Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PESHAWAR389
2008-07-08 08:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Peshawar
Cable title:  

FRONTIER CORPS COMMANDER ON FATA OPERATIONS, COOPERATION

Tags:  PTER MOPS PGOV PINR PK AF 
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O 080859Z JUL 08
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7530
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 
CIA WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
NSC WASHINGTON DC
USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000389 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/8/2018
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PINR PK AF
SUBJECT: FRONTIER CORPS COMMANDER ON FATA OPERATIONS, COOPERATION
WITH US/AFGHAN FORCES

REF: PESHAWAR 381


CLASSIFIED BY: Michael A. Via, Acting Principal Officer, Peshawar, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000389

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/8/2018
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PINR PK AF
SUBJECT: FRONTIER CORPS COMMANDER ON FATA OPERATIONS, COOPERATION
WITH US/AFGHAN FORCES

REF: PESHAWAR 381


CLASSIFIED BY: Michael A. Via, Acting Principal Officer, Peshawar, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Frontier Corps Commander Khattak and 11th Corps Chief of
Staff Aamer Riaz briefed NSC Senior Director for South and
Central Asia Mark Webber on their strategy for the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on July 3. Khattak and Aamer
were on message with other Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)
officials by stating that "successful" operations in Swat and
Khyber as well as North and South Waziristan were aimed at
opening the way for development. Khattak, who remained focused
throughout the meeting on long-term capacity building rather
than addressing the recognized immediate and pressing terrorist
threat in the border regions, continued to press for more U.S.
assistance to provide personal protective gear for his troops
and noted that collaboration with Afghan security counterparts
is helped by U.S. participation. Isolating militant commanders
such as Baitullah Mehsud from "reconcilable" tribesmen will
allow Pakistani security forces to confront these leaders
without fear of collateral damage. While there are encouraging
signs of increased coordination between Governor Ghani and the
Frontier Corps, Khattak still appears to be frustrated by
equipment shortfalls for his troops. End Summary.

Frontier Corps Commander on FATA Strategy
--------------


2. (C) Frontier Corps Commander Major General Mohammad Alam
Khattak noted that "undertakings" with tribesmen in Swat as well
as North and South Waziristan are aimed at creating stability
which will allow development to proceed. He said that force may
be used to enforce these "undertakings" with the tribes.
According to the Commander, a "pure use of force is not the
answer; rather, we need a comprehensive approach." He stated
that he needed "immediate employment" to give alternatives to
the FATA's youth. Development should take place on a "war
footing: fast and big." (Comment: Khattak is on message with
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Governor Owais Ghani, who
also intends to use peace talks to create "space" for

development and also considers the understanding reached with
tribal elders to be a one-sided acceptance of GOP demands,
rather than a bilateral peace agreement. End comment.)


3. (C) Responding to Senior Director Webber's concern over a
growing terrorist threat in the border regions, increased
violence levels in Afghanistan, and growing cross-border
violence, Khattak said that he was "confident" that his troops
could overcome these challenges. According to Khattak, the aim
the current FATA strategy is to win over "the silent majority"
and to isolate militant groups but offered no information how
Pakistani security forces were making progress in this area.
Khattak said that he remains concerned about inflicting
collateral damage during military operations and remarked that
military strikes in the border regions could be
counterproductive and increase violence levels. He claimed,
however, that the public's opinion of the Frontier Corps is
positive due to the perception that the armed services are
"backing" the political government.


4. (C) Like Governor Ghani, Khattak attributes growing unrest in
the FATA and NWFP to problems in Afghanistan. "Cross border
movement is a problem for us too," he said. According to
Khattak, Afghanistan's "poppy-riddled" eastern flank is the
"engine that drives the insurgency." When pressed on addressing
the short-term threat, Khattak suggested that poppy eradication
should be the highest priority, noting Pakistan's success in
eliminating the scourge in Pakistan. The Commander repeated a
request that he had previously addressed to Counselor Eliot
Cohen (reftel) to increase the number of ISAF troops on the
Pakistan/Afghanistan border.

