(C) Secretary Rice's December 16, 2008 Meeting

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TAGS: OVIP RICE CONDOLEEZZA PREL IR EUN XF XG
SUBJECT: (C) Secretary Rice's December 16, 2008 Meeting
on Iran with the P5 plus Germany, EU High Rep Solana,
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, and

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Egypt.


1. (U) Classified by: Uzra Zeya, Deputy Executive
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reason 1.4.(d)


2. (U) December 16, 2008, 0915-1050, UN Headquarters,
New York City


3. (U) Participants:

U.S.
The Secretary
NEA A/S Welch
NEA PDAS Feltman
NEA/ARP Office Director Steinfeld (notetaker)

P5 plus Germany
UK Foreign Secretary Miliband
China Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei
France Political Director Araud
Russia Amb. to the U.S. Kislyak
Germany UN PermRep Matussek
EU High Rep Solana

GCC plus 3
Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal
UAE FM Abdullah bin Zayed
Bahrain FM Sheikh Khalid
Kuwait UN PermRep Abdullah al-Murad
Iraq FM Zebari
Jordan FM Bashir
Egypt UN PermRep Maged Abdelaziz
(Oman and Qatar did not participate)


4. (C) Summary: Secretary Rice led a frank 90 minute
exchange between the P5 plus one and the GCC plus 3 at
UNHQ on December 16. Seven foreign ministers and EU
High Representative Solana attended; only Oman and Qatar
were absent. France and Germany expressed support for
further strengthening of sanctions in 2009, while Russia
and China were more nuanced in their approach, stressing
the need for negotiations. The Arab participants,
nearly in unison, reiterated the threat they felt from
Iran, pointing out that the Iranian drive for regional
hegemony and its malevolent behavior in the region were
as dangerous to them as the nuclear program. Their
message was that the price for resolution of the nuclear
file could not be acceptance of Iran's hegemonic goals.
Several of them decried any moves by the P5 plus one to
grant Iran an explicit regional role, while
acknowledging the reality that Iran already had one,
albeit a malign one. All agreed that the goal was to
steer Iran -- through increased pressure, but with the
door open to negotiations -- to a more positive role,
one that did not seek hegemony over other states. There
also was acknowledgement that, while sanctions might be
taking their toll on the Iranian economy, they had
failed thus far in pushing Iran to suspend enrichment.
The Saudi and Egyptian participants also referenced the
Israeli nuclear program and issues regarding the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) more broadly. There seemed
to be consensus at the end that this forum was a useful
one, and should be continued under the leadership of the
new U.S. Administration. End Summary.

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Opening Comments of the P5 Plus One and EU
--------------


5. (C) The Secretary opened the meeting by reviewing the
current international approach of two tracks: increased
pressure through five UN Security Council resolutions to

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convince Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment program
coupled with an offer for negotiations and potential
benefits should Iran comply. She noted how important
these matters were for the Arabs at the table and that
both the nuclear file and Iran's malevolent behavior
throughout the region needed to be addressed in tandem.


6. (C) EU High Representative Solana offered brief
comments, noting his intention to meet soon with Iranian
nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, that Iranian
cooperation with the IAEA was seen to be severely
wanting, and that the number of centrifuges Iran was
developing continued to grow. He noted that his deputy,
Robert Cooper, would travel to Iran that week, but he
downplayed expectations. The Iranians seemed to be
playing for time, Solana said.


7. (C) UK Foreign Secretary Miliband began by commenting
on the increasing difficulties facing the Iranian
economy: inflation in Tehran of 50 percent, falling oil
prices when Iran's budget was based on a price of
$75/barrel, and the significant negative effects on the
bazaaris. That said, Miliband noted that sanctions were
not having the desired effect on Iran's nuclear program.
Hence, 2009 needed to be a year for increased
international pressure on the Iranians, while continuing
to make clear the potential benefits to them of halting
enrichment. Miliband added that the international
community had to counter Iran's argument that it was the
victim of UNSC actions; rather, it must be stressed that
Iran is the victim of its own behavior. The
international community needed to change the
cost/benefit calculus for Iran to avoid a nuclear arms
race in the region, which is the last thing that was
needed.


8. (C) French MFA Political Director Araud conveyed
President Sarkozy's strong interest and concern about
the Iranian nuclear program. He stressed that the
Iranians had continuously spurned negotiations, and that
they were buying time while they continued enrichment.
As they have no nuclear power plants for this potential
fuel, their intent is obvious -- enrichment of weapons
grade material. The international community is thus
"obliged" to increase pressure on Iran; France and the
EU are currently looking at new and more robust
sanctions, as should the UNSC.


9. (C) Chinese Vice FM He Yafei said the Iran file was
an important and difficult issue, where the possibility
of negotiations between the P5 plus one and Iran were
still possible. Iran needs to give a positive response
to the P5 proposal, but all parties need to show
patience -- dialogue and negotiations are still
possible.


10. (C) Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Kislyak said that
the P5 wanted Iran to deal with the offer on the table,
but that it was not the "Bible or the Quran" and could
be modified. Engagement by the P5 plus one with Iran
was the key, but there were still no serious
negotiations taking place. UNSC resolutions were the
outgrowth of issues related to IAEA non-compliance; the
resolutions were not "inventions" of the P5 plus one.
Kislyak said that whatever help the Arabs could provide
to bring Iran to negotiations would be useful.


11. (C) German UN PermRep Matussek said that 2009 would
be a critical year. While the P5 plus one had a firm
commitment to the dual track approach, Iran was not
interested in negotiations. It was thus "wise" to think
about additional measures from the UNSC, as well as to

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strengthen national implementation of existing
sanctions. It was important that Iran not be able to
circumvent sanctions and "we at the table" need to
remain united.

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GCC Plus 3 Opening Remarks
--------------

Saudi Arabia


12. (C) Saudi FM Prince Saud quipped that any incentives
offered to Iran should also be offered to the GCC. He
said that Iran would be an even larger threat than it
already is were Tehran to secure nuclear arms. He added
that the balance of power in the region had been
"shattered," even if for good causes; Iran has been able
to broadly extend its power and influence throughout the
region in the aftermath of the Iraq war. The two key
issues with regard to Iran are linked: the nuclear
program and regional activities; both sides of the
equation needed to be solved. Saud expressed hope that,
while tackling the nuclear file, the situation regarding
Iran's role in the region is not made worse. The
Iranians, he said, were obstinate and would go ahead
with the nuclear program. He continued that Iran was
looking for a leadership role in the region --
politically, economically, and militarily.


13. (C) Saud said that since WMD already was in the
region, the Iranians would pursue them as well.
Preventing this with the use of carrots and sticks would
not work, he said. The "original sin" was when Israel
developed nuclear weapons, and there was a double
standard at play. Perhaps it would be necessary to
demilitarize the whole region, as was done in South
Africa. This was the "only conceivable possible way" to
solve the problem.


14. (C) Saud also suggested that it might be useful to
pursue a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN charter
that guaranteed the sovereignty, territorial integrity,
and independence of Iraq as a way of increasing Iraq's
sense of security vis-a-vis Iran.

Jordan


15. (C) Jordanian FM Bashir asked for more clarity from
the P5 as to what was in the incentive package, in order
to determine more fully whether we all see "eye to eye"
on the issues. He outlined a series of interlocking
issues in the region: WMD, Iranian hegemony, Israel-
Palestine, and Iraq. He stressed that the P5 plus one
needed to insist that no one play outside the rules,
whether with regard to WMD or interference in the
internal affairs of others. He asked what political
incentives were actually being offered to Iran.

Egypt


16. (C) Egyptian UN PermRep Maged Abdelaziz said that
sanctions had not proved effective. He then spoke at
length about the crisis in the NPT system, noting that
some non-signatories' possession of nuclear weapons had
gained legitimacy. This in turn legitimized the Iranian
program. The right to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear
energy must be preserved, he said. Abdelaziz added that
Egypt did not want to give Iran a "regional role." The
GCC plus 3 needed to be involved with the P5 plus one as
policies were developed.

UAE

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17. (C) UAE FM Sheikh Abdullah said that both the
nuclear program and growing Iranian hegemony were of
concern to the UAE. He noted that it was difficult for
the UAE to worry about Shahab 4, 5, and 6 missiles, when
"I am already covered by Shahab 1." Iran without the
bomb, he asserted, is already "creating a big mess in my
country;" with the bomb, it would be much worse. He
continued that "nothing" would stop Iran from attempting
to get the bomb; this was partially out of revenge
against the Arabs when they invaded Iran 1,400 years
ago. Nothing, he said, worried the UAE more than
Iranian hegemony. While it was not possible to declare
war on Iran, "Iran needs to feel that time was running
out." 2009 should be a year that is very serious for
us.

