Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08PARIS34
2008-01-08 18:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

S/I SATTERFIELD'S DECEMBER 28 MEETINGS PRECEDE

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM FR LE SY 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000034 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM FR LE SY
SUBJECT: S/I SATTERFIELD'S DECEMBER 28 MEETINGS PRECEDE
DRAMATIC FRENCH DECISION TO BREAK OFF HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS
WITH SYRIA OVER LEBANON


PARIS 00000034 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: CDA Mark Pekala for reasons 1.4. (b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000034

SIPDIS

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NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO/YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM FR LE SY
SUBJECT: S/I SATTERFIELD'S DECEMBER 28 MEETINGS PRECEDE
DRAMATIC FRENCH DECISION TO BREAK OFF HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS
WITH SYRIA OVER LEBANON


PARIS 00000034 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: CDA Mark Pekala for reasons 1.4. (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary: S/I and NEA PDAS David Satterfield on
December 28 urged French Presidency diplomatic adviser
Levitte and MFA NEA A/S-equivalent Felix-Paganon in separate
meetings to strengthen the Siniora government in Lebanon
pending election of a president and to consider using the
Arab League summit in Damascus as a lever vis-a-vis Syria.
Levitte agreed with Satterfield's assessment of the situation
and Syria's effort to dismantle Lebanese state institutions
but expressed frustration with March 14's leadership, which
he felt was not as coherent or decisive as it should be. He
further agreed with the idea of using the summit as a point
of pressure with Syria -- although with the idea that the
threat would be to transfer the venue away from Damascus and
not to cancel it outright ) and offered to raise with
President Sarkozy before he met Egyptian President Mubarak in
Cairo December 30. Levitte complained that Syria was using
talks about the composition of the Lebanese cabinet --
designed to ensure an opposition blocking minority -- to
ensure its allies had the upper hand. Satterfield expressed
skepticism about France organizing another conference on
Lebanon, especially if it involved Syria and Iran among
interested outside powers. Felix-Paganon expressed familiar
worry about the possibility for a rapid breakdown of the
situation in Lebanon but noted that inertia was holding
things in check for the moment. Like Levitte, he was
skeptical that Sleiman -- the best of the bad choices on
offer -- could be trusted to select neutral ministers if
given the chance. Felix-Paganon had few ideas about the way
forward and asked that the U.S. continue to express concerns
about French dealings with Syria over Lebanon. Since
Satterfield's meetings, Sarkozy has suspended high-level
contacts with Syria over Lebanon (but not broken or reduced
ties to Damascus) and expressed full support for the

just-announced Arab League proposal. An expected January 8
lunch in Paris between Sarkozy and Saad Hariri should be
another opportunity for France to indicate its public support
for March 14 and democracy in Lebanon free of Syrian
interference. End summary


2. (C) S/I and NEA PDAS David Satterfield met December 28
with French Presidency Diplomatic Adviser Jean-David Levitte
to discuss Lebanon and Iraq (see septel for Iraq discussion).
DCM and poloff accompanied Satterfield. Levitte welcomed
the meeting as an opportunity to do some "brainstorming"
prior to French President Sarkozy,s upcoming meeting with
Egyptian President Mubarak in Cairo, during which Sarkozy
wanted to discuss Lebanon. He jokingly expressed the hope
that Satterfield had brought a "magic formula" for dealing
with the Lebanon crisis.


3. (C) Satterfield regretted that he had no magic formula.
He asserted, however, that Syria is progressively and in a
largely passive manner, seeking to dismantle everything March
14 has set up since Rafiq Hariri's 2005 assassination. This
is slowly eroding the Siniora government's legitimacy and
risks the Lebanese government's independence vis-a-vis Syria.
Satterfield said it is not clear to us when an election has
to occur; we would prefer it happen sooner than later but not
at any price. The USG's preference is an approach that would:

--fortify the Siniora government (as NEA A/S Welch put it
recently in Beirut so that it can "act like a government")
and not wait for an election to provide it legitimacy;

--seek to delegitimize what Syria is doing on its own and via
its Lebanese allies vis-a-vis the Special Tribunal as well as
rallying Arab (particularly Saudi and Egyptian) support for
March 14;

--discuss with Egypt and Saudi Arabia using the upcoming Arab
League summit in Damascus as leverage with Syria to allow the
election to proceed freely in Lebanon.


4. (C) Satterfield noted that March 14 continues to expect
the U.S. and France to take the lead in resolving the
Lebanese stalemate. We have argued that it must act and
avoid playing into opposition hands. When Satterfield said
that Welch had gotten no clear response from March 14 except
a vague expression of its desire for clear international
support, Levitte and Boillon observed "that is the problem."
Satterfield, when asked whether the USG supported the

PARIS 00000034 002.2 OF 004


Lebanese government's initiative to break the impasse over
election of a president, answered that we strongly support
the normal functioning of a government to avoid the
appearance of a vacuum until there is agreement on the
election. Levitte asked about using the UNSC as a lever.
Satterfield urged keeping the UNSC in reserve and using the
Special Tribunal as the first international body to take
steps to counter Syria's activities in Lebanon.


