SUDAN/DARFUR: SPECIAL ENVOY WILLIAMSON'S APRIL 14

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 PARIS 000741

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM MARR MOPS UNSC SU FR
SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: SPECIAL ENVOY WILLIAMSON'S APRIL 14
CONSULTATIONS IN PARIS

REF: LIBREVILLE 176

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Classified By: DCM Mark Pekala, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings with Foreign Minister Kouchner
and other GOF officials during April 14 consultations in
Paris, Sudan Special Envoy Richard Williamson stressed the
need to accelerate deployment of UNAMID and to exploit the
possibility that the Khartoum regime might be willing to seek
a political solution to the Darfur impasse. The French were
generally in a listening mode, taking keen interest in the
USG's desire to create momentum in the short term and
expressing their support for this effort. They all supported
a speedier deployment by UNAMID and said France would do what
it could in that area, including using its influence with the
UN's new DPKO chief, likely to be a French replacement for
the incumbent. They agreed that the controversy over Tibet
and the Olympic Games could lead to a more flexible PRC
posture regarding Darfur. Kouchner identified Sudan
President Bashir as the key obstacle to progress, calling him
a "liar" at several points. Kouchner's crisis and conflict
advisor Eric Chevallier agreed with the need to build
momentum but thought that Abdulwahid el-Nur should be
accorded more time in order build his strength and enable him
to play a more productive role. MFA A/S-equivalent Jean de
Gliniasty believed that working with Khalil Ibrahim and JEM
was essential to finding a solution and supported the Dakar
Contact Group's efforts to revive patrolling along the
Sudan-Chad frontier. Presidential Deputy Diplomatic Advisor
Bruno Joubert agreed on the need to accelerate UNAMID,s
deployment, restart political dialogue, and engage with
Khartoum, which he thought the U.S. could do better than
France. He also noted the opaque nature of intra-Sudanese
politics and the difficulty of understanding the motivations
of the different players. All of the French acknowledged the
complexity of the series of problems radiating from Darfur,
including especially Chad's problems, and the difficulty in
finding the path to a solution. They nonetheless stated
their intention to work with SE Williamson and U.S.
initiatives on behalf of Sudan and Darfur. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Sudan Special Envoy Richard Williamson met with
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner in Paris on April
14, following extensive meetings with Bruno Joubert (Deputy
Diplomatic Advisor to President Sarkozy),MFA AF
A/S-equivalent Jean de Gliniasty and DAS-equivalent Helene Le
Gal, and Eric Chevallier (Kouchner's advisor for crisis and
conflict management and humanitarian assistance). Ambassador
Stapleton attended the meeting with Joubert and PolMinCouns
attended the meeting with Gliniasty and Le Gal. USUN Jana
Chapman Gates and Embassy acting AF-watcher attended all of
the meetings. Septels report SE Williamson's separate
meetings with Abdulwahid el-Nur and with a JEM delegation
(April 15).

U.S. Position
--------------

3. (C) In each of his meetings with the French, SE
Williamson opened by noting the importance of accelerating
UNAMID's deployment and increasing the number of troops on
the ground. He understood UN DPKO's reticence to move faster
but he nonetheless hoped that DPKO could do so, despite the
absence of the political settlement that DPKO would prefer
and the fact conditions were less than optimal. The expected
change in DPKO's leadership could inject new momentum into
the process. He cited as an example of the UN's tardiness
the fact that only 15% of UNAMID's USD 1.28 billion dollar
budget had been spent even though 75% of its budget cycle had
passed. While the Chinese engineers had begun to deploy, no
new camps or facilities had been constructed to add to the
U.S.-sponsored camps built for AMIS now under UNAMID's
control. Moreover, several countries had made troop
contribution offers but were told that UNAMID was unable to
absorb more troops at present, which was regrettable.


4. (C) SE Williamson described his recent discussion of
Sudan with President Bush and the latter's commitment to
making progress on an expedited basis. SE Williamson had
also corresponded with UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon, stressing the
urgent need to speed deployment. SE Williamson described
other ways of quickening deployment, including the use of
contractors to overcome the inability of some African

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contributors to field self-sustaining units. If some current
obstacles were reduced, he believed that 9,000 additional
troops (7,400 Africans and 1,600 from Nepal and Thailand)
could be deployed by the end of 2008, doubling UNAMID's
deployed force and leading to improved conditions in Darfur.
The limited but focused patrols UNAMID was already conducting
were making a difference.