FATA Operations
--------------


5. (C) Khattak characterized recent military operations in North
and South Waziristan as "very successful" and said that they
have led to decreased cross-border attacks. The Commander said
that operations in Khyber agency's Bara area have achieved their
objective of increasing the security of Peshawar's perimeter
with a "minimal" amount of force. He claimed, however, that the
media is "making us jump when they want us to jump." Khattak
stressed a need to supplement the Frontier Corps' "conventional"
tactics with efforts to enlist the support of tribal lashkars
(militias) in the fight against insurgents. These grass roots
level groups could serve as "force multipliers, as they do in
Iraq," he said.

Cooperation with the United States
--------------


6. (C) The Frontier Corps Commander provided a gloomy outlook on
U.S. military assistance in recent years. "For two and a half
years, there has been a lot of talking, but very little done
except INL funding." He said that the 500-600 vehicles provided
by INL have served as the "main strength of our mobility," but
the majority of his troops remain "ill equipped." Khattak was
critical that more than half of the USD 30 million aid program
had been allocated to the Warsak training center which would
most likely not open until December. Khattak implied that the
construction delay was indicative of the lack of U.S. interest
in supporting the Frontier Corps. He said that the Pakistani
Army had provided him tanks and artillery, but he requires
better personal protective equipment, communications and
mobility capabilities (reftel). Senior Director Webber asserted
that the Frontier Corps should not stall on implementing those
cooperating programs which have already commenced while the
Frontier Corps campaigns for other aid.

Coordination with Afghan Security Forces
--------------


7. (C) Khattak stated that tripartite cooperation among
Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States is proceeding well
at the general headquarters level and said that officers are
meeting frequently. He said that border flag meetings have been
productive but lamented that communications between Pakistan and
Afghanistan had not progressed more rapidly. At the
micro-level, Webber inquired about cross border post
communication and cooperation and whether the outposts had
adequate communications equipment and procedures. Chief of
Staff to the 11th Corps Commander, Brigadier Aamer Riaz noted
that cross-border cooperation works better with U.S.
participation and implied that "hesitation" among posts solely
occupied by Afghan troops may be due to long-standing grudges.
He acknowledged more work needed to done to improve outpost
cooperation across the border.

Confronting Insurgents
--------------


8. (C) Chief of Staff Riaz stated that distinguishing between
reconcilable and irreconcilable militants is becoming
increasingly difficult. Riaz believes, however, that even
madrassa students and those who have "taken up arms" may still
be reconcilable. He said that a misperception among common
Pakistanis that the Army and Frontier Corps is fighting
"America's war" is damaging efforts to reconcile potential
militants. Khattak stated that the United States could assist
in this effort by "reducing its signature and increasing
assistance."


9. (C) Chief of Staff Riaz stated that the Army and Frontier
Corps must "deal with" Baitullah Mehsud, the Haqqani network,
Mullah Omar, Hekmatyar and other militant commanders, and that
Pakistan's security forces should not let these insurgents
"provoke them." Both Riaz and Khattak stated that the best way
to do this is to "isolate" militant leaders from the tribal
society and then carry out surgical operations against them.

Assessment of FATA's Other Security Forces
--------------


10. (C) Responding to Political Counselor's query about other
security forces operating in the FATA, Khattak said that each
tier "has its own role and relevance." "All should be
employed," he said, "but we should invest in the Frontier Corps,
police (in the settled areas),and the Khassadars." Khattak
believes that the investing in the Khassadars is preferable to
assisting the Levies because tribesmen are "used to the
Khassadars." He said that the Levies are still new and it will
take time for them to properly integrate into the tribal
culture. (Note: Khassadars are considered to represent a tribe
and positions are usually passed from father to son. Khassadars
provide their own rifles and uniforms. End note.)

VIA