Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PORTOFSPAIN48
2008-01-22 19:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Port Of Spain
Cable title:  

PM MANNING ON VENEZUELA; INFRASTRUCTURE CONFERENCE

Tags:  PREL EPET ECIN ENRG MARR VE TD 
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VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSP #0048/01 0221942
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221942Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8944
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 3746
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT OF SPAIN 000048 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR, WHA/EPSC AND INR/IAA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2018
TAGS: PREL EPET ECIN ENRG MARR VE TD
SUBJECT: PM MANNING ON VENEZUELA; INFRASTRUCTURE CONFERENCE

REF: PORT OF SPAIN 47

Classified By: DCM, LEN KUSNITZ; REASONS 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT OF SPAIN 000048

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR, WHA/EPSC AND INR/IAA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2018
TAGS: PREL EPET ECIN ENRG MARR VE TD
SUBJECT: PM MANNING ON VENEZUELA; INFRASTRUCTURE CONFERENCE

REF: PORT OF SPAIN 47

Classified By: DCM, LEN KUSNITZ; REASONS 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Patrick Manning agreed in
principle to co-host a Caribbean Basin Energy Infrastructure
Security Conference, but said it would not be feasible to
hold the event until late April or May. It was his strong
preference to invite Venezuela; to do otherwise would be
"hard to explain." In discussing his southern neighbor,
the PM made clear he did not share Chavez, views and that TT
remains a supporter of the FTAA and not ALBA/PetroCaribe.
Nonetheless, Trinidad has to tread carefully when taking
actions its larger neighbor might notice. Characterizing the
Venezuela referendum as a major turning point, Manning urged
dialogue between Washington and Caracas. The political
situation in Venezuela will eventually change, he continued,
and the U.S. would be in a better position to influence a
post-Chavez regime if it made a concerted dialogue effort now
(including, by implication, not seeking to keep Caracas out
of international and regional conferences like the one we are
asking TT to co-host). END SUMMARY

INFRASTRUCTURE CONFERENCE


2. (SBU) The Energy Department's Sam Browne and
SouthCom's Joanna Gutierrez, accompanied by the DCM and
EconOff, met January 18 with Prime Minister Patrick Manning
to discuss a proposed Caribbean Basin Energy Infrastructure
Security Workshop that TT would co-host with us in Port of
Spain. The Ambassador did not attend the session due to his
accompanying a visiting interagency team assessing TT's LNG
infrastructure security to a meeting with the Foreign,
National Security and Energy Ministers.


3. (SBU) After listening to a presentation on the proposed
conference, Manning queried what level officials would be
expected to attend. Indicating they wished to hear the Prime
Minister's views as well, Gutierrez and Browne suggested the

event would be geared toward energy experts below the Cabinet
(or immediate sub-Cabinet) level, as well as relevant private
sector representatives. Manning seemed to agree, but said he
would give more thought to the matter. He then added that
DOE/SouthCom,s proposed early March conference date was too
soon) late April or (more likely) May was a more realistic
target. This would allow for better planning and, not
coincidently, avoid clashing with a still unannounced March
visit of the Prince of Wales to TT.

INVITING VENEZUELA


4. (SBU) PM Manning then turned his attention to conference
invitees, asking specifically if Venezuela would be invited.
As a Caribbean Basin country and major supplier of energy to
both the Caribbean and the U.S., the Prime Minister said it
would be "hard to explain" if Caracas was not invited.
When told Venezuela was not on the initial proposed list, the
PM offered that this was a mistake and underscored his very
strong preference (as conference co-host) to invite it.
"Maybe they will come and maybe they won't, but we should
invite them," he concluded.


5. (C) This comment led Manning into an open, good-natured,
explanation of his country's relationship to its larger
southern neighbor. Clearly wishing to make his guests
understand that what Washington and Port of Spain can do
vis-a-vis Caracas is different, if for no other reasons than
size and geography, Manning said his country must keep in
mind Venezuela's concerns when acting. This does not mean
bending to Caracas, will, but it also does not mean
needlessly antagonizing it.


