Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PESHAWAR511
2008-11-14 13:16:00
SECRET
Consulate Peshawar
Cable title:  

POST CONVENES EAC MEETING

Tags:  ASEC PTER MOPS PK 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 141316Z NOV 08
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7728
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 
NSC WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000511 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018
TAGS: ASEC PTER MOPS PK
SUBJECT: POST CONVENES EAC MEETING

REF: A) TD-314/081980-08 B) TD-314/082591-08 C) PESHAWAR 508

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne M. Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000511

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018
TAGS: ASEC PTER MOPS PK
SUBJECT: POST CONVENES EAC MEETING

REF: A) TD-314/081980-08 B) TD-314/082591-08 C) PESHAWAR 508

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne M. Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1. (S) Post convened an Emergency Action Committee meeting at
10:30 (local) on November 14 in light of specific, credible
threat information targeting Consulate personnel and a request
from local security authorities to limit Consulate movements.
PO, RSO, RAO, and DEA attended the meeting. See paras 7-9 for
Principal Officer's comment.

Threat Report
--------------


2. (S/NF) The EAC reviewed threat reporting developed late
November 13 that described an attempt to target Consulate
vehicles on one of the two primary routes in University Town
used by Consulate personnel traveling from home to office (Refs
A-B). There was no timeframe associated with the threat. Based
on the level of detail, the EAC assessed the threat to be very
credible.


3. (S) RSO received a request late on November 13 from local
security authorities, asking that the Consulate limit its
movements in University Town. Local authorities indicated that
search operations may take place over the next several days in
the Hayatabad and University Town suburbs in the wake of the
November 13 kidnapping of an Iranian diplomat in Hayatabad.
Local authorities also expressed concern that militant elements
may stage further attacks in the University Town area in
reprisal for the search operations as well as military
operations in Bajaur Agency. (Comment: The request by local
authorities to limit Consulate movements is highly unusual if
not unprecedented.)

Consulate Response
--------------


4. (U) The EAC had limited post travel on November 12 to mission
essential following the killing of a USAID contractor on a
University Town street where Consulate residences are located
(Ref C). Mission essential travel status was to remain in
effect through November 14.


5. (S) The EAC determined on November 14 that the Consulate's
mission essential travel status should be extended through
November 17. Post is coordinating with Islamabad to release an
updated warden message about the extension of mission essential
travel status. The EAC agreed that all visits except those with
a mission essential purpose should be deferred through November

17. The EAC agreed that all self-drivers must travel in pairs.
Post is continuing its policy implemented in late August
following the attack on the Principal Officer that vehicles
operated by local drivers travel in a minimum of twos with armed
bodyguards.


6. (S/NF) RSO is separately requesting the immediate deployment
of a Security Support Team (SST) from the Office of Mobile
Security Deployments (DS/T/MSD). Post is also coordinating with
Embassy Islamabad on a comprehensive list of required security
resources to enable the Consulate's presence and to perform its
mission in Peshawar for the immediate, near, and medium term.

Principal Officer Comment
--------------


7. (S/NF) The string of violence in Peshawar over the past week
-- the suicide bombing at a sports stadium, the killing of our
USAID contractor, the kidnapping of an Iranian diplomat, and
reports of an attack on November 14 in Hayatabad on a Japanese
and a Pakistani journalist -- have underscored the ability of
al-Qai'da and its associates to strike successfully and
repeatedly in a short space of time in areas that were once
considered relatively safe. Security forces have been drained
from Khyber and Peshawar to cope with Bajaur, Swat, and hot
spots around Kohat/Darra Adam Khel, leaving Peshawar vulnerable
to hit and run violence as it was earlier this year. In this
latest round of violence plaguing Peshawar, militants appear
more determined than ever to hit at western/foreign targets as
well as local institutions of government.


8. (S/NF) While we have asked at senior local levels and been
promised police support -- we cannot count on that help for our
safety and security, particularly in the University Town area
where all of the Consulate's residences are located. Local
police contacts although genuine in their desire to assist
appear overwhelmed or tell us quietly that the police are
demoralized and deserting. Some local observers fear that the
police will simply "lay down like they did in Swat."


9. (S/NF) The details of the threat contained in Refs A-B
indicate that Consulate personnel and vehicles are being closely
observed and that al-Qai'da and/or local associates already
appear to be adapting to countermeasures that we have put in
place. The resources that will be required to allow Consulate
personnel to move with some reasonable measure of safety from
home to work and on business in the community must come from the
U.S. side. These resources must be sufficiently robust to make
up for gaps in local law enforcement and capable of addressing
the deteriorating security conditions around Peshawar.

TRACY