Iraq


18. (C) Iraqi FM Zebari said that no country was more
concerned about Iran than is his own. Iraq had passed
many messages to the Iranians, had been sincere with
them, and told them to take note of Saddam's demise.
Iraq, he continued, was for a peaceful solution to the
issues, for dialogue. Sanctions are, he stated, having
an impact, but there is no appetite for bombing Iran.
He argued that the way to deal with Iranian hegemony was
to help strengthen Iraq, and he expressed appreciation
to the Arabs who had normalized relations with his
country. He responded to Saud's idea of a UNSCR on
Iraq's independence by quipping that he had been sent to
New York to get out from under Chapter VII, not to have
a new resolution under it. He concluded by saying that
patience was needed when dealing with Iraq.

Bahrain


19. (C) Bahraini FM Sheikh Khalid opened by saying that
every once in a while an Iranian mullah or writer will
still refer to Bahrain as Iran's 14th province. The
threat is real. He queried as to what was actually in
the P5 plus one package. Why, he asked, should Iran be
given a regional role? They play such a role in any
case, but need to do so responsibly. He said any offers
giving Iran a regional role "worries us." He argued for
continuing with these meetings in the future.

Kuwait


20. (C) Kuwaiti UN Perm Rep al-Murad suggested that
another UNSC resolution would be a good idea. He
questioned why Iran's role in the Gulf would have to be
specially enunciated.

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What Regional Role
--------------


21. (C) The Secretary continued the discussion by asking
for some clarity from the P5 plus one partners as to
what actually was promised to Iran with regard to a
regional role. Amb. Kislyak said that the Russian
understanding was not to give Iran a hegemonic role, but
that the Iranians do want to be involved in the security
of the region. Foreign Secretary Miliband commented
that Iran could have no rights without responsibilities.
A regional role was "not for us to give." Iran plays a
malign role because of a lack of balance between rights
and responsibilities; they want their rights but will
not exercise responsibilities. Miliband added, noting
Abdelaziz's comments, that future issues around the NPT

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must not obscure the immediacy of the Iranian nuclear
program. He noted that Germany was right; 2009 will be
an important year and acknowledged that UAE FM Abdullah
had challenged us to act.


22. (C) Prince Saud commented that a role was given to
Iran when the British left the Gulf in the 1970s, and
Iran "took" the UAE islands. This could happen again,
he said. With regard to a regional role having been
"given" to Iran, Araud said that was not part of the
offer in June. He noted that Sarkozy had sent him to
consult in this forum with full transparency. FM Sheikh
Khalid then clarified that caution needed to be
exercised during future negotiations with Iran because
the Iranians could push the P5 plus one for
acknowledgement of a regional role at that time, even if
one had not yet been explicitly offered. Germany added
that Iran does in fact play a regional role, but the
goal is to make it a positive one. In emphasizing the
need to consult regularly, the UAE FM urged that "we
don't give ourselves false expectations regarding
Iranian elections (in spring 2009)." Whoever wins,
Abdullah counseled, Supreme Leader Khamenei will still
direct policy. Ahmedinejad's behavior was perhaps the
best incentive to build international unity in support
of sanctions, but his potential departure in the spring
should not be permitted to weaken international resolve.
Saud added that if there are talks on Iran's regional
role, they should be with the GCC.

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Talks Should Continue
--------------


23. (C) Towards the end of the interventions, several
delegations called for the need to continue the GCC plus
three plus P5 plus one forum after Secretary Rice's
departure from the State Department. This message was
most explicitly stated by Miliband, and seconded by
France, the UAE, Bahrain, and Jordan. Secretary Rice
reiterated her strong support for the utility of the
forum.

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Go Public, or Not?
--------------


24. (C) Jordan began a discussion of how to publicize
the meeting by asking what its outcomes would be. The
Secretary suggested that a short statement could be
issued, or at least points agreed upon, as the meeting
was already public knowledge. Miliband argued for a
robust text with explicit reference to Iran's nuclear
and regional ambitions. Kislyak countered that such a
statement would take "years" to negotiate, and that
something less "dramatic" was needed. The UAE said that
Iranians needed to know that these two groups were
discussing Iran. Saud wondered aloud whether leaving
some mystery around the process might not enervate Iran
even more.


25. (C) In the end, the Secretary iterated some general
points -- the importance of the forum; the concern over
Iran's nuclear policies and regional ambitions;
participants' support for the work of the UNSC, IAEA,
and the P5 plus one; and agreement to continue these
meetings on a regular basis. She subsequently delivered
these points to the press at the end of the meeting.


26. (U) Minimize considered.
RICE