PAKISTAN'S PROSPECTS FOR CURBING MILITANCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000391


E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/8/2018
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV EAID PINR PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN'S PROSPECTS FOR CURBING MILITANCY

REF: ISLAMABAD 2135


CLASSIFIED BY: Michael A. Via, Acting Principal Officer,
Consulate Peshawar, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)

Summary/Introduction
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1. (C) Despite the presence of over 100,000 combined
military/security forces in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) and over 50,000 in the Northwest Frontier Province
(NWFP),the government has been losing space to militants since

2002. The pace of loss has accelerated over the past year.
Distraction at the national level with political survival,
policy dissonance between the federal and provincial
governments, competition over bureaucratic turf, and fractious
civil-military relations have translated into local governance
that is adrift and unable to check swiftly and effectively
opportunities for militant expansion. Militants, meanwhile,
have been moving toward greater coordination, particularly
through Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan.


2. (C) Pakistan faces significant challenges in its efforts to
curb and roll back militancy emanating from the tribal areas.
The threat taking shape goes deeper and well beyond a
historically sometimes romanticized "wild West." The
deterioration of security in the Peshawar district that
culminated in the launch of operations in Khyber Agency is part
of a broader set of trends with the potential to reach beyond
the Northwest Frontier area. Loss of traditional community
leaders, weak administration, ineffective law enforcement, slow
justice, crumbling social services, a distressed economy, and
poverty all have enhanced the militancy's strength in the FATA
and the NWFP.


3. (C) We are implementing long-term development programs and
beginning to provide security training. Given growing
short-term challenges, however, we need a more robust,
fast-track response to help woefully under-funded and equipped
security and government forces extend security, governance, and
development. Other donors are needed through mechanisms such as
a World Bank-led consortium (reftel). Pakistan must also commit
resources to this endeavor, particularly salary and benefits
support for law enforcement. Absent measures to contain the
trends that are in motion in the FATA and NWFP, the insurgency
on the border has the potential to reach elsewhere into Pakistan
-- and it is unclear how Pakistan would cope with that
development. End Summary/Introduction

Accelerating Loss of Space
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4. (C) The government has steadily been losing control of space
to militants since 2002 and that pace has accelerated over the
past year. In 2005, except for the Waziristans, Consulate's
Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) staff building roads in the FATA
were able to operate fairly widely with some manageable,
primarily historical (criminal) risk in the other five agencies.
In 2008, the Waziristans remain nearly inaccessible, and NAS is
no longer able to operate in most of the other five agencies.
In Bajaur and Mohmand where we once operated freely, only small
areas adjacent to the NWFP are now accessible. Friendly pockets
remain in upper Kurram, but can only be reached by air because
of threats on the land route through Kohat and Hangu. Orakzai
once deemed entirely safe is now viewed as risky. Khyber, once
the most accessible agency, has only pockets of space where risk
is manageable, primarily in its northern area and in communities
not far off the Peshawar-Kabul highway.


5. (C) USAID's Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTI) with
embedded partner staff in Political Agents' compounds has seen
similar trends since it started field operations in January
2008, primarily in Khyber, Orakzai, and Mohmand. In the NWFP,
southern districts and some northern districts (Swat, Dir, and
Malakand) are now largely off limits to us. In 2002, we were
able to visit all of these areas. OTI, however, is operating in
five of the seven FATA agencies.


6. (C) More militant and/or criminal hot spots are popping up
than security forces, including the Pakistan army, can control.
The collapse of the North Waziristan Agreement and the Lal
Masjid operation in July 2007 appears to have been the take off
point for the acceleration of violence targeted at government
institutions and the loss of space. The declaration of a new
Lal Masjid in Mohmand, the capture of 250 security forces in
South Waziristan, the open uprising of Tehrik-i Nafaz-i
Shariat-i Mohammadi (TNSM) militants in Swat, the ambush of army
forces in North Waziristan, the outbreak of sectarian violence
in Kurram, the encroachment of militants into the Kohat/Darra
Adam Khel/Orakzai area, the destabilization of Khyber because of
criminal activity, and growing incidents of targeted violence in
NWFP districts near Peshawar have all taken place within the
past year. Many of these developments occurred simultaneously
or close in time. At best, security forces, including the
military, appear to have the ability to address no more than two
major hot spots at any given moment. The impact is that smaller
law and order problems go unattended.


7. (C) Militant coordination and cooperation with criminals
appears to be growing. The most visible example of this over
the past year was the emergence of the Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan
(TTP) in December 2007 that announced an alliance among
militants, including Baitullah Mehsud and Bajaur's TNSM leader
Faqir Mohammad. The degree of cooperation and control is
difficult to assess, but we are seeing more references to TTP
from militants in the FATA and the NWFP.


8. (C) The criminal element poses a different dilemma.
Criminals, according to local contacts, are operating in
relationships of mutual convenience with militants. Khyber's
warlord Mangal Bagh who was the target of recent operations has
predominantly been a criminal figure, running smuggling routes.
Much of his criminal activity in the Peshawar environs --
kidnappings, control of the alcohol and drug trade -- was aimed
at generating revenue for himself rather than attacking
government institutions. Figures such as Mangal Bagh, however,
pose a longer-term danger. In some cases, they are reportedly
facilitating cross-border attacks and other militant activities.
The unchecked criminal activities also soften up the ground for
militants by helping to establish an atmosphere of fear and
intimidation. Perhaps the most dangerous impact of all is that
militants and criminals alike appear to have lost their fear of
security forces, including the military -- a fear that was once
critical to maintaining law and order in the FATA and the NWFP.

