Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS572
2008-03-27 10:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH THINKING ON LEBANON PRIOR TO THE ARAB

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER KDEM MARR FR LE SY IS 
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OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #0572/01 0871057
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271057Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2397
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES PRIORITY
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0086
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3862
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000572 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/DEMOPOLOUS/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM MARR FR LE SY IS
SUBJECT: FRENCH THINKING ON LEBANON PRIOR TO THE ARAB
SUMMIT IN DAMASCUS


PARIS 00000572 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4. (b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000572

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/DEMOPOLOUS/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM MARR FR LE SY IS
SUBJECT: FRENCH THINKING ON LEBANON PRIOR TO THE ARAB
SUMMIT IN DAMASCUS


PARIS 00000572 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4. (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary: The French MFA has publicly repeated its
concern over the continuing political impasse in Lebanon but
seems to have few ideas about what to do next to elect a new
president or address the what appears to be an increasingly
tense situation in that country. DAS-equivalent for the
Levant Ludovic Pouille reiterated French concerns that the
Syrians were merely playing for time and were confident that
the upcoming Arab summit in Damascus would focus more on the
situation in Gaza than on Lebanon. Returning to French/EU
refusal to send COMs to attend the March 14 commemorative
event in Beirut, Pouille emphasized French support for the
Siniora government more than support for March 14 as a
political movement. FM Kouchner is thinking about returning
to Beirut after the summit to resume what he sees as a broken
down intra-Lebanese dialogue. Pouille proposed U.S./French
consultations on Lebanon after the Damascus summit and
organizing another Friends of Lebanon gathering on the
margins of the late April Iraq neighbors meeting in Kuwait.
During his recent visit to Lebanon, Pouille was satisfied
that UNIFIL is doing a good job but Hizballah is also
prepared for another battle with Israel. Fear of a regional
war is rife, although Hizballah officials denied any desire
to replay the 2006 conflict with Israel. Pouille explained
French thinking about delaying the formal creation of the
Special Tribunal, arguing that UNIIIC chairman Bellemare was
not ready to bring indictments and needed the Chapter VII
power at his disposal under UNIIIC. End summary


2. (C) French MFA DAS-equivalent for Levant affairs Ludovic
Pouille told us March 18 that France continued to see no
immediate prospect for a breakthrough in resolving the

ongoing political impasse in Lebanon. The MFA expected no
movement in electing a president when the Lebanese parliament
was scheduled to meet March 25. Waiting for the Arab summit
in Damascus March 29-30 was one reason, according to Pouille,
but the Syrians' determination to play for time to wear down
the Siniora government and state institutions, like the army,
remained the main reason. Based on his recent trip to the
region (see below for more information),Pouille was more
convinced that waiting for a new U.S. administration to take
office was another key reason for Damascus to block any
forward movement on electing a president and keeping the
overall political situation uncertain.


3. (C) The French expect the summit to largely meet minimal
Syrian definitions of success: sufficient senior attendance
to counter any impression that Damascus is isolated and
primary attention paid to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict to
attenuate any pressure regarding Syrian policy in Lebanon.
Pouille claimed that French information indicated that most
Arab leaders would attend, or at least a number comparable to
the historical average at such summits. Discounting usual
no-shows like the King of Morocco and the Sultan of Oman, the
only significant absence was likely to be Saudi King Abdallah
(whom Pouille thought a week ago would be represented by
Turki al-Faisal). Pouille said the French did not rule out
Egyptian President Mubarak attending, although he could still
send his prime minister or some lower ranking official. Most
damaging, in his view, were indications that Iraqi President
Talabani, Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas, and
Jordanian King Abdallah would attend.


