Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PODGORICA193
2008-07-11 15:13:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Podgorica
Cable title:  

SERBIA TELLS MONTENEGRO TO HOLD OFF ON KOSOVO RECOGNITION

Tags:  PREL PGOV MW KO 
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VZCZCXRO5057
PP RUEHPOD
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ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111513Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0870
INFO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0071
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0009
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0392
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0175
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0099
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 0108
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 0032
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 0132
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0020
RUEHPOD/AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 0955
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PODGORICA 000193 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV MW KO
SUBJECT: SERBIA TELLS MONTENEGRO TO HOLD OFF ON KOSOVO RECOGNITION

USUN, USEU, USNATO

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PODGORICA 000193

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV MW KO
SUBJECT: SERBIA TELLS MONTENEGRO TO HOLD OFF ON KOSOVO RECOGNITION

USUN, USEU, USNATO


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Serbian FM Jeremic appealed strongly to the
GOM leadership 7/9 to not recognize Kosovo prior to the
September UNGA. Jeremic laid out a plan whereby Serbia would
persuade Russia to lift its opposition in the UNSC to EULEX in
exchange for European assent to Serbia's effort to have the UNGA
refer the matter of Kosovo to the ICJ. Under Jeremic's plan,
during the 2-3 year period of ICJ deliberations, Serbia would
gradually thaw relations with the U.S. and other countries, that
recognized Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia would refrain from
recognizing Kosovo, and Serbia would seek entry into the EU on
the "Cyprus model." Jeremic implied to the GOM that leading EU
countries supported the initiative. The Ambassador strongly
urged the GOM to hold to its current path toward recognition,
describing delay to and beyond the UNGA a recipe for uncertainty
and instability. Macedonia and Montenegro continue to compare
notes on the timing of recognition. END SUMMARY




2. (SBU) FM Rocen and Parliamentary President Krivokapic
briefed the Ambassador July 10 and 11 on their conversations
with visiting Serbian FM Jeremic on July 9. With both
interlocutors, Jeremic appealed for the GOM not to recognize
Kosovo before the UNGA, where Serbia hopes to get a majority of
votes to refer the issue of Kosovo's independence to the ICJ.
Once the case was referred to the ICJ, Jeremic reasoned, no
additional states -- including presumably Montenegro and
Macedonia -- would recognize Kosovo pending the outcome of the
ICJ case. (Rocen and Krivokapic both said they told Jeremic
they doubted that Serbia would have the necessary votes in the
UNGA). Jeremic said that the GOS thinking was that, during the
2-3 years of ICJ deliberations, passions over Kosovo would
subside in Serbia, and Belgrade would gradually thaw relations
(e.g., return Ambassadors) with countries that had recognized
Kosovo. Serbia would never recognize Kosovo, Jeremic said, but
would seek to enter the EU according to a "Cyprus model." Also,
Jeremic said that Serbia would ask Russia to lift its block in
the UNSC on EULEX in exchange for European agreement not to
actively block Serbia's efforts to have the UNGA refer Kosovo to
the ICJ. Jeremic implied to his GOM interlocutors that leading
EU states -- including Germany and the U.K. -- supported this

approach.




3. (SBU) Both Rocen and Krivokapic sought the Ambassador's
reaction to Jeremic's proposal. The Ambassador strongly urged
both to adhere to Montenegro's current path toward recognition.
The Serbian approach would simply prolong regional uncertainty
and instability and would perpetuate the belief in Serbia that
the recognition of Kosovo could somehow be overturned. He noted
that the USG had acknowledged Podgorica's earlier rationales for
delay (e.g., the specific relationship with Serbia, elections in
Montenegro and Serbia, the tourist season, etc.),but that a
further indefinite delay of this nature would likely receive no
support in Washington. It was time for the neighbors of Kosovo
to recognize the new country and normalize relations with it.




4. (SBU) Although both threw out a few probably unworkable
ideas as to how to at least partially satisfy the Serbian
entreaty, both took note of the Ambassador's reaction and
appeared to re-focus on how to get to recognition. The issue of
moving together with Macedonia loomed larger than in previous
discussions we have had with the GOM, perhaps stoked in part by
several high-level interactions recently between Podgorica and
Skopje. Krivokapic said a contemporaneous recognition by the
two countries would be a "nice package" that would facilitate
this decision in both countries. Rocen made the same point, but
also reiterated that it would be easier to move ahead if EU
countries - e.g., Portugal and Malta -- also recognized. He
noted that he had discussed this with Carl Bildt in Dubrovnik
last weekend.




5. (SBU) Rocen also said it would be helpful for Montenegro if
the US (and EU) would send a strong message to Serbia not to
cause problems for its neighbors in the event of their
recognition of Kosovo.

PODGORICA 00000193 002 OF 002






6. (SBU) Rocen also noted that the Russian Ambassador had been
in earlier the same morning, but hadn't even raised the Jeremic
visit. He also said that Thaci and Djukanovic had spoken on the
margins of the Dubrovnik meeting. The GOM impression of Thaci
was very positive: Rocen described the Kosovo PM as "reasonable
and well-intentioned."




7. (SBU) COMMENT: The Jeremic visit has clearly provoked some
waffling in Podgorica on recognition, an issue that is very
challenging for a small country so heavily interlinked with
Serbia. The opposition has also been loudly warning against
recognition, although even FM Rocen acknowledged to the
Ambassador that reaction to his trial balloon last week -- in
which he strongly implied in a newspaper interview that
Montenegro would recognize Kosovo -- was relatively mild. The
GOM, with the exception of the President, is still strongly
inclined toward recognition, however, and is looking for as much
cover as possible to move ahead. We should consider ways to
provide such cover, including urging consultations between
Skopje and Podgorica, sending the sort of message to Belgrade
that Rocen urged, helping the GOM leadership move ahead with
NATO integration, etc.
MOORE