Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS628
2008-04-04 14:16:00
SECRET
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON WESTERN SAHARA

Tags:  PREL PGOV PBTS PHUM PREF MARR UNSC FR MO AG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #0628/01 0951416
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041416Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2467
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0941
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 2778
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 0987
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1106
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0946
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 0563
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1490
S E C R E T PARIS 000628 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PSC, NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS PHUM PREF MARR UNSC FR MO AG
WI
SUBJECT: FRENCH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON WESTERN SAHARA
POLICY

REF: A. (A) STATE 33088

B. (B) KAAILU-JORDAN MARCH 28 E-MAIL

Classified By: Political Minister counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4. (b),(d).

S E C R E T PARIS 000628

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO/UNP, IO/PSC, NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS PHUM PREF MARR UNSC FR MO AG
WI
SUBJECT: FRENCH RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON WESTERN SAHARA
POLICY

REF: A. (A) STATE 33088

B. (B) KAAILU-JORDAN MARCH 28 E-MAIL

Classified By: Political Minister counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4. (b),(d).


1. (S) Summary: The French generally reacted favorably to
reftel message on Western Sahara in meetings we held with the
French Presidency and the MFA April 1 and 2. The key first
priority seems to be engaging UNSYG Personal Envoy Peter van
Walsum and other key Secretariat officials to encourage
reference to autonomy as the most "realistic" basis for
negotiations, and the MFA said it was instructing the French
mission in New York to do so. Current indications are that a
French statement would express a preference for an
autonomy-based solution, insist that any settlement had to
have full agreement by the parties concerned, and affirm
respect for the principle of self-determination (though not
necessarily via the holding of a referendum). France also
favors a 12-month extension of MINURSO's mandate. The MFA
and Elysee further agree in principle on consultations with
the Friends of the western Sahara, albeit with differing
perceptions of where the Spanish currently are on Western
Sahara. The MFA understands the need to coordinate closely
on our statements, including how we each deal with the
Moroccans. A clear message from our French interlocutors is
that we must be ready for a strong negative Algerian (and
Polisario) reaction to what we are contemplating. End summary


2. (S) We delivered ref a points on Western Sahara to
French MFA DAS-equivalent for North Africa Nathalie Loiseau
on April 2. Loiseau, who was aware of NEA A/S Welch's March
28 phone call to his French counterpart Jean Felix-Paganon
(ref b) and our preview of the demarche to French Presidency

NEA adviser Boris Boillon (see below),provided the following
response, which she said had been coordinated with the MFA's
IO bureau-equivalent:

--France agrees that it would be useful to say something
along the lines we suggested at the end of April, i.e.,
following MINURSO's renewal. Failing to do so could risk
losing the "dynamic" in the UNSC that has sustained its
slight "tilt" in favor of Morocco's autonomy plan as the
basis for a negotiated settlement of the Western Sahara
dispute. (Comment: This has been Loiseau's longstanding and
consistent message to us over the past few months. End
comment)

--France also shares our overall analysis of the current
situation in terms of the deadlock in Manhasset, the
unlikelihood of any immediate breakthrough, and our view that
an independent Western Sahara state is not "realistic."

--France will encourage UNSYG Personal envoy Peter van Walsum
to write a report "in which he says what he believes," or at
least more than he has been willing to do in the past. The
MFA will instruct the French mission to talk to him as well
as those members of the UNSYG's staff that it believes would
be most influential on this issue. (Comment: Loiseau said
that the mission would have to identify the relevant
Secretariat officials. She said the GOF would welcome any

SIPDIS
discussion between our missions as to whom best to target for
these efforts. End comment)

--It is important that the impending report on Western Sahara
state clearly that the UN "is favorable" to some form of
autonomy as the basis for a solution.

--Although Loiseau could not say definitively what a French
public declaration would say, she stated that current ideas
are that it would (1) express a preference for Morocco's
autonomy plan as the basis for negotiations, (2) declare that
any final outcome could only be decided by the parties
concerned, and (3) affirm that a final resolution of the
Western Sahara conflict must respect the principle of
self-determination. (Comment: Loiseau's implied message was
that such a statement would be easier to make following a UN
report to the Council favoring negotiations on the basis of
autonomy. She also mentioned that France may qualify what it
says about respecting the principle of self-determination to
make clear that it did not believe organizing a referendum

was the only to accomplish this. End comment)

--France agrees that a 12-month mandate would be preferable
to the standard six-month term for the reasons we cited.


