Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PORTOFSPAIN121
2008-03-11 14:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Port Of Spain
Cable title:  

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO'S RELATIONS WITH CUBA

Tags:  ETRD PGOV PREL CU TD 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSP #0121/01 0711425
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111425Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9035
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3755
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0051
C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT OF SPAIN 000121 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CAR, WHA/CCA, AND INR/IAA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2018
TAGS: ETRD PGOV PREL CU TD
SUBJECT: TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO'S RELATIONS WITH CUBA

REF: A. PORT OF SPAIN 48

B. PORT OF SPAIN 88

Classified By: DCM Len Kusnitz; Reason 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT OF SPAIN 000121

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CAR, WHA/CCA, AND INR/IAA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2018
TAGS: ETRD PGOV PREL CU TD
SUBJECT: TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO'S RELATIONS WITH CUBA

REF: A. PORT OF SPAIN 48

B. PORT OF SPAIN 88

Classified By: DCM Len Kusnitz; Reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Trinidad and Tobago's relations with Cuba
are a mixture of pragmatism and pan-Caribbean solidarity.
Along with a number of other Caribbean states, it has had
diplomatic ties with Cuba since 1972. Although Fidel enjoys
a positive image among the minority of Trinis who reflect on
foreign policy, many of these persons also recognize that
human rights are violated in Cuba and have no interest in
that country's political or economic system. This line of
thought is often submerged in an overall view that is one
part mysticism over Cuba "standing up" to the U.S., one part
"let's look at the (alleged) social gains," and another part
arguing that Cuba has helped its Caribbean brothers and
gratefulness should be the reaction. Upon Castro's
"retirement," Prime Minister Manning cleaved to the latter
sentiment, noting his own medical treatments in Havana.
Despite the fondness sometimes expressed for Cuba, Manning
and company are hardheaded realists. The GOTT will not act
or speak against Cuba, but it won't go out of its way either
to take a tack likely to irritate the United States. End
Summary.

A Little History
--------------


2. (C) T and T Prime Minister Eric Williams, considered the
father of the nation, joined Guyana, Jamaica and Barbados in
recognizing Cuba in December 1972. The rationale was to
diversify links and to show independence from the U.S.
Gaining credibility inside the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
also played a role, as did Williams' personal background. In
addition, internal Trinidad politics fed into the decision,
especially after the 1970 upheavals. Though a democrat,
Williams also shared the leftist pedagogical thinking style
prominent among third world academics at that time.
Nonetheless, he understood the world he lived in -- a trip by
Williams to Cuba in 1975 reportedly reinforced his view that
free market capitalism was superior to a planned economy.
That Caribbean solidarity only went so far also was

underscored when Cuba became involved in internal conflicts
in Africa. In 1975, it requested permission for aircraft to
refuel in Trinidad en route to Angola. Williams declined
this request.

Consistency in Policy
--------------


4. (C) The "yin and yang" policy on Cuba set in Eric
Williams' time still casts its shadow today. Solidarity,
mixed with mutual assistance, jumbled with mild rhetorical
support and sotto voce recognition that Cuba is a model for
no one are the policy's essentials. T and T politicians,
when dealing with Havana, keep in mind the Caribbean
neighborhood they live in, but also have an eye on U.S.
reaction and, more recently, the view from Caracas. One
person close to the PM told us, for instance, that the GOTT
knows what side of the dividing line it falls on, but as a
small nation, being friendly with all (by upholding the
"principle of non-intervention") is the greater part of
valor.

The Past is Prologue
--------------


5. (C) The departure of Fidel and confirmation of Raul
highlighted again the shape of Trinidad's policy toward Cuba
(ref a). Commenting on the changeover, Manning took note of
Cuban assistance to T and T and Havana's Caribbean-wide aid,
adding his personal thanks for the medical treatments he had
received in Cuba (heart valve surgery in 1998 and a pacemaker
in 2005, as well as laser eye surgery). Despite this
hagiography, Manning was circumspect and said nothing about
Cuba's internal political and economic system. Broader
comments on change, though, did appear in the press, with
editorialists mixing the elements noted above, but also
focusing on potential opportunities when (not if) Cuba opens
its economy. That T and T could -- or should -- even try to
encourage change in Cuba was a bridge too far, though, for
the local mindset.

Diplomatic ties
--------------


6. (C) There is a small three-person Cuban Embassy in Port of
Spain. Though the Cuban Ambassador is seen at events,
Havana's mission keeps a relatively low profile. For its
part, in September 2007, T and T formally opened a Havana
trade facilitation office. Presiding over the ceremony,
Manning announced that Trinidad would "shortly" open an
Embassy. When this officially occurred is not clear, but the
GOTT acquired office space in Havana in October 2007 and,
according to the MFA, Flora Parris-Mills is running the
Mission as Charge, with Yvonne Gittens-Joseph, T and T High
Commissioner in Jamaica, accredited as Ambassador. It is
possible that this is simply a matter of semantics and
Manning was referring to the placement of a resident
Ambassador in Havana. Retired MFA Permanent Secretary Lester
Efebo Wilkinson is reportedly in line for that position.


7. (C) Structurally, Cuba does not fall within the Americas
Unit of the MFA's Bilateral Division (where the U.S.
resides),but in a separate CARICOM and Caribbean Affairs
Division. This organizational split reflects geography and
the MFA mindset (Caribbean solidarity),but also helps keep
policy formation toward Cuba -- at least at the lower levels
-- somewhat insulated from U.S. "pressures" or broader
hemispheric concerns. On a multilateral level, Trinidad and
Tobago is very open to Cuban inclusion. The Association of
Caribbean States (ACS),which includes Cuba as well the
continental Latin states bordering on the Caribbean, has its
headquarters in Port of Spain. Nonetheless, the GOTT has
been clear that it is not interested in leading any pro-Cuba
charge for OAS reinstatement. The Cubans also have not been
involved in any Summit of the Americas planning and are not
expected to be invited to attend to the event.

Economic and Other Ties
--------------


8. (C) Unsurprisingly given its strong economy, Trinidad and
Tobago is one of Cuba's leading Caribbean commercial partners
and interested in the potential for expansion if the Cuban
economy opens up. Currently, T and T has a roughly equal
trade balance with Cuba (about $35 million in total two-way
trade),with its exports centered on ammonia and steel.
Although Cuba is attempting to expand oil production and
Trinidad and Tobago is offering free technical assistance to
a number of emerging producers, there has been no cooperation
in this sector. This may be due to Venezuela's influence, as
well as GOTT hesitation to be seen encroaching on Caracas'
area of energy influence and concern about getting sucked
into PetroCaribe.


9. (C) Despite some well-trained local medical personnel,
serious problems exist in the public health sector and T and
T has accepted Cuban assistance. There are approximately
seventy Cuban doctors and nurses here (the first arrived in
2003),mostly in rural areas and small towns in the east and
south. While only a handful have defected since the program
began, a number have married and remained in Trinidad.
Though some Trinis do travel to Cuba for medical care (like
the PM),the proximity of Miami, and cultural ties to the UK,
mean that most in search of complex care go elsewhere.


10. (C) On the agricultural front, the GOTT has had periodic
discussions with the GOC on how to increase the locally grown
food supply (food price inflation here tops 20 percent per
year). In 2007, T and T finalized arrangements for Cuban
agricultural experts to serve as technical advisors for a
200-acre farm in Tucker Valley (about a 30 minute drive from
the capital). The site is one of 15 large farms that PM
Manning proposed in his 2007 budget as a way to revive
agricultural production. The other farms are on offer to
international investors, although Post is not aware of any
serious expressions of interest (though there have been some
rumors involving Germans). Opposition politicians have
criticized the "mega-farm" approach as at best irrelevant and
(in somewhat of a contradiction) at worst an effort that
would depress local farm incomes. One well-to-do farmer, not
friendly to the government, told us that the "mega-projects"
were a "joke" and, focusing on Tucker Valley, that production
costs there would be far beyond what could be recouped. The
Cuban-assisted farm is expected to launch soon (a status it
has had for some time),with the first crops (possibly
tomatoes and beans) coming to market in 2009.

Comment: Stuck in the Middle with You
-------------- --------------


11. (C) With admitted nuances depending on who was in
office, the core Trinidadian policy toward Cuba has not
appreciably varied over the years. Absent major changes in
Cuba, the local policy course will remain on its current
track -- friendly to Cuba, but not too friendly, advising the
U.S. to talk to Cuba (allowing for a bit of moral high-ground
posturing),but not being vociferous or proactive about this,
willing to take assistance from Cuba and reciprocate as well,
but not in any large ways, and keeping an eye (but only one)
on potential economic opportunities on that island. Similar
to its relations with Venezuela (ref b),T and T seeks to
take what it believes is a middle course in navigating
between Washington and Havana. While it will not push the
GOC, it also will not act in any way it judges might be
inflammatory to the U.S. At least one person in the GOTT has
told us that the government's stance means it will be well
positioned to talk to the Cubans when a democratic opening
occurs (and PM Manning has privately implied this as well).
We are not so sure, though, and the government might be
hesitant to act absent a "CARICOM consensus." In any case,
it is worthwhile to keep the Cuban change issue before the
GOTT, if only to be able to go back to it at a critical
future moment and ask, "Well?"





AUSTIN