RSO PESHAWAR MEETING WITH POLICE OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS

S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000519


NOFORN

DEPT FOR: DS/IP/SCA; DS/TIA/ITA; DS/EX; S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2018
TAGS: ASEC PTER
SUBJECT: RSO PESHAWAR MEETING WITH POLICE OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS
SECURITY MEASURES OF FOREIGN MISSION'S

REF: PESHAWAR 000475

CLASSIFIED BY: David J. Hazarian, Regional Security Officer,
RSO, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d)

1.(U) On November 19, 2008, Regional Security Officer (RSO)
Peshawar attended a meeting which was chaired by the Home
Secretary Branch of Government, North West Frontier Province
(NWFP),Mr. Fayaz TORU to discuss the security measures of
Foreign Missions and U.N. Agencies in Peshawar. Present at the
meeting were: Provincial Police Officer, NWFP; Commissioner,
Peshawar Region; Commandant Frontier Constabulary, NWFP; Deputy
Inspector General, NWFP; Chief Capital City Police Officer,
NWFP; and members representing security interests for the UN-All
Offices in NWFP; ICRC University Town; British Consul; Afghan
and Iranian Consulates and RSO Peshawar.


2. (SBU) TORU called the meeting to discuss the significant
increase of violence in Peshawar over the past week to include:
the killing of a USAID contractor, the kidnapping of an Iranian
diplomat, and the attack on a Japanese and a Pakistani
journalist. TORU emphasized the ability of militants to strike
successfully and repeatedly illustrated their acute surveillance
abilities, targeting their objectives and apparent determination
to kidnap and/or kill western and foreign targets.


3. (SBU) The Chief Capitol City Police Officer (CCCPO),NWFP
indicated they are increasing operations throughout town and
expressed concern that militant elements may stage further
attacks throughout Peshawar, specifically in the University Town
area in reprisal of these operations. Additionally, the CCCPO
indicated they have very diminished resources due to their
heightened state of alert and will not be able to continue with
the level of support currently being provided.


4. (S//NF) The area referenced, University Town, is primarily a
residential area approximately 13 kilometers southeast and a
roughly 20-minute commute from the Consulate. All 46 Consulate
residences and several off-site facilities, to include the
consulate's only recreation, TDY lodging and dining facility
(Khyber Club) is located in this area. University Town was the
area of the attack on the Principal Officer in September and all
Consulate personnel must transit the limited number of roadways
into and out of the area on a daily and frequent basis, making
University Town one of Post's primary security concerns. This
was also the area, on November 12, 2008, where a USAID
Contractor, working as the Director for Community Housing
Foundation (CHF) was shot dead along with his local driver by
unknown assailants. Theses attacks, together with the recent
successful kidnappings of the Afghan Consul General and Iranian
diplomat in another upscale neighborhood similar to University
Town, denoted a clear shift in adversary methods to organize
coordinated attacks in areas thought to be "secure."

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RSO PESHAWAR ASSESSMENT
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5.A. (S//NF) Based on the complexities and volume of recent
attacks throughout Peshawar, RSO assesses local police assets
are inadequate to deal with the current security situation.
Additional police support is unlikely to materialize, and from
all indicators it will diminish in the immediate term as the
NWFP's existing security forces continue to be stretched by
other demands and operations in support of GOP military actions
in the NWFP.


B. (S//NF) There has been a significant increase in specific
threat reporting targeting US personnel and facilities in
University Town, the US Consulate itself and movements
throughout Peshawar. Multiple reports specify on-going
pre-attack surveillance that clearly indicates knowledge of
Consulate routes, procedures and facilities/residences. GPRO
places high credibility on the reporting and assesses that
militants possess the capability and intention to carry out
attacks. Additionally, local police also indicate that sustained
Pakistani operations along the border have also angered
militants who may now conduct more brazen attacks with less
concern regarding HN reprisal and collateral damage.


C. (S//NF) There is strong indication that pre-attack
surveillance has been completed against potential targets,
allowing attacks to initiate at discretion of the attacker
against US personnel, routes, vehicles and facilities. All of
these particulars are known to the adversary.


D. (S//NF) In the wake of the PO attack in September, NWFP
police augmented the BG contingent and RSO has been managing a
follow/chase car system to increase the level of security
afforded Consulate motor pool movements. Consulate/police
assets are stretched critically thin in maintaining this
initiative. The reduction of personnel and increase in the
number of local guard mobile reaction teams (MRTs) have lessened
the pressure to a degree but RSO and NWFP police have limited
ability to provide adequate, sustained security or conduct
operations to disrupt planned or in-process terrorist
operations.

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NEXT STEPS
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6. (S//NF) In the last week, Post has re-located most of the
Consulate personnel to Islamabad to reduce the footprint of
movements in and out of University Town. As of November 22,
2008, the Consulate's American staffing levels wil be as
follows: State-seven; USAID-one; ODRP/ Special Operations
Command and Control Element (SOCCE)-twelve; and RAO-thirty-five.
GRPO and SOCCE provide for their own security infrastructure.
The staff who have departed currently reside in Islamabad, a
two-hour car ride away. Consideration is being given to visits
from these officers back to Peshawar so they can review their
ongoing programs and initiate new ones. For the reasons
delineated in the above paragraphs, RSO and Post Management will
consider these visits on a strict case-by-case basis until
personnel, procedural and physical resources improve. RSO will
provide separate requests for funding and personnel in an effort
to permit post to move forward with these important foreign
affairs initiatives.


7. (U) Point of contact for this information is RSO Peshawar,
David J. Hazarian


TRACY