3. (S) Expanding a bit on the subject of a referendum,
Loiseau said that France is not against the organizing of a
vote strictly on the basis of approving or disapproving an
autonomy-based settlement, i.e., that did not include
independence as an option. This would mean that a no vote on
autonomy would mean that the parties would return to square
one to find a solution. We encouraged Loiseau to instruct
the French mission in New York to raise this and associated
points relating to the French legal understanding of the
principle of self-determination with our mission at the
expert's level. She agreed that this would be a good idea to
ensure we were on the same wavelength on this particular
point.


4. (S) With regard to consultations with other Friends of
the Western Sahara (Friends),Loiseau posed no objection to
our doing so with the British (although she asked for an
indication of their reaction once we had it). She said she
would reflect on discussions with others, particularly the
Spanish. The French have found the Spanish difficult to pin
down on Western Sahara, irrespective of the political party
in power, but the fact that parliamentary elections just
occurred in Spain could make it easier to bring the Spanish
on board. She repeated the oft-expressed fact that, for
Spain alone among the Friends, the Western Sahara remains a
potent domestic political issue.


5. (S) Loiseau readily agreed that we need to share
information on our contacts with the parties involved. With
respect to the Moroccans, she concurred that once they sense
what we are contemplating, they may try to play Paris and
Washington against each other in an attempt to force one of
us to express unequivocally a settlement on Morocco's terms.
The French have not so far told the Moroccans anything about
their intentions related to the MINURSO rollover. As for the
Polisario, Loiseau said that she had recently met the newly
appointed representative to Paris (whom she named as "Ahmed
Mansour"). By contrast with his predecessor, he was
extremely hard line and inflexible. This seemed to confirm
Loiseau's view that the Polisario's last congress had led to
a significant toughening of its position on a negotiated
settlement outside the previously agreed Baker plans.
Indeed, when Loiseau previewed the French line favoring a
referendum with a straight yes/no vote on autonomy, he
declared any such proposal a complete non-starter and the
Sahrawi people adamantly against any autonomy-based solution.


6. (S) Regarding Algeria, Loiseau repeated that the
Algerians have expressed "disappointment" over the French
position on Western Sahara since President Sarkozy's
election. They had hoped, with Chirac's departure, that
France's strong pro-Moroccan stance would soften, with
implications for Western Sahara. The few discussions of
Western Sahara the French have had with Algeria since last
summer, and Sarkozy's public comments, have disabused the
Algerians of any such notions. She expected that Western
Sahara would figure in President Bouteflika's expected
reelection campaign, with various politicians using French
(and U.S.) backing of Morocco's position for their electoral
purposes. Indeed, Loiseau emphasized the importance of not
underestimating the blowback from the Algerians in response
to French and U.S. statements along the lines we envisage.
Kosovo, she concluded, is very much on their minds. She
claimed that the Algerians used a recent visit by the Serbian
foreign minister to assert their opposition to Kosovo's
independence. Loiseau agreed that this paradoxical Algerian
denial of the right of self-determination may be a tactical
ploy to ensure strong Russian support of its Western Sahara
equities in the UNSC.


7. (S) In addition to delivering the message to the MFA, we
used an April 1 meeting a the Elysee with Boris Boillon
(mostly devoted to Lebanon, per septel) to preview the points
we would make to Loiseau. His reaction largely foreshadowed
Loisau's, although he was more cautious in terms of French
readiness to issue a statement as we proposed. (Comment: We

interpret that more as reflecting the fact that Boillon had
not yet conferred with the MFA than Elysee hesitation on the
general idea. End comment) France agreed that the Manhasset
process was bogged down, but we needed to anticipate a
strongly negative Algerian reaction. We should not be nave,
therefore, and per the last point in our demarche that our
statements would do anything to make possible "increased
dialogue" among the parties. With regard to consulting the
other Friends, Boillon was slightly more hopeful than Loiseau
that the Spanish might react favorably to our proposal. He
claimed their position had evolved "positively" in the past
few months, and we should "test" them.


8. (S) Comment: Loiseau understood perfectly that time was
of the essence in terms of consulting further on possible
statements to follow the rollover. The next step seems to be
in New York, and we would encourage our colleagues at USUN to
check that their French counterparts have received
instructions to engage van Walsum and the Secretariat. We
are ready here to follow up as required.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


PEKALA