Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PRAGUE803
2008-12-23 15:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Prague
Cable title:  

REPRESENTATIVE WEXLER'S MEETINGS IN PRAGUE

Tags:  MARR PREL PGOV EZ 
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VZCZCXRO3626
RR RUEHSR
DE RUEHPG #0803/01 3581503
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231503Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0949
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUEAMDA/MDA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000803 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV EZ
SUBJECT: REPRESENTATIVE WEXLER'S MEETINGS IN PRAGUE

Classified By: CDA Mary Thompson-Jones, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000803

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV EZ
SUBJECT: REPRESENTATIVE WEXLER'S MEETINGS IN PRAGUE

Classified By: CDA Mary Thompson-Jones, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: During a December 4 trip to Prague,
Representative Robert Wexler (D-FL) met with DFM Tomas Pojar,
DPM Alexandr Vondra, and opposition MP Jan Hamacek. Pojar
and Vondra urged continued Congressional support for missile
defense (MD). Representative Wexler expressed appreciation
for Czech political efforts invested in MD and agreed that
the U.S. could not dismiss the political ramifications of
halting MD. Pojar and Vondra expressed wariness about
Russia; Pojar was skeptical that Russia would fulfill a
&grand bargain8 trading MD for Russian cooperation on Iran.
Vondra highlighted Czech efforts to upgrade EU relations
with Israel. Opposition MP Hamacek outlined his party,s
objections to MD and said, contrary to the government's view,
Czechs would welcome halting the system. End Comment.

DFM Pojar
--------------


2. (C) Representative Wexler briefed DFM Pojar on his recent
trip to Israel, including the state of the Palestinian
Authority (PA) security forces, the internal Israeli
political situation, and possible ways forward on Middle East
peace.


3. (C) Wexler and Pojar discussed in the incoming Obama
administration. According to Pojar, the government is
comfortable with the incoming foreign policy team. Pojar
expressed concern that Russia would attempt to divide NATO
and the EU; he hoped that, on transatlantic relations,
Washington would not deal only with Germany and France, but
with a broader Europe. Wexler predicted the next
administration would challenge Germany and France to use the
changeover in Washington as an opportunity to consider more
contributions on dealing with Afghanistan and Iran.


4. (C) Pojar agreed, emphasizing that Europe needs to have
realistic expectations about the incoming administration. On
Guantanamo, he said the Czech Republic had asked European
countries critical of the Guantanamo facility to help close
it by taking detainees.


5. (C) Pojar strongly urged an Obama visit to Prague to meet
with the EU 27 in April; this would be a good signal for
relations with central Europe.



6. (C) Wexler predicted that the incoming administration
would focus both on more diplomacy but also robust economic
sanctions with Iran; he worried about European support for
sanctions. Pojar agreed European economic interests would
hinder consensus on sanctions. Pojar said the Czechs, as EU
president, could not push their own views.

Russia/MD
--------------


7. (C) On relations with Russia, Pojar said &being nice
does not work.8 The West should not isolate Russia, but it
should be firm. On the Medvedev security architecture
proposal, Pojar advised that the Allies should discuss it
among themselves before discussing it with Russia. Pojar
said that the West can work with the Russian business elite,
but not the political elite, who he characterized as
anti-West.


8. (C) Pojar said Russian opposition to MD in Europe is
geopolitical: &they do not want the U.S. in central
Europe.8 MD is therefore also about U.S. standing in
central Europe. Failure to put MD in central Europe would
open up space for Russia and would give Russia a veto over a
defensive system, which is the heart of the NATO philosophy.
Pojar was skeptical Russia would help the U.S. on Iran if the
U.S. abandoned MD.


9. (C) Pojar said the Czech government can accept the need
for more testing of MD, but strongly urged the U.S. not to
make a &grand bargain8 trading MD for Russian promises of
cooperation on Iran. Geopolitically, for the sake of central
Europe, &we should not be failed by the U.S.8 on MD.


10. (C) Wexler agreed it would be irresponsible to dismiss
the political ramifications of MD to a good ally. However,
that does not mean the U.S. would not explore alternate ways
to implement MD.

DPM Vondra
--------------


11. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Vondra discussed two key
topics with Representative Wexler ) MD and the link with

PRAGUE 00000803 002 OF 002


Russia, as well as Czech EU Presidency priorities with
respect to Israel.

Missile Defense
--------------

12. (C) (C) DPM Vondra started by acknowledging he was aware
of Representative Wexler,s views on MD. He pointed out that
the Czechs have done a lot of work to &NATOize8 missile
defense and that we should continue this important work.
Vondra also emphasized, using strong language, that he did
not want to see MD unraveled by the incoming Congress.
Vondra anticipates that MD will not be taken up in the lower
house of parliament this year, but as soon as possible next
year. He also noted that the opposition Social Democrats
(CSSD) are focused on the Lisbon Treaty, while the leading
coalition ODS party is championing passage of MD.


13. (C) Representative Wexler stated that he and his fellow
congressional members were aware of the Czech political
efforts invested so far on MD and that the U.S. Congress
would not treat the efforts of a close ally cavalierly.
Wexler did state that the orientation of the new Congress
will be &a bit different8 than in the past, since he
expects this incoming congress will want to do a cost/benefit
analysis of how the MD program fits with other USG interests.
He also raised the question with the DPM of why, if this is
so important to Europe, the USG is picking up the entire tab
of the program and why there is not greater support with the
European public.


14. (C) The DPM also flagged that while the Czechs are
willing to offer assurances and keep the Russians informed
about the Missile Defense program, there are limits. In the
views of the Czechs, the problem is with Russia trying to
dictate conditions. The Czechs have no intention of allowing
the Russians to have a say in their national security policy
decisions. In response to Wexler,s query as to how can we
achieve better cooperation with Russia, Vondra responded by
emphasizing that the West must show determination in this
particular area, but openly discuss all issues of the
relationship.

Czech EU Efforts on Israel
--------------


15. (C) On Israel, the Deputy Prime Minister noted that the
Czech Republic is one of the most pro-Israeli countries in
Europe. He commented that the Czechs are working to raise
the level of relations between Israel and the EU and that
they hope to put the final touches on the EU action plan for
EU-Israeli relations during their EU Presidency. Vondra
noted that Germany and the Netherlands have been good friends
on this issue, but that Spain and Ireland (a surprise for the
Czechs) have not.

Opposition MP Jan Hamacek
--------------


16. (C) Wexler also met with main opposition Social Democrat
(CSSD) MP Jan Hamacek, who heads parliament,s foreign
affairs committee. Hamacek explained his and CSSD,s
opposition to MD: there is no clear threat that warrants it;
it is not part of a NATO system; it is not popular; it may
not work. Hamacek dismissed the idea that having MD would
make Europeans feel less vulnerable to Iran and more likely
to support Israel.


17. (C) Wexler pointed out that many, but not all, in the
U.S. Congress support MD. He asked Hamacek what would happen
in central Europe if MD were halted. Hamacek replied Czechs
view MD as a product of the Bush administration and would
welcome halting it. However, Hamacek conceded halting MD
could create a problem with NATO Allies, and Russia would
perceive it as a victory. Hamacek suggested halting MD
should be traded for Russian concessions in other areas, such
as Iran.


18. (U) Representative Wexler did not havQthe opportunity
to clear this message before departing post.
Thompson-Jones