5. (C) SE Williamson requested that the French use their
influence to encourage DPKO to deploy more rapidly,
particularly if a French replacement became DPKO chief. He
repeatedly lauded the French for their foresight in including
Chad as part of the larger regional problem; their response
to the February fighting in Chad; their leadership in
creating and deploying EUFOR in Chad and C.A.R.; their role
in the Friends of UNAMID group at the UN; and their mentoring
relationship with Senegal regarding its engagement in Sudan.
He stressed the need for the U.S. and France to work together
on Sudan.


6. (C) On other diplomatic fronts, SE Williamson expressed
the importance of identifying a single negotiator who might
replace Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim, who, while well
intentioned, had not been effective. It might also be useful
to form a small contact group of key players, which would
include France, to provide additional impetus, as had been
done earlier regarding certain IGAD issues. SW Williamson
noted the possibility of increased Chinese flexibility on
Darfur because of China's preoccupation with Tibet and the
Olympic Games and its desire to avoid making Darfur another
target for China's critics. The pre-Olympic period could
thus be a useful time to make advances in the UNSC.


7. (C) Although noting that the UN's performance could be
better, SE Williamson made clear that the bulk of the problem
rested with the Khartoum regime, which continued to impede
progress with the UN and with political dialogue. He sensed,
however, that the Sudanese might be more open to compromise,
in part because of two factors. The first was the
willingness of the U.S. to improve relations with erstwhile
foes, such as Libya, when they changed behavior and started
acting more responsibly. This example could move Sudan in
the right direction. Second, the Sudanese were increasingly
aware that President Bush's successor could present new and
different challenges to the Khartoum regime, and that it
might be better to make progress during President Bush's
tenure rather than gamble on an unknown future. For these
reasons, SE Williamson was meeting in Paris with Abdulwahid
el-Nur and a JEM delegation, and would then meet in Rome with
Bashir's advisor Nafi ali Nafi. Following overtures at the
AU Summit, Deng Alor had already visited Washington, itself
an indication of a Sudanese willingness to engage, with
Secretary Rice reminding him that the U.S. position could

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change in response to improved Sudanese behavior. The U.S.
and Sudan had exchanged papers on possible ways forward,
another encouraging sign, although the initial Sudanese
response was less than it could have been.

Meeting with Foreign Minister Kouchner
--------------

8. (C) After welcoming SE Williamson and offering his
encouragement, Foreign Minister Kouchner noted that EUFOR's
deployment in Chad and C.A.R. was going well, although
dealing with Chad President Deby was a challenge. Kouchner
said that the rebel attack in February was well timed to take
place as EUFOR was beginning to deploy. SE Williamson
outlined USG priorities and his talks with Sudan President
Bashir, who displayed some openness to progress with the UN
and UNAMID and to agreeing to Nepalese and Thai
participation. Kouchner expressed skepticism about Bashir,
considering him to be the key problem. Kouchner noted
Bashir's long tenure in office, his tendency to lie, and the
difficulty in believing and working with him. However, he
probably appreciated the direct approach the USG was making.
SE Williamson said that Sudan was likely to explore what it
could achieve during the remainder of the current U.S.
administration. Hence the need to exploit the short window
by moving faster.


9. (C) Unfortunately, Kouchner noted, the killing was still
taking place, with Bashir's approval. He referred to Bashir
directly as "a liar." Kouchner remarked on continuing

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North-South problems and the possibility of Sudan's division
following the 2011 referendum. Darfur remained the key to
many of these issues. SE Williamson was more optimistic
about the North-South CPA. There seemed to be movement on
the internal political front in the South, although moving
troops into the border area raised the possibility of danger.
He noted the possibility that their could be agreement on
dividing Abyei's oil wealth, with each new map moving closer
to original demarcation lines, with two separate oil fields,
making it convenient for both North and South to possess an
oil field.


10. (C) Kouchner agreed on the need to "keep pushing," as
the French had in Chad. He noted the parallels between Chad
and Sudan, but again cited Bashir as the main obstacle. He
said that he and President Sarkozy remained engaged on Sudan.
He agreed that 18,000 troops on the ground in Darfur by the
end of 2008 would make a difference. The meeting concluded
with Kouchner's encouragement for SE Williamson's efforts and
his commitment to France's remaining engaged.

Meeting with Eric Chevallier (Kouchner Advisor)
-------------- --

11. (C) SE Williamson met with Eric Chevallier, Kouchner's
advisor on crisis and conflict management and humanitarian
assistance, just prior to the meeting with Kouchner. After
summarizing key USG objectives (paras 3-7, above),SE
Williamson described his meeting earlier that day with
Abdulwahid el-Nur (septel) and the meetings he planned with
JEM and with Nafi in Rome, commenting that Abdulwahid
remained fixed on obtaining "security" before he would
engage. The problem was that his insistence on "security"
(which Abdulwahid construed in the most absolute terms)
allowed him to avoid acting. On the other hand, the Khartoum
regime was making overtures to the U.S. that created certain
possibilities. The U.S. had advised the Sudanese to seize
their opportunities. SE Williamson noted that if Bashir
stalled for the rest of the year, it might take up to two
years to regain momentum, considering the need for a new U.S.
administration to take office, construct a policy, and then
implement it. SE Williamson reiterated his concerns about
Eliasson and Salim Salim and the need for a small group
(including France) to focus on Sudan. We had to achieve as
much as possible by the end of July.


12. (C) SE Williamson noted the important role of Khalil
Ibrahim and JEM, and the difficulty of obtaining their
cooperation. Expressing appreciation for French efforts in
Chad, SE Williamson said that the USG had approached Chad
President Deby about his support for JEM. Unfortunately,
such was the level of violence over long periods in the
region, it appeared to some Chadians and Sudanese that what
passed for an intolerable situation for the rest of the work
was for them a state of relative peace. It was difficult to
gain momentum in the face of that mind-set.


13. (C) Responding to SE Williamson's points, Chevallier
said that the U.S. timetable (elections, change in
administration) was important and increased the need to
accelerate efforts. He assured that the likely new French
chief of UN DPKO would be helpful. He agreed with SE
Williamson's point that criticism should not be directed at
the current DPKO chief personally, who was faced with a
difficult challenge and had to operate within UN parameters.
The new DPKO leadership would, he hoped, strive for new
impetus. He agreed that 75% of the problem rested with
Sudan, and advised "pushing the UN and not bashing it," with
which SE Williamson expressed agreement. Despite France's
bilateral problems with Rwanda, which both sides were trying
to improve, Chevallier said that Rwanda was committed to help
in Sudan.


14. (C) Chevallier said that the GOF had been talking with
Abdulwahid. While his position was not totally "locked," he
was nonetheless "not where we want him to be." Chevallier
noted Abdulwahid's presence at the recent meeting in Geneva
(for which SE Williamson expressed his appreciation to the
French) but he still seemed to think there was no urgency to
negotiate. Chevallier advised giving Abdulwahid more time.
Abdulwahid's sense of momentum was not the same as ours and
he needed to manage SLM issues in his own way. Chevallier
said that the French would continue to work with Abdulwahid

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and would keep the U.S. informed. SE Williamson said that he
had advised Abdulwahid to rethink his constant refrain on the
need for "security," which did little to advance the process.
Chevallier agreed that Abdulwahid could not simply repeat
the need for "security" at every turn. He needed to be more
precise and reasonable. That said, Chevallier observed that
one had no choice but to try to strengthen Abdulwahid's
position and to maintain SLM cohesion. SE Williamson agreed,
and observed that with JEM, its military posture was
paramount; with Abdulwahid, the concerns were on the
political side. Chevallier said that Abdulwahid was not
ready to talk to Khalil Ibrahim and needed to be stronger
politically.


15. (C) On China, Chevallier said that President Sarkozy's
nuanced and uncommitted stance on attending the opening of
the Beijing Olympic Games was good. In that context, the
recent statement by a senior USG official critical of other
leaders' threats to boycott the opening ceremony was, in
Chevallier's view, shortsighted. He agreed that the Games
provided an opportunity concerning China and Darfur. He said
the French would try to raise the French public's
consciousness on Darfur. In France, almost all attention was
focused on Tibet. It would be helpful to develop awareness
of China and Darfur, as a means of influencing Chinese
behavior there. At the same time, Chevallier said that one
could not "declare war on China." (NOTE: The French press
is reporting a growth in anti-French sentiment in China as a
result of the trouble-plagued Olympic-flame incident in
Paris. END NOTE.)


16. (C) Chevallier discussed the UK's interest in Darfur,
with Mark Malloch-Brown as his main recent interlocutor.
Malloch-Brown seemed to favor a UNSC initiative that would
bring the players together for discussions. SE Williamson
reserved judgment on Malloch-Brown's idea and would see how
it developed, stating that in the past, his proposals were
often based on the premise that he could move the USG to
compromise. SE Williamson reiterated the need for an
IGAD-type arrangement that would include France and the U.S.
He also stated his preference for a single negotiator to
replace Eliasson and Salim Salim. Chevallier said that the
French had just met with AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping,
who displayed a helpful attitude on a number of AU-related
issues. Chevallier said Ping was easy to deal with, and
indicated that Ping thought that a Sudan negotiator to
replace Eliasson and Salim Salim did not have to be African.


17. (SBU) The meeting with Chevallier concluded with his
escorting SE Williamson to Kouchner's office, with the
Foreign Minister agreeing on the spot to meet with him.

Meeting with MFA AF Bureau
--------------

18. (C) Before meeting with Kouchner and Chevallier, SE
Williamson met with MFA A/S-equivalent Jean de Gliniasty and
DAS-equivalent Helene Le Gal. PolMinCouns also attended.
Gliniasty provided an overview, stating that Chad was part of
the Darfur problem and that the French, via EUFOR and Deby's
survival, had succeeded in Chad. The situation remained
tenuous, however, with UNAMID slow to deploy and political
dialogue deadlocked. Abdulwahid remained in Paris, Khalil
Ibrahim was still seeking victory in Sudan, and Bashir
continued to support Chad's rebels. There were elements that
could form a global solution but deadlock prevailed.


19. (C) Gliniasty said that France at first had put little
stock in the Dakar Agreement on Chad-Sudan but he attended
the first Chad-Sudan Contact Group meeting in Libreville
April 10 (reftel) and found some positive indications,
notably the possibility of re-establishing 10 border
monitoring stations. He said there would be a follow-up
Contact Group meeting in Tripoli in two weeks. He said that
France very much hoped that there would no further combat in
Chad before the onset of the rainy season and that the
Contact Group's work would also forestall a resumption in
violence. He also mentioned a possible UK-sponsored
conference in London. SE Williamson said that the U.S. had
not yet decided on the conference; Gliniasty said that
neither JEM nor Abdulwahid had agreed to attend either.
Gliniasty said that JEM was no longer in Darfur, which meant
there could be renewed fighting if JEM sought to reestablish

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itself there. Gliniasty believed there was now an
opportunity to negotiate.


20. (C) In Gliniasty's view, JEM was the most problematic
issue. JEM was composed of the Zaghawa and wanted to take
power in Khartoum, with all-out war an option. Deby
supported JEM and used it for his own protection. JEM
represented a direct threat to Bashir. Gliniasty believed
that if "the JEM problem" could be resolved, 75% of the
region's problems would also be solved.


21. (C) SE Williamson reviewed USG perspectives on the
region (paras 3-7 above). He concluded by discussing his
exchanges with Khartoum, Abdulwahid, and JEM. Gliniasty
cited the importance of a cease-fire, which he described as
"the bridge" between UNAMID and the political process. He
said that Sudan indicated it was ready for a cease-fire but
would react if attacked. Monitoring a cease-fire would be
important, with UNAMID perhaps serving in that role. A
cease-fire nonetheless would be problematic if both sides
continued to arm their rebel allies. Gliniasty, clearly
interested in a cease-fire, discussed the possibility of
using drone aircraft to monitor. But "political monitoring"
would have to take place as well. He reiterated that the
border monitoring scheme that emerged from the Libreville
talks was an opportunity. He said that Abdulwahid's
insistence on "ensured security" could perhaps be met if an
effective and monitored cease-fire could be established. SE
Williamson noted Abdulwahid's insistence on "security" but
observed that a cease-fire might be difficult to establish
given present circumstances and the need to obtain the accord
of many parties that would have to agree to one and whose
objectives diverged. He commented that Abdulwahid wanted to
be king of Darfur whereas Khalil Ibrahim wanted to be king of
Sudan.