4. (C) With respect to Lebanese attendance, Pouille said
the French were still waiting for a decision. He understood
the cabinet was supposed to reach some sort of decision
imminently. (Note: Pouille was speaking before the GOL's
March 26 announcement that it would boycott the summit. End
note) Pouille said the GOF was leaving the decision entirely
up to the Lebanese, although he added that French COM Andre
Parant had told Siniora not to be pressured by false
deadlines and to take his time figuring out whether Lebanon
should attend and whom best to send. Paris was aware of the
various rumors about who might attend in Siniora's stead,
including former President Gemayel or Justice Minister Rizk.
Regarding the latter, Pouille thought sending Rizk would be
too provocative, given Rizk's association with the creation
of the Special Tribunal. Pouille returned to his earlier
contention that Lebanon would likely not be the main topic of
discussion in Damascus to argue that this was complicating
Lebanese decisionmaking on attendance.

PARIS 00000572 002.2 OF 004




5. (C) French policy, according to Pouille, was focused
very much on supporting Siniora and his government, but he
indicated that French support for the March 14 political
movement was not total. Returning to the French/EU decision
not to send COM-level representation to the recent March 14
commemorative event in Beirut, he explained that EU COMs
agreed that they needed to signal a distinction between March
14 as a political entity and its status as the majority
faction in the Lebanese parliament and government. They
concluded the rally was a political event and not
governmental in nature. As we debated the point, Pouille
reminded us that France had recently hosted Siniora as de
facto head of state to underscore its support to Lebanon's
legitimate government. France, however, had concerns about
March 14's apparent decision to go on the political offensive
for fear that it might trigger a sharp reaction by March 8
and increase the risk of instability.


6. (C) In this context, Pouille stated that FM Kouchner was
thinking seriously about "making another pilgrimage" to
Beirut after the Arab summit. Kouchner has concluded that
the intra-Lebanese dialogue he felt he had restarted last
summer in Celle Saint-Cloud has broken down and may require
new French intervention to resume. Pouille stressed that
this was still only under discussion and observed that the
post-summit period might be a good time for the U.S. and
France to review where the situation in Lebanon seems to be
headed and coordinate next steps. He wondered as well about
the possibility of organizing another "Friends of Lebanon"
meeting in the weeks ahead, perhaps on the margins of the
late April "neighbors of Iraq" meeting in Kuwait. Pouille
opined that it would be easier taking advantage of an already
scheduled gathering like that than trying to organize
something separately.


7. (C) Pouille and the French A/S-equivalent for IO
affairs, Sylvie Bermans, visited Lebanon recently primarily
to consult with Lebanese and UN officials about UNIFIL.
Overall, Pouille was satisfied with what he saw and heard in
terms of UNIFIL's operational status and capabilities as well
as its cooperation with the Lebanese army. He said the joint
patrols are going well and proving effective in terms of
maintaining a constant presence that serves to keep Hizballah
and other armed elements out of the zone between the Litani
River and the Lebanese border with Israel. Hizballah was
keeping its personnel -- and weapons -- north of the Litani.
Pouille said Hizballah cited the infiltration of jihadists
into Palestinian camps as the primary security concern in the
area. He claimed that Hizballah maintains close watch over
the camps and regularly reports to Lebanese military
intelligence through liaison channels it has established.


8. (C) Talk of possible war is widespread, Pouille
continued, especially among residents of the south along the
Israeli border. He described the prevailing attitude as
fatalistic rather than panicked. The trigger for a
potentially imminent armed conflict was some sort of
Hizballah riposte in response to the presumed Israeli
assassination of Hizballah official 'Imad Mughniyah. Pouille
claimed that many Lebanese believe the U.S. administration
will also likely launch a military strike against Iran during
the fall presidential campaign season. Syria would be part
of any Israeli conflict involving Lebanon, thus leading to a
wider war. Pouille stressed this was not GOF thinking but a
distillation of the views he heard during his visit to
Lebanon.


9. (C) Pouille referred to a meeting he had with Nawaf
Musawi, Hizballah's international affairs liaison and
Hizballah's key official interlocutor with the French embassy
in Beirut. Musawi told Pouille that Hizballah was rearmed
and ready for another conflict with the Israelis but not
eager to initiate it. Hizballah intended, however, to
retaliate for Mughniyah's death and would do so in a manner,
place, and time of its choosing.