Tribal Fabric in Distress
--------------


9. (C) The FATA is hemorrhaging leaders. According to local
estimates, 250 to 300 tribal elders have been killed, most of
them since 2004. The majority of the assassinations have been
in the Waziristans, but other parts of the FATA and NWFP have
been hit as well. The attacks have primarily picked off tribal
leaders in twos and threes. More recently, a suicide attacker
killed 50 elders in Darra Adam Khel in March, and Baitullah
Mehsud loyalists executed 23 in Jandola in June.


10. (C) Many of the educated and professionals -- natural
sources of local leadership and bulwarks against extremism --
are leaving their communities and are unable to return even for
brief visits. From Bajaur to South Waziristan or places such as
Swat, we are seeing or hearing of those who have decamped to
adjacent NWFP districts, Peshawar, Islamabad, or Karachi --
mainly because of security. The newer heros, particularly to
young boys, are reportedly the Baitullah Mehsuds who do not come
from particularly important local families, but who have
acquired status through their reputations as "jihadi
commanders."


11. (C) In this environment, peace agreements signed and
enforced by tribal community leaders will be difficult to
maintain. The deterioration of security, and particularly the
targeting of pro-government elders, has shaken many traditional
community leaders who do not have confidence that the government
is able to protect them if they agree to stand up to militants.
The government has been encouraging Political Agents to return
to living in their agencies to counter this trend.

Weakening Administration
--------------


12. (C) Turnover among key civilian field and working-level
officers is increasing. Historically, Political Agents served
at least two years in a posting. More recently, Political
Agents have been rotating out short of twelve months in an
assignment and in some cases after less than six months in the
more difficult areas such as the Waziristans. One FATA
Secretariat official attributed the relatively rapid turnover to
"burnout" because of the increasing danger and pressures of the
position.


13. (C) The training ground for Political Agents is gone. The
system of positions, known as the District Management Group
(DMG),that once groomed young civil service officers to
administer tribal agencies and provincial districts throughout
Pakistan was largely dismantled under President Musharraf's
"devolution" reform in 2002. The DMG positions once wielded
broad authorities at the district level -- administration of
resources, authority over the police, and magistrate powers.
"Devolution" substantially diluted these authorities in the
provinces, leaving a much weaker district administrator
position, the usual starting position for most Political Agents.
More broadly, with the loss of prestige, the DMG is no longer
seen as the premier civil service path. Pakistan's best and
brightest in the civil service are no longer choosing district
administration at a moment when top talent in this field is
desperately needed. USAID's capacity building projects in the
FATA Secretariat can help the situation but alone will not
counteract this trend.

Ineffective Law Enforcement
--------------


14. (C) FATA's paramilitary forces including Frontier Corps, and
NWFP police are increasingly de-moralized. They are facing
adversaries who are reportedly better paid and equipped with
better weaponry. Law enforcement recruits generally make
4,000-7,000 rupees ($50-$100) per month while militants are
reportedly paying twice that amount. In some cases,
paramilitary personnel must supply their own weapons,
ammunition, and uniform. Training is often inconsistent. There
are few, if any, retirement or death benefits. In the tribal
areas and along the NWFP/FATA border, these forces are
frequently deployed in remote 10-20 man posts that become the
target of militants who are able to intimidate or overwhelm.
ODRP reports that 11th Corps often deploys Frontier Corps as an
infantry battalion -- a role for which they are not trained and
consequently do not perform well.


15. (C) There is insufficient authority in the field to direct
law enforcement. "Post-devolution," in practice, means that
provincial law enforcement has no administrative or elected
oversight at the district level, often leaving the police
adrift. The "devolution" reforms also destroyed the
cross-cutting jurisdiction that gave senior administration
officials in the field combined oversight of a tribal agency,
frontier region, and provincial district. That combined
oversight and other broad authorities gave these officials the
power to order the movement of law enforcement assets to tackle
quickly law and order problems that straddled the NWFP/FATA
border. Such coordination must now be referred back to Peshawar.

Justice Deferred
--------------


16. (C) Militant identification with Sharia law is one of its
most potent tools for generating local support. The most
frequent example of militant parallel government in the FATA and
NWFP is administration of justice. The call for Sharia law,
however, is for many simply a demand for "quick justice." Local
dissatisfaction with the access to the courts and the pace of
judicial decision is high. Civil cases, particularly for
property disputes, regularly drag on for decades. According to
a number of Peshawar observers, the heart of the discontent in
Swat has been long unresolved land disputes which gave TNSM (and
now Tehrik-I Taliban - Swat) a popular local cause. When
Sharia's full meaning is explained, enthusiasm for Sharia drops
quickly.

No Teachers, No Jobs, No Money
--------------


17. (C) While the FATA has been identified as a long neglected
area for development, mainstream Pakistan, as ostensibly
represented by many parts of the NWFP appears only marginally
better off - and may not be well enough to ward off the
pressures of militancy and extremism. On travels to outlying
NWFP districts that have been possible, lack of social services,
particularly health and education, surface quickly in
conversations with local residents. The closing of schools for
lack of teachers and the falling standards of qualifications for
teachers are a source of frustration. The lack of local
employment opportunities and rising prices of energy and
commodities is a source of anger. Local militants have not yet
shown a serious interest or capability in parallel government
function that would deliver basic services a la the Hezbollah
model. However, signs of such a development would spell even
greater danger for the FATA, NWFP, and potentially the rest of
Pakistan.

VIA