Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PESHAWAR517
2008-11-19 14:03:00
SECRET
Consulate Peshawar
Cable title:  

POST CONVENES EAC MEETING ON NOVEMBER 19, 2008

Tags:  ASEC PTER MOPS AMGT PK 
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O 191403Z NOV 08
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7739
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 
CIA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
NSC WASHINGTON DC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000517 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018
TAGS: ASEC PTER MOPS AMGT PK
SUBJECT: POST CONVENES EAC MEETING ON NOVEMBER 19, 2008

REF: A) TD-314/083844-08 B) TD-314/083599-08 C) TDX-315/083642-08

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne M. Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000517

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018
TAGS: ASEC PTER MOPS AMGT PK
SUBJECT: POST CONVENES EAC MEETING ON NOVEMBER 19, 2008

REF: A) TD-314/083844-08 B) TD-314/083599-08 C) TDX-315/083642-08

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne M. Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1. (S) Post convened an Emergency Action Committee meeting at
13:00 (local) on November 19 to review specific, credible threat
information targeting Consulate personnel that developed late
November 18. PO, RSO, RAO, and Special Forces element attended
the meeting. See para 7 for Washington action. RSO overall
assessment of Consulate's threat environment will be reported
septel.

Threat Reports
--------------


2. (S/NF) The EAC assessed the reftels, particularly Ref A, to
have a high degree of credibility. Ref A outlines a threat
initiated by the Haqqani network directed against American and
local Consulate staff with plans to target them (suicide
bombers) at an "opportune" moment after leaving the American
(Khyber) Club/Consulate residential cluster in University Town
or after departing the Consulate compound in the cantonment.
Ref B describes a possible attack on the Consulate compound.
Ref C outlines the possible use of "Uzbeks" to kidnap foreigners
in Peshawar. None of the threats have a timeline. The Haqqani
order in Ref A reportedly took place approximately one week ago.

Post Actions
--------------


3. (S/NF) The EAC agreed to accelerate the re-location of some
Consulate personnel to reduce our footprint of movements in and
out of University Town. Nearly all re-location or departure on
R&R will be completed by November 21. As of November 22, the
Consulate's American staffing levels will be as follows: State
- five; USAID - one; ODRP (Special Forces and 101st Liaison) -
twelve; and RAO - thirty-five. The EAC is continuing to review
the Consulate's staffing levels and may designate a few
additional personnel for re-location.


4. (S/NF) Some of the remaining staff will be re-positioned to
the American Club cluster. The EAC noted that the threat
reporting mentions the Club area. However, this is also the
most defensible Consulate residential area and where the most
Consulate security resources can be brought quickly to bear.


5. (C) The EAC determined that local staff should be asked to
remain on standby at home until November 24 with some limited
exceptions for essential operations. Principal Officer will
hold a townhall with local staff on November 24. Only visitors
with a mission essential purpose will be permitted to travel to
Peshawar. Post will continue using the Peshawar airport. The
Consulate build-out project has been placed on hold until
additional RSO support arrives. The project which includes
upgrades/re-configurations to the Consulate perimeter requires a
dedicated RSO to supervise.

Host Country Response
--------------


6. (C) Provincial authorities are hosting a meeting on November
20 on security measures for the diplomatic/foreign community in
Peshawar. Consulate representatives will attend. EAC members
report an increased police presence in University Town with some
checkpoints (fixed and impromptu). The EAC assessed the
additional police numbers as unlikely to be effective in
countering the threats outlined in reftels.

Washington Action
--------------


7. (C) Post is still awaiting the confirmation of the arrival of
the Mobile Security Detection Team. The team's date of arrival
was November 22. However, post understands that the team is
having difficulty obtaining visas. As noted in para 5, post is
also still awaiting the confirmation of additional RSO support,
particularly for oversight of the build-out project and vehicle
movements. This is where current requests stand. Post will
continue to assess Consulate security requirements and may make
additional requests.

TRACY