Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PORTAUPRINCE1585
2008-11-14 20:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Port Au Prince
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR DAS ROBINSON VISIT TO HAITI

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON USAID OVIP HA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PORT AU PRINCE 001585 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR, DRL, S/CRS, INR/IAA
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
TREASURY FOR MAUREEN WAFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON USAID OVIP HA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DAS ROBINSON VISIT TO HAITI

Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson. Reason: E.O. 12958 1.4
(b),(d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PORT AU PRINCE 001585

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR, DRL, S/CRS, INR/IAA
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
TREASURY FOR MAUREEN WAFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON USAID OVIP HA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DAS ROBINSON VISIT TO HAITI

Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson. Reason: E.O. 12958 1.4
(b),(d)

Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) Your visit comes when the Government of Haiti is
digging out from the wreckage of four hurricanes that
affected 10 percent of the population and from the collapse
of a school that killed nearly 100 children. The
newly-installed government of Prime Minister Michele
Pierre-Louis is battling to implement disaster relief and
begin rebuilding, while fending off growing criticism that
government assistance is not reaching all who need it.
Relations between the government and parliament remain tense,
and the Prime Minister is not getting the support from the
President she feels she needs. Your meetings will be an
opportunity to showcase support for the government and the
Prime Minister, whose priorities for Haiti coincide with our
own. End summary.

Progress Until Riots, Floods
--------------


2. (SBU) Mid-way through the third year of President Preval's
five-year term, Haiti has hunkered down into
crisis-management mentality. Haiti made slow but measurable
progress in political consolidation and economic growth in
the two years following Presidential and legislative
elections in 2006. The food riots in April 2008 brought
political progress to a halt, and the hurricanes and floods
of August-September dealt the economy a hard blow. Food and
fuel inflation that built up beginning in late 2007 brought
out the worst instincts in Haiti's political actors.
Although there was genuine social grievance over food price
inflation, there is evidence that the violent elements in
April were organized and paid by political forces seeking to
oust then-PM Jacques Edouard Alexis, increase their own
representation in a new government, and generally take
advantage of increased instability.


3. (SBU) During the five-month hiatus that followed the
Senate's April 12 vote that brought down the Alexis

government, Haiti indulged in sterile executive-legislative
branch confrontation and made no progress in addressing
inflation or in preparing for overdue Senate elections.
Parliament rejected two Prime Ministerial candidates on
flimsy grounds, in no small part because President Preval
refused to bargain with parties and parliamentarians seeking
money-generating positions in government. Preval finally
lobbied hard for his third nominee, Michele Pierre-Louis, and
made promises of party representation in the cabinet and in
ministries. Feeling public pressure to give Haiti a
government after five months without one, parliament finally
confirmed Pierre-Louis, and she took office September 5.

Challenges the Prime Minister Faces
--------------


4. (SBU) Although Pierre-Louis lacks the political instincts
and skills of her predecessor, she seems sincere in her
determination to reform Haiti's institutions, bring
investment to create jobs, fight corruption, have elections
according to the constitution's calendar, organize
post-hurricane assistance and reconstruction, and establish
overall development priorities. Her policy goals align
closely with our own for Haiti. However, she took office
just as the staggering dimensions of damage caused by four
tropical storms and hurricanes became clear. While previous
natural disasters have affected a limited area of the
country, these storms caused serious damage in eight of ten
departments of the country. The flooding killed almost 800
people and affected nearly 800,000, crippled land
transportation arteries, devastated livestock and crops, and
reduced economic growth for 2008 to a projected 1-1.5
percent.


5. (SBU) The unprecedented storm damaged created a temporary
climate of political good will in the public and the
Parliament toward the Prime Minister and her government. She

PORT AU PR 00001585 002 OF 004


acted decisively in her first weeks in office. The President
and she jointly declared a state of emergency, under which
authority she allocated nearly USD 200 million, the entire
proceeds of Haiti's Petrocaraibe oil transactions with
Venezuela, for emergency relief and reconstruction.

Growing Tensions with Parliament, President
--------------


6. (SBU) That good will, however, is already beginning to
fray, as the Prime Minister is beginning to encounter the
traps lurking in Haiti's dysfunctional political institutions
and in the leadership style of President Preval. With
disaster relief being the number one political game in town,
Parliament rushed to exercise oversight and influence. Both
houses have called the Prime Minister and other ministers to
testify over a dozen times. The government had to beat back
parliamentary demands to co-manage disaster relief projects
in members' constituencies. The Prime Minister is beginning
to feel that these repeated summons are hampering her ability
to govern. There are also mounting accusations that aid is
not reaching intended recipients. Mayors and other local
officials are accused of directing GOH-funded disaster aid
for political purposes or diverting it into their own
pockets. (Note: foreign disaster relief is channeled
through independent NGO implementers. End note) Sensing a
political opportunity, several parliamentarians the week of
November 10 criticized the government for ineffectiveness in
disaster relief, and said they would give it two months
''grace period'' before parliament would interpellate the
government and perhaps call a vote of confidence.


7. (SBU) The collapse of a school in Port au Prince November
7 that killed almost 100 pupils and teachers has sharpened
the parliament's instinct to call the government to account.
This disaster put the government on the defensive by seeming
to corroborate the deep-set perception among Haitians that
the state is failing to live up to its elementary
responsibility to protect its citizens. The President and
Prime Minister on November 13 announced plans to enforce
building codes on public buildings throughout the country --
a promise that Haiti lacks the institutional capacity to
carry out.

