NWFP/FATA: SENIOR LOCAL OFFICIALS ON SECURITY CONDITIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000513

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV MOPS PK
SUBJECT: NWFP/FATA: SENIOR LOCAL OFFICIALS ON SECURITY CONDITIONS

REF: PESHAWAR 511 (NOTAL)

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne M. Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
Summary
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1. (C) In the wake of the killing of a USAID contractor,
Principal Officer called on key senior local officials on
November 13 to reinforce that the United States will stay
engaged on the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and
the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). Across the board, these
officials viewed the attack as part of a broader effort to shake
resolve and support for military operations in Bajaur that are
putting pressure on militants. While all expressed a genuine
desire to assist the Consulate's security situation, these
promises may be hard to keep. The demand for security forces in
Bajaur, Swat, and other hot spots has left areas around
Peshawar, particularly Khyber Agency, vulnerable to militant
encroachment as was the case earlier this year. The violence
that spiked in Peshawar this past week with security forces
struggling to keep up is a stark reminder of the challenge that
Pakistan faces to clear and hold. End Summary.

Expressions of Support and Concern
--------------


2. (C) PO met separately with NWFP Chief Minister Hoti, Governor
Ghani, 11th Corps Commander General Masood/11th Corps Chief of
Staff Brigadier Aamer, and Inspector General Police Malik
Naveed. All expressed horror at the killing of USAID contractor
Stephen Vance on November 12 and urged increased caution in
movements around Peshawar (see EAC reftel). CM Hoti asked that
the Consulate consider co-locating office and residential space.
PO explained that the Consulate was looking at this option (but
did not mention post's interest in the Pearl Continental site).
IG Naveed offered manpower in the University Town area and is
working with the Consulate on strengthening security at key
intersections where post residences are located. Brigadier
Aamer said that the 11th Corps is reviewing "silent" support
that it can provide to the University Town area. A visible
military presence in the suburb, he added, would not be the
right optic.

Spike in Violence -- Pressure from Militants
--------------


3. (C) Brigadier Aamer tied the spike in violence in Peshawar to
militants who are under pressure in Bajaur. Governor Ghani
ticked off recent acts of violence -- the September 22
kidnapping of the Afghan Consul General (and
Ambassador-designate for Pakistan),the suicide bombing at
Qayyum stadium on November 11, the killing of the USAID
contractor on November 12, and the kidnapping of an Iranian
diplomat on November 13 as indicators that operations in Bajaur
are shaking things up. PO asked if there had been any progress
in the Afghan CG's case. The Governor responded negatively and
indicated that Pakistani authorities believe that the Afghan CG
has been moved to Afghanistan.


4. (C) Ghani also mentioned the November 12 kidnapping of a
female Canadian journalist on the outskirts of Bannu, heading
toward Miramshah. The journalist was reportedly traveling in a
hired vehicle in the company of two local support staff. Her
companions were also taken. Ghani noted that the journalist did
not have permission to travel to the tribal areas. According to
press reports, the journalist is a convert to Islam who runs a
website, Jihad Unspun, and was on freelance assignment for Al
Jazeera. (Note: The Canadian Embassy is aware of the case.)

Bajaur and Mohmand
--------------


5. (C) Operations in Bajaur are continuing, Ghani said, and
initial forays into Mohmand (NFI) have begun. He commented that
militants from Bajaur and Mohmand are moving into the settled
districts around Peshawar and shaving their beards to blend in.
(Note: According to NGO contacts, 5,000-7,000 IDPs from Mohmand
have moved into Charsadda district, north of Peshawar.) The
government, Ghani declared, was committed to maintaining
sufficient force levels to keep the pressure on militants and
wanted to move steadily south. PO asked about the government's
hold strategy for Bajaur and other areas. There were no fixed
force numbers yet, Ghani responded, but he estimated that
approximately 60 percent of the Frontier Corps force that is now
in Bajaur would be left in place to help maintain security.

