009. Both Langer and
Vondra said they might go to Brussels and Vondra would try to
explain things to Commissioner Frattini. It was also
important to explain that ETA was not a visa.

(C) 7. Comment
--------------
We attribute success in these negotiations to a number of
facts that serendipitously came to bear at the same time:
The Czechs are strongly motivated to do something on visa
waiver when their Prime Minister visits Washington. The
Czechs very much want to be in the VWP before beginning their
first EU presidency in January 2009. We convinced the Czechs
this was a window of opportunity that, if not taken now,
could slam shut for a long time. DHS flexibility was a
surprise to the Czechs. In light of Greek indecision the day
before, and probable Estonian success next week, the Czechs
saw an opportunity to move to the head of the queue. The
ease of these negotiations and the Czech decision to defy
Brussels have sent Czech expectations for Visa Waiver
accession in 2008 into orbit. As difficult as it may be, it
would be useful if Department and DHS developed a time-line
for the various steps that need to be taken, so we can
sustain the momentum and keep everyone moving in the right
direction. End Comment.

(U) 8. Assistant Secretary Barth did not have an
opportunity to clear this cable before departing post.
Graber