Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS855
2008-04-30 16:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH EOV ON MINURSO RESOLUTION WILL NOT CALL

Tags:  PREL PBTS UNSC FR MO AG WI 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #0855/01 1211627
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301627Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2887
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000855 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, IO/PSC, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS UNSC FR MO AG WI
SUBJECT: FRENCH EOV ON MINURSO RESOLUTION WILL NOT CALL
SAHARAWI INDEPENDENCE "UNREALISTIC"

REF: STATE 43376 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4. (b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000855

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, IO/PSC, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS UNSC FR MO AG WI
SUBJECT: FRENCH EOV ON MINURSO RESOLUTION WILL NOT CALL
SAHARAWI INDEPENDENCE "UNREALISTIC"

REF: STATE 43376 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4. (b),(d).


1. (C) The French MFA's IO desk officer covering the
Western Sahara, Jay Darmadhikhari, informed us April 30 that
France would present an explanation of vote following the
UNSC's extension of MINURSO. That statement, however, would
not echo the USG's contention that the option of an
independent Sahrawi state as a way of resolving the Western
Sahara conflict is not realistic. Darmadhikhari outlined the
seven points that would be contained in the French EOV (which
he said would follow ours):

--A reference to the Moroccan autonomy plan as a sincere
effort to break the existing impasse in UN-led negotiations
being held in Manhasset;

--A recognition of the absence of any progress in those
talks, which is rendering the overall search for a peaceful
resolution "more fragile;"

--A statement that the status quo is unacceptable, given
tensions among the parties and the obstacle the dispute poses
to meaningful cooperation or integration among the Maghreb
countries;

--A salute to the "serious and credible" efforts Morocco has
made to find a negotiated solution;

--An assertion that self determination does not ipso facto
imply independence coupled with the argument that Morocco's
autonomy plan is not a sine qua non for a peaceful resolution
but a basis for negotiations and a possible settlement that
would respect the principle of self determination;

--A reference to UNSYG Personal Envoy van Walsum's
supplemental note to the UNSC and an expression of
appreciation to the UNSYG and van Walsum for their work on
this issue;

--A call on the UNSC and the parties concerned for "realism"
so that the negotiations can enter a new and more productive
phase; and

--An emphasis on the importance of "mobilizing" member states
and neighbor states to the conflict (i.e., principally
Algeria) to support the talks fully and in good faith.



2. (C) With respect to the imminent UNSC consideration of
the draft UNSCR, Darmadhikhari stated that he understood
there was general agreement on the latest draft. Costa Rica,
however, on behalf of Polisario/Algeria and others, might
submit an amendment seeking to shorten MINURSO's mandate from
the proposed 12 months. In addition, South Africa may ask
that the word "endorses" in the second operative paragraph be
changed to "notes." (Note: We understand that the current
text of this paragraph reads: "Endorses the report's
recommendation that realism and a spirit of compromise by the
parties are essential to maintain the momentum of the process
of negotiations;")


3. (C) We expressed some disappointment and surprise that
France had decided in the end not to go further in echoing
what van Walsum had forcefully expressed to the UNSC with
respect to the unrealistic option of an independent Sahrawi
state. This did not seem consistent with what the MFA had
indicated was France's rapidly evolving position given the
unstable and worrisome security situation in Northwest Africa
and its concerns about even the remote possibility of a
failed state through which terrorists could circulate with
relative impunity. Although we would go ahead with our EOV,
in spite of sharply negative responses by Algeria and the
Polisario to our stated intention, we regretted that the
French statement would not state as bluntly or as explicitly
what we had agreed to in our private discussions.


4. (C) Darmadhikhari countered by arguing that France was
with us on everything but the point on the "realism" of an
independent Sahrawi state. He claimed that this EOV would
further mark the first time France has expressed itself after
a vote in this manner on the Western Sahara. The French
presidency, whose key members were traveling with President
Sarkozy in Tunisia, had ultimately decided not to go any
further out of concern for antagonizing the Algerians and
Polisario in a way that would complicate French bilateral
relations in North Africa or jeopardize the UNSC's support
for the Manhasset process. In a brief exchange on the way
forward for the UN-led talks, Darmadhikhari agreed that

Algeria, the Polisario, and others have bruited van Walsum's
dismissal or Polisario's boycott of the Manhasset discussions
until he is replaced. The French understand that Morocco is
more eager than ever to continue the talks, even if they make
no substantive progress.


5. (C) Comment: For the French, the statement they plan to
make is more than half a loaf, and they are not overly
troubled that we might be isolated in the UNSC for publicly
appearing to rule out Sahrawi independence as a realistic
option. We suspect, as NEA A/S David Welch's French
counterpart suggested in a phone call with A/S Welch, that
internal discussions allowed the "Algeria lobby" within the
GOF to temper the earlier expressed MFA readiness to take its
publicly positive comments on the Moroccan plan a step
further. President Sarkozy needs a reputedly reluctant
Algeria's support for his Union for the Mediterranean.
French business is eager to pursue business opportunities
notwithstanding the ongoing frustration of doing business in
the former colony. Darmadhikhari, previously the Algeria
desk officer in the Quai, acknowledged that the French
ambassador to Algeria's recent speech describing the killing
of Algerian nationalists on V-E Day in 1945 as a massacre
(i.e., as Algerians prefer to do) may not have been a pure
coincidence. We will seek further explanation of France's
position after DAS-equivalent for North Africa Nathalie
Loiseau returns from Tunisia, but the Department may want to
consider formal consultations with the French on next steps
on Western Sahara.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


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