5. (C) Levitte agreed with all the points Satterfield made,
although he doubted the Arabs would agree to cancel or
postpone the summit. He and Satterfield discussed having
Sarkozy raise with Mubarak and Saudi King Abdallah the
possibility of seeking an alternative venue for the summit as
a form of pressure. Satterfield acknowledged, and Levitte
agreed, that threatening to cancel the summit outright over
Syrian behavior was likely out of the question. With respect
to changing the venue, Levitte wondered whether Mubarak might
be willing to host, to which Boillon retorted "he wouldn't
dare." Levitte then suggested Saudi King Abdallah, who
"hates Asad." After pointing out that Presidents Bush and
Sarkozy would be in Riyadh the same day on separate programs,
Levitte called for them to coordinate their messages to the
Saudis. Satterfield agreed to pass that suggestion on to
Washington. Levitte said he would suggest that Sarkozy
propose to Mubarak, in the absence of progress on Lebanon,
moving the Arab summit venue elsewhere, perhaps Riyadh.


6. (C) Satterfield reiterated the Secretary's hope that
there would be no further EU missions to Syria. This
prompted Levitte to discuss French efforts at dialogue with
the Syrians. He acknowledged having gotten nothing or
limited gains (e.g., Lahud's peaceful departure from the
presidency, probably on Syrian instructions). Levitte agreed
that Asad's strategy is to destroy Lebanese state
institutions, including the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The
"good news" is that, in the face of this crisis, relations
between the GOL and LAF have never been stronger.


7. (C) In terms of possible next steps, Levitte said the
French were thinking about calling for a "well-prepared
conference," to be held in Cairo, or Paris, that could
include March 14 (i.e., Hariri, Gemayel, Ja'ja', and
Junblatt) and March 8 (Berri, Hizballah, Aoun) leaders as
well as key external players (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Iran, Italy, Spain, the Arab League, and the U.S). Levitte
wondered whether Syria's and Iran's inclusion would cause the
USG problems. Satterfield responded that the French should
first of all discuss the viability of such a conference with
March 14. He added that we would be very concerned with any
concept that appeared to establish equality between March 8
and March 14 and could lead to more pressure to form a
compromise government with a blocking minority. If our
concern now was to shift the focus from Syria's continued
ability to exert leverage over Lebanon to how the GOL could
function effectively and independently of such influence,
Syria's inclusion would be a non-starter. Satterfield said
we would probably not support any gathering that included
Syria and Iran.


8. (C) Levitte affirmed the importance of maintaining
U.S./French cooperation on Lebanon. France, like the U.S.,
cannot accept a blocking minority. It would accept a 15
(March 14)-10 (March 8)-5 (ministers appointed by Sleiman)
formula but shares U.S. reservations about the five ministers
Sleiman would appoint. He and Satterfield discussed apparent
convergence on the outlines of a reform of the electoral law
as a possible basis on which to build a broader accord, with
Satterfield stressing the need to ensure that whatever may
have looked possible a few weeks ago was still something that
March 14 accepted and would strengthen its position.
Satterfield repeated that we need to ensure that anything the
U.S. and France does now strengthens the Siniora-led GOL as
Syria seeks to weaken it. We need to be clear whether our
objective is to strengthen the GOL or simply get a president
elected. Levitte agreed but contended that Syria, if it
believes time is working against it, will work to weaken the
GOL through new demonstrations, provocations, and even
assassinations.


9. (C) Levitte continued by voicing familiar French
concerns about the risk of a breakdown of order and security
the longer the current situation runs. He said Sarkozy would

PARIS 00000034 003.2 OF 004


speak to Mubarak December 30 about the Arab League summit.
Levitte also said that "we" will speak to Hariri about the
five ministers Sleiman would appoint under a 15-10-5 formula.
He agreed with Satterfield's qualification that the end
result would not be a cabinet with a blocking minority.
Levitte also agreed that March 14 should not be pressed to
compromise or to concede anything for an agreement on the
election, although he asserted that "eventually there must be
an agreement."


10. (C) Satterfield's subsequent meeting at the MFA the
same day was initially with the French NEA PDAS-equivalent
Gilles Bonnaud and later NEA A/S-equivalent Jean
Felix-Paganon, who arrived late from a working lunch.
Felix-Paganon's Lebanon team accompanied him. DCM and poloff
accompanied Satterfield. In addition to the core points
above, Satterfield recounted how David Welch, during his
recent trip to Beirut, told Lebanese parliament speaker Nabih
Berri that he had a personal responsibility for what is
happening. This triggered some discussion, with general
agreement all around, of Berri's limited room for maneuver,
his determination to hold onto his position (and stay alive),
and the need to keep pressure on him to help resolve the
situation.


11. (C) Felix-Paganon observed that the U.S. and France
agree completely on the strategic objectives but differ on
tactics. He noted we have all accepted Sleiman as the least
worst of the candidates and opined that if he fails to go
through, the names likely to come up next will be
progressively worse. Felix-Paganon expressed no confidence
in Sleiman's likely choices for his five ministers in a new
cabinet. Overall, Felix-Paganon argued, we are in a
situation of having to accept the least worst of the bad
alternatives before us. If we ever had a real alternative of
an election based on a 50 percent plus one outcome, we
certainly do not have it now. Satterfield acknowledged the
challenges we face but countered that we should still strive
for the best outcome. France and the U.S. will be blamed if
there is no peaceful end to the current crisis. Satterfield
several times hammered home the argument that we should not
agree to pay a price for an election that would weaken March
14 even if the passage of time works to everyone's
disadvantage. We must be cautious, he argued, about any
formulation that might get a president elected but lead to
the death of March 14 as an independent political entity.


12. (C) There was some discussion of the status of the
Special Tribunal (Felix-Paganon believed the money was mostly
in hand to set it up and the judges appointed),the lack of
movement on implementation of UNSCR 1701, and questions about
Saad Hariri's real position. On the latter, Felix-Paganon
said that he is in a classic suq-style bargaining situation
with Damascus. Felix-Paganon also asserted that France
believes the assassination of LAF number 2 al-Hajj was
undertaken to get him out of the way as Sleiman's successor.
He agreed with Satterfield's assertion that composition of
the next government was what was really at stake, which
raised questions about Hariri as the next prime minister.


13. (C) Similar to Levitte, Felix-Paganon doubted anything
violent would happen immediately in Lebanon. Over time,
however, he expected tensions to rise. He said the only ones
currently with people being mobilized for possible trouble
belonged to Aoun and Hizballah. Felix-Paganon called for
three things: (1) a public statement of firm support for
March 14, (2) a frank private dialogue, preferably undertaken
jointly by our two governments, with March 14, and (3)
extreme caution with respect to maintaining any dialogue with
Syria. On this latter point, Felix-Paganon referred to "the
debate in Paris on this" and said that the U.S. position
would be extremely important in influencing what France
decides to do next. On EU dealings with Syria, Felix-Paganon
and his DAS-equivalent for the Levant noted that Mu'allim is
due to visit Berlin shortly. Felix-Paganon said that others
in the EU are likely to argue that anything they do now with
Syria is only "matching" what France has been doing.


14. (C) Update and comment: As reported in Paris Points
and international media, President Sarkozy announced during a
joint press conference December 30 with Egyptian President
Mubarak that he had suspended his own contacts with the
Syrian leadership over Lebanon and had ordered his "team" to

PARIS 00000034 004.2 OF 004


do the same. This step occurred even as Elysee Secretary
General Claude Gueant continued to pursue a political
compromise with Syria that would lead to a presidential
election until at least December 28. It appears to us that
Sarkozy finally tired of Syrian double-dealing and agreed
that he should not further pressure March 14 after Hariri
rejected the Gueant formula that would likely have given the
opposition a blocking minority in a new cabinet. (As an
ironic denouement to this episode, Gueant reportedly phoned
Mu'allim December 31 to "officially" inform him that contacts
were being broken off.) Sarkozy's decision, however, does
not constitute a total rupture with Damascus but a decision
not to engage with the Syrian leadership at a senior level.
Our understanding is that the French ambassador remains in
Damascus and that French/Syrian relations remain "normal."
The MFA press spokesperson underscored this point January 4,
when she said that "political level" contacts would be
suspended until Syria "demonstrates its good faith and a
consensus president is elected in Lebanon. Our diplomatic
relations with Syria are not called into question by this
decision."


15. (C) Update and comment continued: The French
government has welcomed the three-part Arab League plan. FM
Kouchner issued a statement January 7 calling the plan a
"very positive step, giving grounds for hope" and asserting
that it was "based principally on ideas that France has been
helping to develop over the past few months." The statement
called on all parties to implement the plan quickly so that
presidential elections may be held immediately. It
reaffirmed France's commitment to remain in contact with all
concerned parties and stated that France was pursuing a
"close dialogue on the subject" with the Arab League.
Although the spokesperson refused to discuss the status of
France's efforts vis-a-vis the Arab League decision, the Arab
League's intervention ended days of difficult questions and
answers by reporters eager for details about the proposal
France had been working on with Syria. Sarkozy, when asked
at his January 8 press conference about his dealings with
Syrian President Asad, did not express any regret for having
gone to such lengths to head off a potentially violent
denouement of the Lebanese crisis. President Sarkozy's
expected lunch in Paris with March 14 leader Saad Hariri on
January 8 should be an occasion for France publicly to affirm
its support for democracy in Lebanon and privately to clear
away any bad feeling over Sarkozy's Damascus gambit.


16. (U) S/I Satterfield agreed to post sending this cable
without his clearance.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


PEKALA