Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PODGORICA104
2008-03-31 16:03:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Podgorica
Cable title:  

MONTENEGRO'S FINAL PRE-BUCHAREST BLITZ ON NATO

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR SR MW 
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VZCZCXRO9232
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RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHPOD #0104/01 0911603
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311603Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0717
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHPOD/AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 0795
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TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR SR MW
SUBJECT: MONTENEGRO'S FINAL PRE-BUCHAREST BLITZ ON NATO


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TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR SR MW
SUBJECT: MONTENEGRO'S FINAL PRE-BUCHAREST BLITZ ON NATO


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1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Affirming that Montenegro is ready and capable
of entering a "new phase of relations with the Alliance," PM
Djukanovic called on NATO Ambassadors 3/31 to support his
country's inclusion in Intensified Political Dialogue (IPD) at
the upcoming Bucharest Summit. Granting IPD to Montenegro would
help prevent the deepening of gaps within the region following
NATO invitations to Adriatic Charter countries; would provide a
positive stimulus to Serbia; and would help build stronger
public support for NATO among Montenegro's population, he said.
Regarding Serbia, the PM feared that that country is
"determined to have a last experiment with a Radical government"
and that the GOS' "satanization" of NATO would retard Serbia's
integration into NATO for years to come. Most of the ten NATO
countries present explicitly indicated their support for IPD,
although the UK Ambassador (protect) told us he had received
unclear signals from London. END SUMMARY




2. (SBU) Recently-elected PM Djukanovic emphasized to NATO
Ambassadors 3/31 that his Government is firmly committed to
Montenegro's integration into NATO and that he plans to
intensify ("dynamize") the country's efforts vis-a-vis NATO
during the 18 months left in his mandate. He called on NATO
representatives to support Montenegro's inclusion in IPD at the
Bucharest Summit later this week, affirming that Podgorica is
"ready for the challenge of entering a new phase of relations
with Alliance." He also stressed repeatedly that Montenegro
"has the capacity to be a credible partner" of NATO, pointing to
significant progress it had already made since joining PfP.




3. (SBU) In terms of progress to date, the PM pointed
specifically to institutional defense reform; committing to at
least 2 percent of GDP for defense spending; the creation of a
high-level "PFP Council" and inter-Ministerial commission; and
the adoption of IPP, PARP, and IPAP documents. He added that
the creation of a "Council for National Security" chaired by the
President, combined with an enhanced parliamentary role in
adopting Defense and National Security strategies, had

strengthened civilian oversight of the military. Montenegro was
a party to the Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC) agreement
signed earlier between SAM and NATO, had initiated the process
of acceding to the PfP SOFA; and was close to receiving
certification from NATO regarding its protection of classified
information. The GOM was committed to participating in
international peacekeeping operations, including "within the PfP
framework," and had already identified various resources for
this purpose (e.g., a medical unit; an infantry capacity; a
general-purpose helicopter, and a tugboat).




4. (SBU) The PM argued that IPD for Montenegro would be in the
interest of both the Alliance and of Montenegro, as it would
have important and positive consequences for regional stability.
Such an invitation would minimize the risk of "deepening gaps"
within the region in the event of membership invitations to the
A3 countries (which the PM said he fully supported). It would
also be a positive impetus to Serbia, just as Croatia's progress
toward NATO had had positive repercussions in Montenegro. It
would also help Montenegro make up for the "time it had lost" as
a member of the state union with Serbia and would help build
public support for NATO in Montenegro. The PM expressed his
hope that NATO would maintain its "Open Door" policy at and
beyond Bucharest and that it would continue to judge aspirants
on their own merits.




5. (SBU) The PM said he was "absolutely convinced" that the
Montenegrin leadership would be able to build majority public
support for the country's orientation toward NATO. "We must be
active, persistent, and serious" in implementing our NATO
Communications Strategy, he said. The GOM is also enlisting the
support of NGOs to support this campaign and suggested that NATO
Embassies could also play a role. The current low levels of
support (around 30 percent) derive largely from the "trauma" of
the 1999 NATO intervention, a trauma that had been exploited by
some opposition politicians during the ongoing Presidential
election campaign. This was particularly true among the
population in the North, which still looks toward Serbia, he
averred.




6. (SBU) Serbia is, and always has been, the central question
(and problem) of this region, the PM said. Problems that had
cropped up relating to the RS, Kosovo, and Montenegro could all
be traced back to Belgrade. The PM was not optimistic that that
a major change in Serbian strategy would be forthcoming anytime

PODGORICA 00000104 002.2 OF 002


soon. He expected that Belgrade's policy of blaming the
international community for its woes -- rather than recognizing
that Kosovo and other problems stemmed from disastrous Serbian
policies -- would continue. While the international community
needed to help the democratic forces in Serbia nudge that
country toward Euroatlantic integration, he was pessimistic that
Serbian support for NATO, at least, would be in the cards
anytime soon. While the May elections in Serbia would result
in a consolidation (regardless of the outcome) of pro-European
forces, Belgrade's "satanization" of NATO in recent times would
make it difficult for any future government to adopt a pro-NATO
policy. The best antidote would be continued enlargement of the
Alliance, as the inclusion of other countries in the region in
NATO would lead Belgrade to conclude there is no alternative to
NATO membership. He predicted that the elections in Serbia
would show that Serbs are "determined to have a last experiment
with a Radical government." Nonetheless, he argued against
"disqualifying anyone in advance as a potential partner,"
pointing to the transformation of Croatia's post-Tudjman HDZ as
an instructive example.




7. (SBU) COMMENT: This meeting was the last in Montenegro's
pre-Bucharest blitz to press for IPD. This blitz included two
meetings with NATO Ambassadors at the Prime Minister level, one
at the DefMin level, a meeting by the DefMin with NATO DATTs,
and the IPAP presentation in Brussels on 3/12 by the Ministers
of Defense and Foreign Affairs. The PM left no doubt that NATO
will figure heavily in his government's foreign policy, and he
expressed deep conviction that the GOM is capable of taking the
relationship to the next level.




8. (SBU) COMMENT (CONT'D): Most of the ten NATO countries
gathered around the table expressed explicit support for
Montenegro's IPD, and NATO, aspirations. Interestingly, the UK
Ambassador (protect) told us that he had received unclear
signals from London and suggested that a USG nudge to the UK
would have an impact in bringing London along.




9. (SBU) COMMENT (CONT'D): The PM appealed to NATO Ambassadors
not to misinterpret the fact that President Vujanovic will not
be in Bucharest. With Presidential elections scheduled for
April 6 and the sole pre-election television debate conflicting
with the Bucharest schedule, the President had to revise his
earlier plans to travel to be at the Summit, he said.
MOORE