Prime Minister Increasingly Beleaguered
--------------


8. (C) The Prime Minister tells us that she is appalled by
the mismanagement and corruption that she continues to
encounter throughout government, in parliament, and even
among the Prime Minister's office staff that she inherited
from her predecessor. She reserves her harshest criticism
for parliament, most of whose member she has concluded
privately are corrupt and/or linked to criminal activity, and
are interested primarily in the travel perks and immunity
from prosecution their office gives them. Just as troubling
is Pierre-Louis' deteriorating relationship with President
Preval. This President has always tended to micromanage his
government and not allow his Prime Minister autonomy to
govern. Preval continues to treat foreign affairs as his
private domain. Pierre Louis beat back the President's
initiative to replace her Foreign and Planning Ministers.
For now, she appears determined to soldier on.

A Few Bright Spots
--------------


9. (SBU) The government has a small number of talented
people. Minister of Economy and Finance Daniel Dorsainvil is
a solid economic policy-maker, although he does not always
coordinate with the Prime Minister. Newly appointed Minister
of Justice and Public Security Jean Joseph Exhume, whom the
Ambassador first met November 13, appears determined to
pursue judicial reform, prosecute corruption cases, and
enforce work discipline on malingering judges. Minister of
Planning Jean Max Bellerive is an able administrator. Yet
even the best ministers lack the staff and the financing to
implement good policies.

Elections

PORT AU PR 00001585 003 OF 004


--------------


10. (SBU) Another positive note is that the Provisional
Electoral Council (CEP) recently set April 19, 2009 as the
date for the long-overdue partial Senate elections, which
should have been held in late 2007. Since May, the Senate
has had only 18 of 30 members, making the institution
vulnerable because it is often difficult to achieve the
16-member quorum. The Prime Minister strongly supports those
elections, although she and many others are aware of the
CEP's capability gap and its need for strong technical
assistance. Financing pledged by donors and in the GOH
amended budget is available in the amount of USD 16.5
million. President Preval has yet to issue a decree
announcing the elections, as the law requires. There are
still no plans to organize or finance the late 2009
legislative elections, which will renew the entire Chamber of
Deputies and another one-third of the Senate.


11. (SBU) We and our major allies in Haiti have a strong
interest in supporting this reform-minded but beleaguered
Prime Minister. Your visit will be an opportunity to show
our support. So would a Pierre-Louis visit to Washington,
which we continue to encourage her to undertake at the
earliest opportunity.


The Assistance Picture: Rule of Law/Governance
-------------- --


12. (U) Your visit will also allow you to review our
assistance priorities in Haiti. Our assistance efforts in
Haiti -- financed by USAID, CDC, INL/NAS, and the US Coast
Guard -- seek to implement reforms, build public
institutions, improve law enforcement and corrections
capability, and help deliver basic services. Rule of Law
programs target Haiti's justice system by helping increasing
judicial authorities' administrative, management and
technical capacity. Good Governance Programs provide
technical assistance and training to Haiti's Parliament in
the areas of legislative drafting, legal and judicial reform,
and rules of procedure. Programs aimed at conflict
mitigation address poverty and gang-related violence through
creation of short- and long-term employment and transfer of
job skills trough labor-intensive reconstruction of social
and productive infrastructure. Another program targets the
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to help it solidify its
organization and modernize the voter registration process.
Civil society programs assist a variety of local media,
regional journalist associations, and public service
associations, including those that monitor corruption.

Humanitarian Assistance
--------------


13. (U) The steep rise in food prices in 2008 followed by the
four hurricanes sharply exacerbated Haiti's chronic food
insecurity, to which approximately 3 million Haitians are now
exposed. USAID contributed USD 45 million in emergency food
aid and another USD 14 million for post-hurricane recovery.
USAID is continuing its programs to build disaster early
warning, response and mitigation capacity. The Ambassador
will officiate at the ground-breaking ceremony November 21
for an Emergency Operations Center for Haiti's disaster
response agencies. Following the hurricanes, Congress
appropriated an additional USD 96 million over three years
for the restoration of public services, repairs to public use
infrastructure, provision of income-generating activities,
asset restoration, and support to affected families.

Health and Education/Economic Growth
--------------


14. (U) Basic health programs help increase access to
essential health services in 72 public sector clinics and 80
NGO clinics. Nearly 50 percent of Haiti's population
receives at least some health services financed by the USG.
USAID-financed education programs include a new basic
education project to strengthen the Ministry of Education's
management and supervisory system, help it extend supervision

PORT AU PR 00001585 004 OF 004


over the vast private-sector education system, and provide
scholarships. Social assistance programs support Haiti's
most vulnerable citizens. Economic growth programs target
trade and invstment, financial sector programs for small and
medium enterprises, and programs for agricultural
productivity and marketing. Reducing environmental
degradation is the goalof USD 7 million in programs that
focus on restoing watersheds that are the source of periodic
fooding.

PEPFAR
--------------


15. (U) PEPFAR will provide just short of USD 100 million in
FY 2009 to prevent infections and put HIV positive persons
into treatment. Implemented by USAID and CDC, PEPFAR
programs target HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, but also benefit
large parts of Haiti's health care system. Haiti has the
highest rate of HIV/AIDS in the Western Hemisphere.

Police Reform/Corrections
--------------


16. (SBU) The U.S. is the lead donor in implementing the
MINUSTAH police reform plan, which foresees building up the
Haitian National Police (HNP) from its current strength of
9,000 to 14,000 officers by 2011. In concert with MINUSTAH's
mandate to enhance Haiti's border security, the U.S. Coast
Guard provides training for the Haitian Coast Guard, financed
by INL/NAS. The U.S. made a commitment in2007 to assist in
improving the conditions and human rights in Haiti's prison
system, and remains the lead dono
SANDERSON