Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS383
2008-03-04 16:26:00
SECRET
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRANCE: ONE MONTH FROM NATO SUMMIT IN BUCHAREST

Tags:  PREL MARR MOPS NATO FR AF GG UK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ1578
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #0383/01 0641626
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 041626Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2147
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0603
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0544
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0490
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3853
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T PARIS 000383 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO FR AF GG UK
SUBJECT: FRANCE: ONE MONTH FROM NATO SUMMIT IN BUCHAREST

REF: A. PARIS 338

B. PARIS 305

C. IIR 6 832 0389 08

D. SARKOZY-POTUS LETTER

Classified By: DCM Mark A. Pekala, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T PARIS 000383

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO FR AF GG UK
SUBJECT: FRANCE: ONE MONTH FROM NATO SUMMIT IN BUCHAREST

REF: A. PARIS 338

B. PARIS 305

C. IIR 6 832 0389 08

D. SARKOZY-POTUS LETTER

Classified By: DCM Mark A. Pekala, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. Summary. (C) With the NATO summit in Bucharest only a
month away, the French are solidifying their positions and
anxious to find consensus on the key issues on the agenda:
NATO enlargement, missile defense and Afghanistan. GOF
officials believe that the Bucharest summit, President
Sarkozy's first, will best show success by demonstrating
strong unity among the members of the alliance. On these
grounds, they want to avoid overly "divisive" positions that
will split the alliance. On enlargement, the French are open
to admitting any, or all, of the three Adriatic countries
(although they remain resistant to pressuring Greece on the
name issue with Macedonia). They want to send a "positive
signal" -- but short of a MAP -- to Georgia and Ukraine. On
French rapprochement to NATO, we expect President Sarkozy to
make a positive statement at Bucharest, targeting next year's
60th anniversary summit as the deadline to complete French
reintegration. GOF officials express optimism that we can
find consensus on missile defense language for Bucharest, but
remain wary of a specific endorsement that pre-judges whether
NATO needs such a system. They want to get the debate out of
the EWG-R report and negotiated at a higher political level.
Finally, the French military has presented to the Elysee two
main options for bolstering French troop deployments in
Afghanistan -- the preferred option would base troops in
RC-East but a second option allows for a deployment to the
south -- and they are now awaiting a political decision by
President Sarkozy. Embassy believes that there are two
principal areas of divergence between the United States and
France. First, on missile defense it will take some
concerted, high-level interaction in the next few weeks to
assure a strong MD statement at Bucharest. Second, a USG

decision in favor of MAP for Georgia and Ukraine would likely
face strong resistance here (as we understand that President
Sarkozy himself is opposed) and would again require a
significant push before Bucharest. End summary.

--------------
NEW NATO MEMBERS: GOF HAPPY WITH 1, 2 or 3
--------------


2. (C) French government officials have expressed a solid
uniformity of message on the issue of NATO enlargement in all
of our meetings. France is prepared to see an enlargement of
one, two or three of the Adriatic members, with Croatia
presenting the best case for admission and Macedonia and
Albania further behind, but acceptable to the GOF. That
said, in a recent meeting with Philippe Carre, A/S-equivalent
for Strategic Affairs at the MFA, he noted that France is not
willing to pressure Greece on the name issue with Macedonia;
at most they will encourage the two sides to find a
compromise. Philippe Errera, Strategic Affairs Advisor to FM
Kouchner, agreed, noting that forcing Greece to a compromise
will be counterproductive, as the GOG will have to present
the admission of the new members to its parliament for
ratification, so a final decision must be broadly politically
acceptable in Greece.

--------------
POSITIVE SIGNAL FOR UKRAINE OR GEORGIA
--------------


3. (C) French officials are also uniformly opposed to
extending a Membership Action Plan to Georgia or Ukraine,
citing such a move as "premature." According to Damien
Loras, Advisor to President Sarkozy for Ukraine (as well as
Russia, Central Asia, the Balkans and the Americas),the
French President informed Ukrainian President Yushchenko
during his visit to Paris on February 20 (ref A) that France
does not support MAP for Ukraine at this time. However, the
GOF still wants to send a "positive signal" at Bucharest, to
acknowledge progress made by the two countries and to affirm
Georgian and Ukrainian aspirations towards Euro-atlantic
structures. Loras stated that the French position is shared
by Germany and the UK (which German and British diplomatic
colleagues in Paris have confirmed, albeit with one UK
diplomat noting that while HMG was comfortable with the
French position, it would possibly be willing to go further
towards MAP if pushed by the USG.) In a recent discussion,
Philippe Errera stated his view that a signal towards Georgia
and Ukraine could be effected in a way to show Russia that it
does not have a veto over NATO members and even said that the
GOF would consider a "Georgia Action Plan" or other similar
step (while still avoiding the word "Membership"). According
to Errera, additional efforts to agree on MAP for Georgia and
Ukraine are simply too divisive among the members of the
alliance to find consensus at Bucharest.

--------------
COMPROMISE ON MISSILE DEFENSE
--------------


4. (S) While the French position on missile defense
converges with the U.S. on a number of points, there still
remain a couple points of significant difference.
Specifically, the French oppose references to the necessity
of covering all allies or to a NATO "acquisition" of a
missile defense system. At a February 29 meeting with Carre,
he stated that SecDef Gates' proposal on missile defense at
Vilnius was a good basis for discussion. He reiterated that
the main elements of agreement between the U.S. and France
are: 1) that the threat posed is real; 2) that the U.S.
missile defense system is one response to this threat; and 3)
that the U.S. system contributes to security in this area.
To this, it may be possible to add a reference to Russian
cooperation. However, he cited as "premature" any language
attempting to organize a NATO-wide system or making reference
to the "possible acquisition" of such a system.


5. (S) The GOF remains concerned that any text stating that
all allies should be covered on the basis of "indivisibility
of security" pre-judges a NATO decision and implies
collective financing of such a system. Finally, Carre said
the GOF objective is to find consensus language on this
subject for Bucharest; the French do not believe it is
possible for the elements of a declaration for Bucharest to
be resolved in the EWG-R report at NATO. Both he and
Philippe Errera have suggested that a compromise will have to
be worked out at a higher political level (ref B). (Embassy
comment: Part of the problem is timing, as the Bucharest
summit comes before the completion of the French "white
paper" on defense and security priorities for the future.
French officials are hesitant to lock themselves into
anything with large strategic, operational and budgetary
impact until their review process is complete. That said,
the French President has considerable power to shape the
report's conclusions and, in fact, has already taken some
preliminary decisions that the white paper experts must now
incorporate into their final product. We have no reason to
believe that Sarkozy could not do the same on this issue).


--------------
TWO MILITARY OPTIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN
--------------


6. (S) Lt. Gen. Benoit Puga (J-3) recently informed the
Paris DAO (ref C) that the military had completed planning
for two scenarios for Afghanistan and had presented the
options to the Elysee for President Sarkozy to make a final
decision. The preferred military option envisages a move of
the maneuver battalion now in Kabul to the east where French
forces can still benefit from being close to their logistics
base, engage in the fight against Al-Quaida, and concentrate
their troops close to their nearby OMLT's in Wardak and
Logar. The second option is a move to the south where they
would take over a sector near Kandahar. In both options, the
re-deployment of Special Forces troops and possible
deployment of a second maneuver battalion are also envisaged
as a way to augment the French contribution. At this time,
there is a concerted push among RC-South allies (including
this week's visit of the Canadian CHOD and the Dutch PM) to
argue for a French strategic move to the south. Whatever the
final decision, French forces will stay together -- any troop
move will be a package deal that concentrates French forces
in one area and avoids "piecemeal" deployments such as the
decision last year to send a single French OMLT to the Dutch
sector.


7. (C) The recent letter sent by President Sarkozy to all
NATO allies (ref D) delivered a strong message of support for
NATO efforts in Afghanistan and referred to four specific
criteria that should be fulfilled at Bucharest to ensure
success in this mission: 1) a reaffirmation of Alliance
commitment to Afghanistan; 2) the necessity of coordination
among the multiple actors and the importance of naming of a
new UN High Representative to fill this post; 3) increased
efforts in training for Afghan security forces to assist
their eventual assumption of security responsibilities; and
4) adoption of a shared political strategy, to include
Pakistan. To this, he added the willingness of France to
reinforce its military presence and to deploy in a new
(unidentified) zone. These actions give credence to our
hopes that France will both increase its deployments and move
its forces out of their current base in Kabul. It will be
crucial in the next few weeks for the U.S. to send a strong,
unified message if we hope to influence the French president
to shift forces to the south (or alternatively, if we accept
a move to the east that will, in the words of Sarkozy's
diplomatic advisor Jean-David Levitte, "allow for a rotation
of other forces" that could then bolster allied troops in the
south).

--------------
RE-POSITIONING FRANCE IN NATO
--------------


8. (C) Finally, we understand from the Elysee that President
Sarkozy intends to make a positive statement at Bucharest in
favor of re-integrating France into the military structures
of NATO (what our French contacts refer to as "normalization"
or "renewing" of the French-NATO relationship). Sarkozy will
likely pair this goal, as he has in past speeches, with the
corresponding need to strengthen European defense structures.
Various contacts have informed us that the GOF is targeting
the 60th anniversary NATO summit next year as a deadline to
fully announce this "deliverable."

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


9. (S) Comment. France agrees with many U.S. positions we
seek to have endorsed at Bucharest. French decision-making
on Afghanistan is continuing to trend in a positive
direction, with increased commitments (both military and
political) to the ISAF mission. Now is our opportunity to
influence Sarkozy's final decision on the geographic location
(east or south). The GOF appears willing to support a robust
NATO enlargement including all three current candidates, but
officials are flatly opposed, at all levels and in all the
relevant ministries, to extending MAP to Georgia or Ukraine.
That said, they appear willing to go to great lengths to find
a compromise giving a positive signal to the two countries
and reinforcing the message to Russia that it has no veto
over NATO membership. On missile defense, a divergence
remains between our two positions and will require a
significant push -- at a political rather than working level
-- to find compromise language. Post recommends increased
senior-level engagement if we want a strong missile defense
statement at Bucharest. On all these issues, we cannot
exclude the possibility that, in the end, Sarkozy will
overrule his bureaucracy in our favor. End Comment.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON