SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN KURRAM TO FACE PAKISTAN MILITARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PESHAWAR 000474

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/29/2018
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PK
SUBJECT: SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN KURRAM TO FACE PAKISTAN MILITARY
OPERATION?

REF: A) PESHAWAR 409 B) PESHAWAR 396 C) PESHAWAR 384 D) PESHAWAR 36 E) 07 PESHAWAR 739 F) 07 PESHAWAR 248

CLASSIFIED BY: Michael A. Via, Acting Principal Officer,
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Violence in Kurram Agency has claimed over 700 lives
since early August when the latest wave of sectarian fighting
escalated. Over 1300 have been killed in the last 17 months of
sporadic clashes. The Sunni have historically had a slight
upper hand in fighting, first in the April 2007 violence (Ref.
F) and again in November (Refs. D, E). Within the past month,
however, the Shi'a have launched a series of lethal attacks and
have won new ground. Rumors consistently attribute the Shi'a
momentum to Afghan and Iranian support. Local taliban from
North Waziristan, who support the Sunni tribes, carved out a
transit corridor in lower Kurram in late 2007, linking North
Waziristan to Khost Province in Afghanistan. But on August 31,
the Shi'a captured several Sunni and local taliban strongholds
in the corridor. A ceasefire struck on September 9 has slowed
but not stopped the violence, and over 45 have been killed since
September 18. A second ceasefire was concluded on September 27
whose effect has yet to be seen. The patchwork of Sunni, Shi'a
and local taliban control of roads has led to the shutdown of
most of the main arteries linking the agency to Hangu District
and Afghanistan, even though on August 20 the Frontier Corps
deployed four wings (approximately 2,400 men) to intervene along
the road. The military authorized an operation of one brigade
to clear the corridor that the local taliban control on
September 2. But with ongoing operations in Bajaur, Swat and
Darra Adam Khel it is unlikely that military intervention will
be launched in the immediate future.

Baghzai: A Shi'a Victory
--------------


2. (C) Ghulam Qadir, the Secretary for Law and Order at the
FATA Secretariat, confirms that the recent fighting in Kurram
has resulted in heavy casualties for the local taliban from
North Waziristan. Over 700 on both sides have been killed in
six weeks of fighting, nearly 100 of whom were killed on August
31 in battles for the Baghzai area and in three alleged suicide
attacks staged by the Sunni Bangash tribe against the Shi'a Turi
tribe. Much of the fighting has taken place in the area between
Alizai and Sadda in Sunni-dominated Lower Kurram and around the
Peiwar border crossing, 25 km northwest of Parachinar in Shi'a
dominated upper Kurram. The Turi tribemen lead the six Shi'a
tribes and the Bangash tribesmen lead the six Sunni tribes. On
August 31, the Shi'a captured several villages in the Baghzai
area, a stronghold of the Sunni Bangash tribe and their taliban
supporters. A post contact whose staff visited Baghzai soon
thereafter said that the villages were burnt down and the
inhabitants had fled.


3. (C) Sited across the river from Alizai in lower Kurram,
Baghzai also has strategic significance for the local taliban
from North Waziristan. It lies in the heart of the transit
corridor that these local taliban carved out in lower Kurram in
late 2007 to link North Waziristan to Khost Province in
Afghanistan. A post contact estimates that the taliban from
North Waziristan receive bribes of between $150,000 and $250,000
per month to allow safe passage along the dust "kacha" tracks in
the corridor. (Note: The corridor consists of all of lower
Kurram west of the river to Afghanistan, as far north as
Arawali, which is approximately seven kilometers south of Sadda.
End note.)

The Fight to Control the Roads
--------------


4. (C) Most roads that supply Kurram are closed. Smuggling
routes have become the primary ways of supplying the agency and
sustaining the local economy. On August 20 the Kurram Militia,
the Frontier Corps for the agency, deployed four wings --
approximately 2,400 men -- to intervene along the Thall-Sadda
road, much of which is controlled by the Sunni. Qadir said that
the Kurram Militia has been successful at checking local

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vehicles. They are afraid to confront vehicles of the local
taliban, however, because they are outgunned. The locals
interpret this as government support for the local taliban,
creating a credibility problem for the political administration.
(Note: The levies in Kurram are predominantly Shi'a and mostly
police Parachinar. The Kurram Militia once consisted of mostly
Shi'a members but recent heavy Sunni recruitment outside of
Kurram has made it Sunni dominated. End note.)


5. (C) Previous government convoys, supply trucks and private
vehicles attempting to use the road to Parachinar through Hangu
District and Lower Kurram have been blocked and seized.
Drivers, particularly those who are Shi'a, have been killed and
mutilated. On June 19 the political agent ordered a government
convoy of 24 trucks to use the road despite the blockage. When
the convoy was ambushed, the political agent used pre-positioned
military air support to drive away the militants. Even so,
twelve drivers were killed and their bodies mutilated (Ref. C).
Post contacts state that roads linking the agency to Afghanistan
and Hangu District are still controlled by a patchwork of Sunni,
Shi'a and local taliban groups. Essential to travel from Kurram
to Peshawar is the Thall-Hangu road through Hangu District.
This has again come under the control of Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) despite the military operation in Hangu in July
(Refs. A, B). In Lower Kurram, the Thall-Sadda road is
primarily controlled by the Sunni and local taliban, with some
pockets of Shi'a control. In Upper Kurram, the roads are
predominantly held by Shi'a tribes, though there is ongoing
fighting at the most heavily used border crossing with
Afghanistan at Peiwar. As a result of the fighting in the
border region, this road has not been a reliable supply route in
recent months. Even when the Peiwar crossing is viable, convoys
must pass through unstable areas in Khost Province in
Afghanistan and Khyber Agency in Pakistan in order to reach
Peshawar. (Note: The Sunni Maqbal tribe spans the
Pakistan-Afghan border and the Afghan tribesmen sometimes take
revenge on transiting vehicles for attacks on their kin on the
Pakistani side of the border. End note.)


6. (C) Episodes of sectarianism have hit elsewhere in the
province in the past six weeks. On September 18, press sources
reported that the local taliban evicted 200 Shi'a families from
Orakzai. The August 18 suicide bombing near a Dera Ismail Khan
hospital killed 32 who had gathered to mourn the assassination
of a Shi'a leader. A Shi'a leader was killed separately in
Peshawar on August 16.

What the Shi'a and Sunni Want
--------------


7. (C) The Shi'a and Sunni of Kurram both want three things:
the reopening of the roads, the right to return to their homes
in areas dominated by the other sect, and monetary compensation
for property damage in the past ten months. In July, Shi'a
tribal elders agreed to the resettlement of Sunnis in Upper
Kurram in principle but refused to give guarantees of their
safety. The Sunnis did not return out of fear that the Shi'a
majority in Upper Kurram would seek retribution against them for
any action against the Shi'a in Sunni-controlled Lower Kurram.
(Note: Central Kurram, known as Frontier Region Kurram until
February 2004, is almost exclusively Sunni. Although tribes
from this area are involved in the fighting in Upper and Lower
Kurram, there have been no reports of fighting in their
territory. End Note.)

Outside Support Exacerbates the Violence
--------------


8. (C) The local taliban from North Waziristan allegedly moved
into Kurram to maintain a corridor to Afghanistan and to support
the Sunni in the sectarian unrest. The Shi'a allegedly receive
support from former Northern Alliance elements of the Afghan
military as well as financial and advisory support from Iran.
On 25 August, Advisor to the Prime Minister on Interior Affairs,
Rehman Malik, publicly accused foreign elements of involvement

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in Kurram. Post contacts say that if the outside fighters were
pushed out of Kurram, the local Sunni and Shi'a tribes could
negotiate a credible truce. Although it is unclear how many
outside fighters support the young militants in Kurram, post
contacts estimate that the numbers on each side are in the
hundreds.

Local Taliban from North Waziristan
--------------


9. (C) According to post contacts, Sunni tribes allowed the
local taliban from North Waziristan to support them during the
unrest in November 2007 (Refs. D, F). The local taliban wanted
a corridor into Afghanistan due to the pressure on the Afghan
side of the North Waziristan border. According to the Liaison
Officer (LNO) from Combined Joint Taskforce (CJTF) 101, there
are four navigable passes from the lower Kurram corridor into
Afghanistan. Coalition forces have not had significant enemy
contact on the Afghan side of that border, however, nor have
they recorded more cross-border attacks from Kurram. The LNO
from CJTF 101 reports that cross-border attacks from Lower
Kurram number about one or two each week. (Note: Upper Kurram
attacks are almost non-existent. End note.)


10. (C) The local taliban quickly extended their reach within
Lower Kurram, according to post contacts. Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) took responsibility for the suicide bombing at a
PPP rally in the run-up to the parliamentary elections in
February in Shi'a dominated Parachinar, which killed 40. Post
contacts suggest that the local taliban motivation to engage
Shi'a in Kurram has been spurred on by the anti-Shi'a group,
Lashkar-i-Janghvi, which has links to TTP in North Waziristan.
When the local taliban entered the agency, they demanded that
the Sunnis blow up CD shops in Alizai and Sadda, the two main
cities in lower Kurram. The damage from ongoing violence to
economic livelihoods in the area and the ideological bent of the
local taliban have soured the relationship between the Sunni and
the Wazirs. But, according to a post contact, the local taliban
from North Waziristan are now sufficiently entrenched in Kurram
that the Sunni do not know how to sideline them. The local
taliban in Kurram are mostly from the Utmanzai Wazir and Daur
tribes. They are allegedly supplemented by small contingents of
Chechens and Uzbeks and some local taliban from South
Waziristan.

Afghan Support for the Shi'a
--------------


11. (C) Ghulam Qadir claims that some Afghan intelligence
officers formerly of the Northern Alliance have brought in
weapons, financing and advice to support the Shi'a against the
taliban. Another post contact specifies that Hazara, Tajiks,
and Uzbeks have been lending support for two months now. But
post contacts are unsure whether the Afghan support has been
officially sanctioned. They only point out that the Afghan
government has tried to send convoys of supplies to Shi'a
dominated Parachinar, the administrative hub of the agency
located in upper Kurram.


12. (S) On August 17, the Sunni Bangash tribe claimed to
capture seven uniformed Afghan National Army personnel. A post
press contact who interviewed two of the captured men said that
they spoke of Shi'a elders from the Turi tribe meeting earlier
in the year with Afghan President Hamid Karzai to ask for
support in their fight with the local taliban. Although the
political agent publicly dismissed the presence of Afghan
soldiers in Kurram, post contacts close to him say he was trying
to prevent a blame game from ramping up. Post contacts
attribute part of the success of the recent Shi'a offensive to
this Afghan support.

The Iran Connection
--------------


13. (C) Senior Pakistan military officials stated that Iran has

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also stepped up its financial and advisory support to the Shi'a
of Kurram, according to one civilian Pakistani security advisor.
They speculate that this support may be channeled through the
Hazaras of Afghanistan, who also receive Iranian support. For
years the Iranian Consulate in Peshawar has allegedly provided
scholarships to Shi'a students from Kurram. Although some
students have gone to the Iranian seminaries in Qom to become
clerics, others have gone instead to Lebanon and, more recently,
Iraq to be trained as fighters, according to a post contact.
The two militias operating in Upper Kurram call themselves the
"Mehdi Militia" and "Hezbollah." (Note: Although sectarian
violence in Kurram began in 1939, the relationship between the
Shi'a of Pakistan and Iran goes back to 1979. The era of
heightened sectarianism after the Iranian revolution under the
leadership of President Zia ul-Haq ushered in new ties between
Iran and the Shi'a communities throughout Pakistan. End note.)

Jirga Brokers an Ineffective Ceasefire
--------------


14. (C) The ceasefire declared on September 9, designed to last
until December 26, came on the heels of a Shi'a offensive in
lower Kurram. The ceasefire has not held. Hangu District and
Orakzai Agency jointly sent a peace jirga to Kurram on August 19
to broker peace. Eight Sunni members negotiated in Lower
Kurram, and eight Shi'a members negotiated separately in Upper
Kurram. Over the course of two weeks, the Shi'a agreed to
support the government's efforts to end militancy in the agency,
but the Sunni were reluctant to submit to a ceasefire. Several
post contacts noted that tribal elders from the Kurram tribes
have lost their influence to the young militants. On the Shi'a
side, the elders have also lost ground to pro-Iranian clerics.
Many are afraid to speak out for fear of being targeted.

Possible Military Intervention
--------------


15. (C) Despite the weakness of the tribal elders, post
contacts believe that peace can be negotiated among the tribes
once the outside elements are pushed out of the agency. On
September 2, the military authorized an operation of one brigade
to clear the corridor that the local taliban of North Waziristan
control, according to a post contact who proposed the plan.
With the corridor controlled, he expects negotiations between
the tribes and Kurram Militia efforts will have vastly better
prospects of success. He maintains that it will be insufficient
to clear Kurram alone, however. Without extending the operation
into Hangu District and clearing the Thall-Hangu road of TTP
militants, the agency will still be blocked off from access to
the settled areas of Pakistan.

Political Administration Enforces Sanctions
--------------


16. (C) Qadir reports that with approximately $250,000 the
political agent could buy off everyone in authority to halt
violence in the agency. In early September, the political agent
ordered sanctions against Shi'a and Sunni business interests, in
a bid to coerce the tribal elders into cooperation. Section 21
of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) enables the political
agent to confiscate property belonging to any member of a tribe
if a fellow tribesman disrupts the peace. The political agent
closed transport businesses, shops, and hotels owned by Kurram
businessmen both locally and throughout the province.

Humanitarian Situation Worst for Minority Pockets
-------------- --------------


17. (C) The humanitarian situation throughout the agency is
poor due to the road blockages. The real humanitarian crisis is
for the pockets of Shi'a in lower Kurram and of Sunni in upper
Kurram. Qadir reported that the FATA Secretariat approached the
army to do helicopter resupply of these minority pockets but was
turned down because of the prospect of anti-aircraft fire.
Although militants on both sides are modifying ground machine

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guns and rockets to fire on planes, Qadir is skeptical of the
effectiveness of such anti-aircraft fire. Prices of basic
staples have skyrocketed throughout the agency. In Lower and
Central Kurram, schools and banks have been closed, and
electricity has been shut down for more than a month, which has
led to a shortage of drinking water. Post contacts estimate
that 100,000 of the half million inhabitants have left the
agency since late 2007. Army helicopters regularly transport
medicine, the critically wounded and some civilians between
Parachinar and Peshawar. But normal supplies must get into the
agency by paying off militants at checkposts or transiting via
smuggling routes. Kurram is one of the most fertile areas in
FATA, which has helped to supply the agency with some of its
food needs. USAID/OTI has been able to undertake limited
operations with the Shi'a in Upper Kurram for three months but
has not been able to undertake sustained programs in Lower
Kurram.

Post Contacts
--------------


18. (C) Post contacts mentioned above include NWFP Governor
Owais Ghani, Ghulam Qadir (Secretary for Law and Order at the
FATA Secretariat),a former Additional Chief Secretary of the
FATA Secretariat (a retired military brigadier general who has
held senior civilian positions in NWFP and who advises top
political and military leaders on FATA),the Khyber Political
Agent and former Kurram PA, the head of the International
Organization for Migration's (IOM) USAID/OTI sponsored program
in Kurram, the Peshawar Bureau Chief of Dawn News, a local
journalist based in Sunni-controlled Sadda, and Peshawar Liaison
Officer from Combined Joint Taskforce 101.

Comment
--------------


19. (C) The Shi'a may be emboldened but the people of the
agency are perplexed by what they view as a lack of political
will to stop the bloodshed. More people have been killed in the
past six weeks than were killed in all of 2007. Even though a
military operation may occur eventually, the Pakistan security
forces are unlikely to deploy in the near term given ongoing
operations in Swat and Bajaur.


20. (C) The challenge now will be to prevent the spread of
unrest beyond Kurram given the significant Shi'a populations in
Orakzai, Hangu, Dera Ismail Khan and Bhakkal.
VIA