6. (C) Illustrating his point, Manning noted Trinidad remains
a strong supporter of the FTAA, open markets and
non-hegemonic regional integration. For those reasons, and
others, it has not joined PetroCaribe ("and will not"),
telling Caribbean partners that as an extension of ALBA it
made no sense for pro-FTAA Trinidad to become a PetroCaribe
member. (Note: This is one reason Summit of the Americas
trade discussions with Trinidad have to be approached
carefully lest Manning's PetroCaribe stance is inadvertently
undercut. The PM habitually refers to the SOA as the "FTAA
Summit.")


7. (C) In addition, Trinidad will not jettison its
commercial concerns to curry favor with Chavez. Recalling
the still-born effort last year to reach a production sharing
agreement on a large underwater cross-border gas field,
Manning related he knew that when he sent the draft accord to
Venezuela that country would not agree to it due to the
suggested tax structure for exploration companies and statist
views inside the Venezuelan government. Specifying further,
Manning said he had the impression the strongest resistance
to Trinidad,s proposed terms came from PDVSA and
Venezuela,s Energy Minister, with Chavez deferring to the
"experts."


8. (C) Part of TT's balancing act with Venezuela involves
being open to dialogue, Manning continued. Hinting that
since the failure of the gas accord last year, which played a
role in stifling planned leader trips to each country, his
direct discussions with Chavez have been limited, Manning
said that "Summit-level" conversations between the two
countries are not taking place.


9. (C) Despite this, it is a mistake to try to isolate
Venezuela. Dialogue is key to both changing and containing
Caracas, behavior, but even more important in preparing the
ground for influencing future change. "I won't be here
forever, Bush won't be here forever, and neither will
Chavez." Frankly, he continued, Chavez, referendum was a
critical moment. It was now possible to glimpse a Venezuela
absent Chavez. Though it may take a while, politically and
economically, the situation in Venezuela is
"unsustainable."


10. (C) In this regard, the U.S. should learn from past
mistakes, the PM reflected. In the mid-nineties, he
understood Washington was considering softening policy toward
Havana, beginning a more fulsome dialogue with Castro. This
was short-circuited by the "Brothers to the Rescue"
shootdown. Not moving forward on the dialogue plan was an
historical mistake, Manning asserted. The U.S. would be in a
much better position to influence ongoing/coming change in
Cuba if it had begun a dialogue ten years ago. By not
engaging Chavez and Venezuela at every opportunity, the U.S.
similarly risked losing future influence on what will occur
in Venezuela.

SO CLOSE TO VENEZUELA AND SO FAR FROM GOD


11. (C) COMMENT: Trinidad and Tobago's relationship with
Venezuela is complex. Manning is a friend of the U.S. and no
fan of Chavez, but also a firm believer that needlessly
ticking off a country multiple times Trinidad's size that is
only seven miles away and with which it shares at least two
(so far non-producing) offshore gas fields needed to fulfill
industrial development plans, is not prudent politics or
economics. In addition, to the extent TT can gain Caracas,
assistance in the anti-crime battle (guns and drugs from
there transit TT),it would be helpful. On the darker side,
though there is no indication this occurs, Manning may have
the occasional thought that a little meddling by a displeased
Venezuela could easily worsen the already abysmal local
security situation.


12. (C) It is important to underscore, though, that Manning
does not see Trinidad as in thrall to Venezuela (or the
United States). When it is in Trinidad's interest, or can
be at least rationally explained away, Manning does take
stands against Venezuela (e.g., on PetroCaribe, welcoming
ties with the U.S. military). On a similar track, he intends
to make the Summit of the Americas a success by closely
working with us. Where standing contrary to Caracas is less
explicable (at least to him),he looks for ways to square the
circle. Advocating dialogue is one of these ways and a
recognition that any reduction in U.S.-Venezuela tensions is
good for Trinidad. While Manning's comments on the U.S.
more fulsomely engaging Venezuela downplay the
reluctance/rhetoric on the other side, it is heartfelt (as
well as a bit calculated). In triangulating relations with
Caracas and the U.S., it also is worth noting that Manning is
really playing four-dimensional chess since he also feels the
need to take into account the views of his
sometimes-more-sympathetic-to-Caracas Caricom colleagues.


13. (U) Mr. Browne and Ms. Gutierrez did not have an
opportunity to clear this cable.
AUSTIN