Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS763
2008-04-22 09:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

AFTER THE NATO SUMMIT: GOF LOOKS AHEAD

Tags:  PREL NATO MARR MOPS FR AF GG UP UK MK GR 
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PP RUEHBW RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #0763/01 1130910
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220910Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2715
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0620
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000763 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR MOPS FR AF GG UP UK MK GR
SUBJECT: AFTER THE NATO SUMMIT: GOF LOOKS AHEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000763

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FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR MOPS FR AF GG UP UK MK GR
SUBJECT: AFTER THE NATO SUMMIT: GOF LOOKS AHEAD


1. (C) Summary. President Sarkozy is reportedly "very
satisfied" with his first NATO summit,
a meeting which demonstrated to the world the change in
France's approach to the Alliance.
President Bush's endorsement of a strong European defense in
Bucharest gave the GOF the green
light it wanted to proceed with its parallel track policy of
strengthening European defense
capabilities and reintegrating France fully into the military
command of NATO. We expect to
see movement on both of these tracks during the upcoming
French presidency, with an additional
emphasis on the question of NATO-EU cooperation. French
contacts emphasize that the decision
delaying MAP for Georgia and Ukraine did not constitute a
"Russian veto" as the moment was simply
not ripe for this major strategic decision, but confirm that
both countries' future membership
has now been affirmed by the Alliance. On Afghanistan, the
announcements of troop numbers at
the summit were conservative estimates in deference to
domestic sensitivities; however, these
numbers will swell with an additional deployment of personnel
in RC-C for the French command
beginning this summer. Special Forces troops may also still
be on the table if the need presents.
French officials still demur on the subject of
Greece/Macedonia, largely pushing the responsibility
for finding a compromise onto Macedonia. End summary.

-------------- ---
EUROPEAN DEFENSE PLANNING IN THE COMING MONTHS
-------------- ---


2. (C) In recent meetings at the Elysee and MFA, our
contacts made clear that the GOF
regarded President Bush's positive remarks at Bucharest -- in
which he endorsed the vision
of a strong European defense, welcomed France's full return
to NATO's integrated structures
and addressed the issue of cooperation between NATO and the

European Union -- as a clear green
light to pursue their duel objectives of promoting European
defense structures and reintegrating
France back into the military command of NATO. According to
Francois Richier, President
Sarkozy's Advisor on Strategic Affairs, the GOF plans to use
its authority during the EU
presidency to "give direction" to European efforts to
reinforce military capabilities,
promote greater engagement and provide better coherence in
organization to avoid duplication
of effort. This will build on initiatives already launched
at the French-UK summit, where
the two countries discussed cooperation in maritime matters
and launched a trust fund on
helicopters to upgrade existing European capabilities.
Richier said that France will seek
ways to encourage all European countries to support increased
European defense capabilities,
which will then allow those countries which are really
engaged to move forward. He added that
President Bush's positive remarks at Bucharest provided the
necessary backing to the French
initiative to spur progress.

-------------- ---
FRANCE IN AFGHANISTAN: INCREASED ENGAGEMENT
-------------- ---


3. (C) President Sarkozy publicly announced at Bucharest two
main initiatives for ISAF: a
supplemental battalion for RC-East and France's assumption of
the command of RC-Central.
However, various interlocutors including Richier and Colonel
Philippe Montocchio, Deputy of
the MOD NATO Section, explained that Sarkozy's public mention
of the number of troops as "700"
only takes account of the additional battalion for RC-East.
Montocchio confirmed that several
hundred reinforcements would bolster the French presence in
Kabul as well, but added that
"there is no need to announce this number to the public."
(Richier confided that Sarkozy opted
in favor of citing the smallest possible number, to minimize
public opposition which was coalescing
at the time of the Bucharest summit, with two major

PARIS 00000763 002 OF 003


parliamentary debates providing a platform
for critics of the President's "atlanticism" and approach to
Afghanistan.) The major outstanding
question after Bucharest remains whether France still intends
to deploy Special Forces troops,
as we'd been informed in the weeks leading up to the summit.
Richier said that no decision has
yet been made on SOF deployment, as the Elysee is seeking to
manage the public and parliamentary
debate by incrementally increasing French engagements.
Jean-David Levitte, the President's
Diplomatic Advisor, offered in a meeting with the Ambassador
that the French SOF could still be
deployed later as needed.