10. (C) In a brief discussion of the status of the Special
Tribunal, Pouille indicated that France is thinking that a
rush toward creating the Tribunal and disestablishing the
Commission would be a mistake. He recounted recent
conversations the GOF had with UNIIIC chief Daniel Bellemare
in which Bellemare asked for French help in providing

PARIS 00000572 003.2 OF 004


information he could use as investigative leads in support of
future indictments. It was clear to the French, according to
Pouille, that Bellmare would not have enough evidence to file
indictments before the end of the UNIIIC mandate in June.
The French are worried as well that "Damascus would close the
doors to Bellemare" and refuse any cooperation with him once
he begins his work as prosecutor for the Special Tribunal.
The GOF view is that it would be best to prolong the UNIIIC
and hold off creating the Special Tribunal until such time as
Bellemare has what he needs to issue indictments. Pouille,
who worked on the UNSCR establishing the Tribunal during his
previous posting in New York, explained that the UNIIIC can
compel member state cooperation under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. This would go away, he claimed, once the transition
from UNIIIC to the Special Tribunal occurred.


11. (C) Comment: The French remain uncertain about how to
push things forward in Lebanon and continue to harbor
suspicions about March 14 as a coherent and credible
political movement. Pouille's emphasis on GOF support for
the government of Lebanon under Fuad Siniora and not ipso
facto for March 14 was striking and likely reflective of
majority sentiment among those working on Lebanon at the MFA.
Similarly, the French have largely come to accept that the
Arab summit in Damascus will go ahead pretty much as the
Syrians would prefer, i.e., with a focus on Gaza, rather than
as an embarrassment that highlights their interference in
Lebanon. The French have typically blamed the Arabs for
failing to unite behind Lebanon and against Syria and the
situation in Gaza for giving Damascus the classic pretext for
diverting attention away from what it is doing in Lebanon.
Pouille's essential message is that the French continue to
fret about an increasingly tense situation in Lebanon but
have no ideas about what to do next. As he hinted, this
could lead Kouchner to another round of diplomatic
improvisation. If we want to influence their thinking on
steps after the Damascus summit, we should start doing so as
soon as possible.


12. (U) LATE NOTE: French MFA press spokesperson Pascale
Andreani on March 25 released the following statement to
reporters after the latest postponement of Lebanese
presidential elections (text to the Q's & A's is the official
English translation; text after that is the embassy's
unofficial translation):

We've taken note of the announcement by the speaker of the
Lebanese parliament of the 17th postponement of the
parliamentary session that was supposed to elect a president
of the Lebanese Republic. France, with Lebanon's other
partners, expresses its concern at this further postponement
and the prospect of thus seeing the election delayed another
four weeks.

It is now more than four months since Lebanon has had a
president even though an agreement in principle was reached
at the beginning of September on the election of a consensus
candidate in the person of Michel Suleiman.

Just days ahead of the Arab League summit, France reaffirms
the support it has provided, along with the European Union,
to the plan that was unanimously adopted by the Arab League
states in January, the first point of which provides for the
presidential election to be held without delay. We regret
that Lebanon cannot be represented at the Arab summit by a
president.

Q: You have judged it useful today to make a special
declaration concerning Lebanon. To what do you attribute
this? Is it because of the 17th postponement?

A: It is effectively due to the 17th postponement. More
than four months ago, Lebanon no longer had a president. We
are a few days away from the Arab League summit and we had
hoped the presidential election in Lebanon would have
occurred before the start of the summit. It seems,
therefore, important to recall our position.

We reaffirm our support for the Arab League plan and reaffirm
our hope that Lebanon will quickly be able to have a
president.

Q: Usually, you do not miss the opportunity to express your

PARIS 00000572 004.2 OF 004


full support to the Siniora government.

A: Our support to the Siniora government is full and I
raffirm it since you gave me the occasion to do so.

Q: What do you think about the problem of the weakness of
the representation by certain Arab countries at this summit
in Damascus? Will this pose a problem later, i.e., when the
French or French/Arab initiative is resumed? What could be
the fallout for Lebanon?

A: I do not today have all the details about who will
represent whom at the Arab League summit. Let's wait to see
how it unfolds and not draw pessimistic conclusions.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


PEKALA