21. (C) Gliniasty said that it was possible that JEM was
the easier party, with indications that a channel existed
between Khalil Ibrahim and Khartoum. If JEM were removed
from the equation, the rebel side might be left with only 500
fighters. Abdulwahid controlled much of the refugee camps
but was weak militarily. If JEM cooperated with a large
UNAMID presence, the situation would improve significantly.


22. (C) Gliniasty agreed with SE Williamson that a single
negotiator should replace Eliasson and Salim Salim, although
he did not have an individual in mind. Gliniasty conceded UN
shortcomings but said the UN was far less at fault than the
Sudanese. He noted recalcitrance within the EU and the need
to hire Russian helicopters for EUFOR in Chad and C.A.R.
Gliniasty said that the French had pressured UN DPKO over
establishing UNAMID as an entity so that it would be in
existence within the same timeframe that France was pushing
the EU to agree to EUFOR. DPKO resisted but did so
"honestly," Gliniasty said.


23. (C) On Abdulwahid, Gliniasty said there was some
pressure within the GOF to expel him for his lack of
cooperation but the breakdown in the political dialogue meant
there was no longer a reason to do so. France would continue
to try to "manage and push him." Abdulwahid suffered from an
inflated ego. SE Williamson remarked that he had few
fighters but enjoyed the loyalty of the Fur, and was able to
say what the Fur and other refugees were feeling.
Unfortunately, Gliniasty said, part of his popular support
was based on his ability to say "no;" if there were progress
politically, he could lose credibility. UNAMID's success or
a successful political dialogue could cost him.


24. (C) DAS-equivalent Le Gal asked whether the U.S. had
talked to Deby. SE Williamson said that the U.S. had done so
and would continue to do so, in coordination with France. He
reiterated the need for an IGAD-like group, which would
include France largely because of the Chad dimension.
Gliniasty said increased involvement by the international
community (e.g., the P-5 and others) in the Dakar Contact
Group could be helpful as current members might not be able
to exploit opportunities the Contact Group provided. A
"Friends of the Dakar Agreement" group could be formed, which
could at least act as a consultative body that could also
"name and shame" when necessary. At the Contact Group
meeting in Libreville, France refused Sudan's suggestion that

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French troops (not in the EUFOR context) help patrol the
border. Gliniasty hoped that the Contact Group meeting in
Tripoli could mark an advancement, perhaps by getting Chad
and Sudan to agree to steps they had accepted in previous
peace accords.


25. (C) Discussion turned to the CPA and North-South issues
and the possibility of Sudan becoming two countries. The key
would be the extent to which the two sides could agree to an
amicable separation and resolution of the oil issue.
Gliniasty said that the preferred outcome would be a unified
Sudan. He hoped that the 2009 vote would see SPLM officials
elected in the North and NCP officials in the South. This
was not likely, however, and the South's secession would not
be welcomed in the region, where other countries suffered
from similar divisions. SE Williamson agreed that the 2009
and 2011 votes presented challenges and potentially difficult
outcomes. Gliniasty said that it would be better to have an
agreement in place between North and South so that both sides
together would be prepared to manage the outcome of the vote.


26. (C) On the oil resources, SE Williamson said that there
was a fairly even distribution (55-45) already in place,
which was a good sign. He noted that the two sides were
coming closer on demarcation issues, with the possibility
that both would end up with a fair chunk of Sudan's oil.

Meeting with Bruno Joubert (French Presidency)
-------------- -

27. (C) Accompanied by Ambassador Stapleton, SE Williamson
also met with Bruno Joubert, Deputy Diplomatic Advisor (and
Senior Africa Advisor) to President Sarkozy. After SE
Williamson reviewed U.S. policy (paras 3-7, above),Joubert
commented on the complexity of the situation, with "obstacles
everywhere," but he agreed on the need to make progress with
UNAMID's deployment; UNAMID needed to be a "serious force."
He encouraged SE Williamson's pragmatic approach. He
acknowledged the UN's reluctance to add UNAMID to the
existing UNMIS operation. But, the decision having been
made, the UN had to move forward. He shared SE Williamson's
hope that new leadership at DPKO provided an opportunity.


28. (C) Joubert that the political question was at the core
of the problem and stressed the need to restart it. He noted
the ineffectiveness of Eliasson and Salim Salim and referred
also to the "black box" of intra-Sudanese politics. He said
that he had met recently in Khartoum with Sudan intelligence
chief Salah Gosh, whom Joubert descried as a "big bad guy."
Was it possible to isolate him? Joubert said that Gosh
surprised him by advising against isolating Khalil Ibrahim,
saying even that "we need him," which Joubert found
inexplicable. Instead, Gosh directed his hostility towards
Abdulwahid. Gosh's statements caused Joubert to reflect on
the "black box" and what could not be perceived by outsiders.
Joubert said there might be some merit in the UK's idea of
circumventing the minor groups to deal with JEM and
Abdulwahid, to see if there were any common ground between
them, which could then be taken to Khartoum in an attempt to
broker a deal.


29. (C) Joubert said that the start of the rainy season
would provide time, assuming there would be no fighting
before then. This would provide another four to six months.
JEM would always be preparing to attack again and Sudan would
be ready to launch the Chadian rebels. The rains would at
least postpone this. Our objectives in the meantime would be
clear: 1) deploy UNAMID, the faster the better; 2) restart
political dialogue; and 3) engage Khartoum. On the last
point, Joubert said that only the U.S. could do this. France
had nothing to offer, except perhaps the specter of ICC
prosecutions, which the Sudanese despised. The possibility
of a Bashir visit to Paris also existed but it would not come
"for free." SE Williamson remarked that the U.S. political
calendar, with a new president soon to take office, could
also prompt movement on the Sudanese side. Sudan could shut
down and wait. Now was the time for additional effort, while
Khartoum remained relatively open to suggestion. China and
its problems with Tibet over the Olympic Games also afforded
an opportunity. SE Williamson said that for all of these
reasons, it was a good moment to press forward on Sudan.
Joubert agreed there would be a loss of leverage after the
Beijing Games.

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30. (C) In response to Joubert's query on the CPA and its
effect on the overall picture, SE Williamson said that he had
been less worried than observers about the unraveling of the
CPA in the fall of 2007, despite the deployment of troops
along the North-South border. He referred to the 55-45
distribution of oil revenues and movement to accept a
demarcation line that offered oil resources to both sides.
The South had done well in surviving the death of John Garang
and his less capable successors, such as Salva Kiir, had
managed to do a fairly good job in holding things together.
SE Williamson acknowledged the possibility of a single rash
act setting off a conflict but he said the CPA was still
intact and making slow progress. The 2009 and 2011 votes
represented different challenges, however. He hoped that the
2009 vote, which was largely a U.S. initiative, would not
prove to be a deal-breaker, with the 2011 referendum looming
as the real issue. SE Williamson stressed the need to keep
the CPA going; its breakdown would be a disaster for Darfur.
The South was not ready to become an independent entity, with
hardly any infrastructure or economic strength.


31. (C) Joubert said that Sudan has been on the French
agenda for a long time but that France lacked leverage.
President Sarkozy has been disappointed that the energy he
brought to Sudan by hosting the June 2007 ministerial
conference was dissipating. On the other hand, France's
efforts in Chad and with EUFOR had, so far, been successful.
SE Williamson suggested a group format based on the IGAD
formula, with France playing a key role and the U.S.
supplying some of the leverage France lacked. Joubert noted
the UK's helpful interest and the EU as a "proxy player."
Joubert said that "we know where we want to go, but the
tactics for arriving there are missing."


32. (C) Joubert wondered about Abdulwahid's real objectives
and what he had to offer. SE Williamson said that Abdulwahid
feared being marginalized as Minni Minawi had been. Joubert
said that this was an area where Eliasson could have been
more effective in sketching out common ground among the
rebels.


33. (C) In conclusion, Joubert offered his encouragement
and noted France's EU presidency during the second half of

2008. He said that France would not likely suggest any new
initiatives on Darfur during that period but that it would do
what it could to encourage broader EU engagement.


34. (U) SE Williamson has cleared this message.


35. (U) Minimize considered.



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


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