UK, AUSTRALIA AND US EMBASSIES JOINTLY DEMARCHE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT LOUIS 000224

DEPT FOR AF/E; AF/S

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM KDEM ZI MP
SUBJECT: UK, AUSTRALIA AND US EMBASSIES JOINTLY DEMARCHE
MAURITIAN PRIME MINISTER REGARDING ZIMBABWE

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Virginia M. Blaser
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On 24 June, DCM met with the High
Commissioners of Australia and the UK to demarche the
Mauritian Prime Minister regarding Zimbabwe. The joint
demarche was somewhat disappointing, with the Prime Minister
agreeing to take only modest actions with regard to Zimbabwe.
Specifically, PM Ramgoolam agreed to call South African
President Mbeki to express concern over the growing problems
in Zimbabwe. He also agreed to call for a SADC meeting
regarding Zimbabwe during the upcoming African Union Summit
in Egypt this week. He did not agree with UK requests to
make a formal statement of condemnation for the violence in
Zimbabwe; nor did he agree to personally attend the AU
summit. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) At the request of the UK High Commissioner, DCM and
the Australian High Commissioner elected to do a joint
demarche on Zimbabwe and on 24 June called for an urgent
meeting with the Prime Minister. At the last moment of the
day, the PM agreed to an "immediate" meeting. DCM opened the
joint demarche noting the important role Mauritius plays in
SADC as a strong and vibrant democracy. She thanked
Mauritius for sending observers, as part of their concern for
human rights and electoral freedom in Zimbabwe, and asked for
Mauritius to continue to take a forward-leaning stance in
working toward stopping the violence and finding a
resolution. The UK High Commissioner focused his requests on
obtaining the PM's commitment to make a public statement both
against the violence and to note that Mauritius would not
accept any results from Zimbabwe elections that may take
place on 27 June. Although diplomatic in response, PM
Ramgoolam declined to make such a statement. He reasoned that
making such statements would do two things; first, it would
undermine the work of President Mbeki, who is conducting
"behind closed doors" negotiations; and second, that such a
statement could put at risk the handful of remaining
Mauritians in Zimbabwe.


3. (C) The PM said that he spoke with Mbeki very late in the
evening on 23 June, having returned Mbeki's call following
the PM's long night in parliamentary budget discussions
(NOTE: These discussions ended after midnight Mauritius time
on 24 June). According to Prime Minister Ramgoolam, Mbeki was
upset by the statements that had been made by other SADC
countries, and felt strongly such statements were not helpful
to his efforts. For this reason, PM Ramgoolam is not
inclined to make a statement because he does not wish to
alienate President Mbeki. Ramgoolam did agree, however, to
call Mbeki again on 24 June to express greater concern over
the lack of results from current negotiations and to urge him
to affect positive results quickly.


4. (C) Ramgoolam noted that during his conversation with
Mbeki last night, Mbeki did not mention the UN Security
Council statement. Ramgoolam speculated that perhaps the
statement had not been concluded prior to his phone call with
Mbeki. The PM believes that Mbeki looks to him for support
and guidance. Ramgoolam did note that Mbeki expressed some
guilt over a recent incident in which Mbeki convinced a
member of the opposition, who was in South Africa as part of
an opposition delegation meeting for negotiations with
Zimbabwe government officials, to return to Zimbabwe.
According to the PM, Mbeki spoke to Mugabe personally to
ensure the safety of the returning opposition member and was
satisfied that his safety was assured. Unfortunately,
immediately upon returning from South Africa, the opposition
member was arrested.


5. (C) Part way through the meeting with the PM, the
Mauritian Foreign Secretary Anand Neewoor joined the meeting.
Neewoor noted shortly upon entering the PM's office that he
was suspicious of Tsvangirai's presence in the Danish
Embassy, implying that Tsvangirai is not a "courageous"
leader because he is afraid to die. The PM noted that it is
important for leaders to be courageous, and gave an anecdote
of death threats he received when he first decided to run for
Prime Minister. DCM acknowledged that it did indeed often
take courage to be a leader, and asked the Prime Minister to
consider the courage to take a proactive role, as both the
leader of a key democracy in Africa and as a respected member
of SADC.


6. (C) The PM agreed that perhaps Mauritius could play a
greater role, and to that end said he would ask for a SADC
meeting on Zimbabwe along the margins of the upcoming AU

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discussions in Egypt. He noted, however, that he would not
be attending the AU meeting because of parliamentary
discussions still underway on his budget proposals for the
year. (COMMENT: Foreign Secretary Neewoor will be
representing Mauritius at the AU summit. Post doubts he will
have much impact there.)


7. (C) As a final positive from the discussions, the PM did
agree to keep Mauritian election observers in Zimbabwe for
the present time. He planned to speak to them in the next
day or so, to get an on-the-ground account from his own
staff. He said he tried to contact them earlier, but did not
have success in reaching them because phone service into
Zimbabwe was "sometimes difficult."


8. (C) On 23 June, DCM took advantage of a pre-arranged
meeting with the Prime Minister's Cabinet Secretary, Suresh
Seeballuck, to also raise the issue of Zimbabwe. During this
meeting, Seeballuck expressed grave concern over the
situation and repeated several times his disgust that Mugabe
would claim to be in power as an "act of God." He agreed
that Mauritius should take a more active role, and promised
to raise his opinions with the Prime Minister. (Comment:
While there was no evidence of Seeballuck's opinions
surfacing during our meeting with the PM, Seeballuck is one
of the few close advisors to the PM, and post believes his
views will be considered when the PM makes decisions on
Zimbabwe. End Comment.)


9. (C) COMMENT: We expected Prime Minister Ramgoolam to be
more inclined to action. It is with disappointment that the
joint demarche seemed, to Post, to make so little immediate
headway. The UK High Commissioner, however, felt quite
differently. He remarked that in all the time the he had
demarched the PM on Zimbabwe, this joint demarche was the
first time the PM agreed on any action, however small. END
COMMENT.
CABRERA