Pulling Forces From Other Areas
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6. (C) The November 10 hijacking of containers in Khyber -- some
carrying supplies for Coalition forces -- was an
"embarrassment," the Governor continued. (Note: A number of
local papers had carried a front page photo of militants
standing on a humvee with signs indicating an association with
Baitullah Mehsud's Tehrik-i Taliban.) Frontier Corps forces in
Khyber, Ghani said, had been reduced to 50, based primarily
inside Jamrud Fort. The remainder of FC personnel normally
assigned to Khyber had been moved to support operations in
Bajaur and Mohmand. Other FC forces had been considered (from
on the border or the Waziristans),but these areas had missions
that were also critical.


7. (C) The Frontier Corps, the Governor added, was short two
wings (approximately 600 soldier per wing),and there had been
calls to bring down the numbers in Bajaur -- a course the
Governor said he has resisted. (Note: On November 15,
Peshawar's Special Forces element reported that a wing of a
Frontier Corps wing from the Khyber Rifles was assigned by the
Political Agent to help provide security for NATO and wheat
shipments passing through Khyber Agency. Frontier Corps is
reportedly disgruntled because of it has pulled forces out of
Bajaur and because of the feeling that transporters should hire
security for these convoys.)

Mehsuds in Khyber
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8. (C) After the security troubles in Khyber during the spring
and summer, the Political Agent, the Governor explained, had
pitched the local criminal warlords Mangal Bagh and Haji Namdar
(both with militant affiliations) against one another. Both
groups had been weakened, but it had also opened the door, Ghani
observed, for Baitullah Mehsud to make inroads into Khyber with
his own people. PO asked why Shinwaris and Afridis were
tolerating the presence of Mehsuds on their territory. "Money,"
the Governor stated flatly.

Waziristanis Asking for Peace
--------------


9. (C) Elders from the Waziristans, the Governor said, were
approaching him quietly and asking for peace. With sustained
operations in Bajaur, community leaders, Ghani maintained, are
seeing the handwriting on the wall -- and trying to avoid the
same fate. (Comment: Conspicuously absent from his remarks on
this topic was the impact of air strikes over the past several
months of which he has been a vocal critic. End Comment.)

Release of Baitullah Mehsud's Deputy
--------------


10. (C) Ghani assessed that the government was making progress
in Orakzai with the help of lashkars (tribal militias) despite
the toll of suicide attacks on local elders. PO asked about the
reported early November release of Baitullah Mehsud's
Orakzai-based deputy, Maulana Rafiuddin. (Note: Rafiuddin was
picked up by police in July. The Maulana is reportedly close to
Mehsud who instigated attacks and kidnappings against government
targets to pressure for Rafiuddin's release.)


11. (C) The Governor confirmed that Rafiuddin had been set free
in return for 10 kidnapped security forces personnel. The
police should have just killed Rafiuddin, the Governor commented
candidly. Once in custody, it was much more difficult "to deal"
with him. PO began to raise the problems created by such a
deal, but the Governor cut her off, saying flatly, "we did what
needed to be done in this case." (Comment: The Governor was
clearly uncomfortable with this topic. In contrast to PO's
conversations with him in early mid-2008 where he played down
prisoner exchanges in South Waziristan as low level and part of
tribal collective responsibility, the Governor was very
straightforward in describing the nature of the action. End
Comment.)

Comment
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12. (C) Operations in Bajaur and Mohmand have likely left
militants looking for targets of retaliation. And, with the
drain in forces from Khyber -- and separately we hear that large
numbers of police have been seconded to Swat and areas north and
south of Peshawar recently -- the city and its immediate suburbs
appear to be vulnerable again to militant/criminal activity
where reduced presence of security forces emboldens these
elements to act. The return of a high volume of violence to
Peshawar after this summer's operations in Khyber Agency as well
as the Governor's comments on post-kinetic plans for Bajaur
underscore the lack of a clear, well-resourced and well-staffed
"hold" plan for the FATA and areas of the NWFP.
TRACY