-------------- ---
THE FUTURE FOR GEORGIA AND UKRAINE
-------------- ---


4. (C) At the Bucharest Summit, Sarkozy united with German
Chancellor Angela Merkel against
extending MAP to Georgia and Ukraine. But our GOF contacts
have been careful since then to
reinforce that the decision merely reflected a determination
that the moment was not yet
ripe for such a significant strategic decision to be made.
Richier noted that a major
retarding factor for Ukraine's candidacy is that it is not
yet politically stable enough
to assure that its goal of NATO membership would survive a
change of administration in Kiev:
If a pro-Russian government were elected in a few years, it
could pull out of NATO MAP,
embarrassing the Alliance. Montocchio informed us that while
Ukraine made a better case
than Georgia, it was hurt because its leadership didn't unite
behind support for NATO MAP
until January, "too late" to prepare for a summit decision in
April. Nicolas Niemtchinow,
DAS-equivalent in Strategic Affairs at the MFA, cited the
Georgian state of emergency at
the end of last year, and the delayed Ukrainian request and
low public support as factors
that prevented a consensus in favor of Georgia and Ukraine
MAP. However, all emphasized
that at Bucharest, the Alliance went beyond MAP in affirming
unequivocally their future
place in NATO. The question now is how far, and how fast,
can they progress. Niemtchinow
characterized the December ministerial meeting as "the first
review," implying that while
the process was open-ended, it would continue until a
positive decision could be reached.
Col. Montocchio pointed out that the language used in the
Bucharest summit communique that,
"We agreed today that these countries WILL become members of
NATO" actually goes beyond MAP
because it explicitly invokes a guarantee of NATO membership
whereas MAP only promises to
launch the formal process. Richier was even more explicit,
saying that "we gave them
membership, but not the MAP." He regretted that the
international press had poorly
analyzed and reported on the result.

--------------
FRANCE'S NATO REINTEGRATION
--------------


5. (C) With regard to NATO reintegration, the advance text
of Sarkozy's April 3 remarks
contained a phrase that he did not actually deliver, stating
his desire to "make the
necessary decisions so that France may play its full role in
NATO structures in 2009."
(Comment: Here again, Sarkozy likely held back setting a date
for rejoining NATO so as
to minimaze public blow back. End Comment.) Sarkozy's
commitment to bringing France
back into NATO, like his increasing of French troop levels in
Afghanistan, is also
contributing to the new salience of opposition to his
administration's foreign policy.
Richier admitted that the Elysee had "underestimated" the
level of the political
polemics that they would face on Afghanistan and NATO. Even
after the successful

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parliamentary vote against the motion of censure on April 8
(by 548 to 227),he
acknowledged that the GOF has alot of "educating to do, for
both the parliament
and the public."

--------------
MACEDONIA: WON'T PRESSURE GREECE
--------------


6. (C) In the post-Bucharest environment, French officials
have not retreated from
their earlier position on Macedonia; namely, that they hope a
compromise will be found
on the name issue, but they refuse to put any pressure on
Greece. In general, officials
in the Elysee, MOD and MFA are sensitive to Greece's domestic
political considerations
and reiterate that it is up to Macedonia to make the
necessary compromises, as
Macedonia is the one seeking to join the Alliance. For
Richier, the question is not one
of capability or Balkan stability, but rather a question of
solidarity with a key ally.
He noted that in the past, Greece has stood firmly with
France on issues when France
made it clear that its vital national interests were at
stake. France intends to do
the same for its Greek ally in this case. He further noted
that some of the proposals
rejected by Macedonia had been quite reasonable, and it was
up to Skopje to make an
effort. These views were echoed in the MFA when Niemtchinow
repeatedly stated that
the alliance cannot "twist the arms" of a fellow ally and
added that, as enlargement
is subject to national ratification by member countries, it
is not in the interest
of the Alliance to make a choice that the Greek government
cannot sustain domestically.
These comments flow directly from President Sarkozy's speech,
in which he stated
that when joining an alliance, a country must make "a minimum
of effort." Post sees
little possibility that this posture will change in the near
future, although
we continue to urge our interlocutors to advocate a
compromise with both Greece
and Macedonia.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) In general, French officials are extremely upbeat over
the NATO summit results,
which they see as having reached reasonable compromises on
difficult issues. A more
cautious President Sarkozy appeared at Bucharest, reflecting
a perceived need to
manage the political debate at home. But the French agenda
for NATO remains robust,
showing increased commitment in Afghanistan, openness towards
further enlargement
and building on the statements by President Bush (validated
by Chancellor Merkel)
for France to progress this coming year in two of its most
important policy
objectives: reintegration and European defense. The fact
that the 60th anniversary
summit will be held in the towns of Strasbourg and Kehl,
which straddle the border
between France and Germany, is their highly symbolic icing on
the cake.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON