CHAD/SUDAN: FRENCH IDEAS ON POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000273

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PINR PINS CD SU FR
SUBJECT: CHAD/SUDAN: FRENCH IDEAS ON POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD

REF: SWAN-KANEDA E-MAIL (2/13)

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: French Presidential AF-advisor Romain
Serman on February 14 sketched out possible next steps
concerning Chad and Sudan jointly to acting Africa Watcher
and UK Emboff. Serman prioritized stabilizing Chad,
promoting reconciliation between Deby and the rebels,
improving Chad-Sudan relations by ending support to both
sides' rebel groups, and implementing a series of steps,
starting at the regional level, progressing to the AU and
then to the UN, to curtail Sudan's negative influence in the
region. He suggested careful coordination among interested
countries and identifying appropriate roles that each could
play as this process develops. Regarding the tactical
situation on the ground in Chad, Serman described friction
between the Nouri and Erdimi factions, with the latter
possibly ready to cease fighting. He added that the French
media tended to look at France's engagement in Chad largely
as a means of finding ways to criticize President Sarkozy.
Serman (PROTECT) also confided that the Presidency was not
happy with Foreign Minister Kouchner, who, in the
Presidency's view, had alarmed EU partners through his recent
pleas that they should carry out EUFOR's deployment. Serman
said that Kouchner's entreaties seemed only to have increased
European anxiety about sending troops to Chad and the Central
African Republic (C.A.R.); Serman believed France would be
better off not saying much and letting the EU's earlier
decision to deploy stand without further comment. Serman was
keenly interested in feedback from the UK and U.S. on next
steps in the region. We reported that much of Serman's
analysis seemed to coincide with Washington's preliminary
thinking. UK Emboff Joyce said that London's biggest present
concern was avoiding the appearance that the only priority
was preserving Deby's regime. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Romain Serman, one of two working-level AF-advisors
at the French Presidency (reporting to Deputy Diplomatic
Advisor and Senior AF-advisor Bruno Joubert),on February 14
invited UK Paris Emboff Lucy Joyce and acting Africa Watcher
to discuss the Chad/Sudan/Darfur cluster of issues. Serman
said that he had been given full authority to devise next
steps for the region and wanted to share the results of his
brainstorming. He remarked that whatever plan he developed
would likely be adopted as policy, given President Sarkozy's
delegation to him of this responsibility and his readiness to
heed his experts' advice concerning less familiar issues such
as Africa.

Chad and Sudan
--------------

3. (C) Serman said that the international community needed
to continue working to stabilize Deby, allow him to
reconstruct his government, and encourage the rebuilding of
Chad's infrastructure so as to make a rebel victory
impossible, if the rebels were not otherwise persuaded to
cease trying to overthrow Deby. France had done "the right
thing" in supporting Chad's legitimately elected government.
In the short term, EUFOR needed to deploy and Chad needed to
return to the principles of the August 13, 2007, political
accord. Some means had to be found to promote reconciliation
between the government and rebels, which could include
opening the political process. Serman explained that this
was one reason the GOF was calling on the government to
explain its treatment of opposition figures in detention.


4. (C) Concerning Sudan, UNAMID's deployment was crucial,
as was a resumption of the political dialogue within Sudan.
Sudan needed to be convinced that it could not continue to
support Chadian rebels. Serman stressed that Sudan must be
made to understand that it could not defeat the "Chad-France
coalition," as he put it, and pressure needed to be placed on
Sudan so as to allow Deby to consolidate his government and
to allow EUFOR's deployment before the next rainy season.


5. (C) Serman said that it was very obvious that Sudan was
supporting the rebels in a major way, which was tantamount to
an open war with Chad. He said that France had clear proof
of this, including evidence of Sudanese orders to the rebels
as to how they should conduct their most recent offensive,
evidence that could be used at some point as leverage against
Sudan. Both sides had to stop supporting the other's rebel
groups and the proxy wars they were carrying out for
N'Djamena and Khartoum. Just as Sudan was supporting Nouri,
Erdimi, and the other Chadian rebels, Chad had to stop
supporting JEM and the Sudanese/Darfur rebel elements. In
short, Serman said that both Chad and Sudan had to stop their
"internal wars" and stop the "proxy war" between the two
countries.


6. (C) Leveling most of his criticism at Sudan, Serman said
that Khartoum must cease and desist and stop supporting the
Chadian rebels. France's presence in Chad had served as an
effective deterrent, while the recent UNSC Presidential
Statement condemning rebel actions had allowed France to
bluff the rebels into thinking twice about resuming their
offensive, on the assumption France had obtained sufficient
international support to use force against them if necessary.
Serman said that the GOF had adroitly used press leaks and
vague public pronouncements to suggest that it would take
military action against the Sudan-backed rebels. He admitted
that this had largely been for show, but believed that it had
been effective in causing Sudan and the rebels to think again
about pressing the offensive.


How to Effectuate?
--------------

7. (C) Serman envisiond a seris of sequential initiatives
bilaterally and multilaterally at different levels that would
keep pressure on both Chad and Sudan, encourage a cessation
of rebel activities, and foster stability in the region. As
a first step, he suggested, France, Libya, Europe, and the
U.S., in various combinations, could broker meetings between
Chad and Sudan. He thought that a regional summit meeting,
perhaps of CEEAC countries, could be a useful next step that
could at least produce a statement calling for the
establishment of a political framework applicable to Chad,
Sudan, the C.A.R., and the region more generally. A
declaration by the AU could then follow, leading to action by
the UN Security Council. The objective would be to create a
network of international constraints that would inhibit
Sudanese adventurism in the region. This, along with the
deployments of EUFOR and UNAMID, would at the same time allow
for progress in Darfur.


8. (C) There were other tools available to pressure Sudan,
Serman noted. Acknowledging that the U.S. "has its own views
on the International Criminal Court," Serman said that the
threat of ICC involvement in Sudan and prosecution of
individual Sudanese for their crimes in Darfur could also be
used to encourage compliant Sudanese behavior. Sudan should
also be told flatly that it could not pick and choose with
respect to UNAMID participants.


9. (C) Serman said that what he had presented was a first
cut at developing a larger, more elaborate set of actions
that could be taken to address the region's problems. UK
Emboff Joyce and acting Africa Watcher said that their
capitals would be interested in exploring these ideas further
with France. Acting Africa Watcher referred to (but did not
provide a copy of) notional USG thinking contained in ref
e-mail, stating that the USG, at least at this preliminary
stage, had objectives similar to those that Serman had
described. UK Emboff Joyce said that London's main concern
at present was to avoid giving the impression that the
principal objective would be to prop up the Deby regime as a
means of reinforcing French influence in the region. Serman
said that that was not France's objective. It wanted to
support Deby to avoid the greater evil that would come with a
rebel victory, and at the same time address Chad's problems,
the Chad-Sudan problem, the problems caused by Sudan more
broadly in the region, and the Darfur problem. He welcomed
any feedback London and Washington could provide.

Rebels Seem Divided
--------------

10. (C) In addition to his presentation on ways to move
forward, Serman also gave an update on the situation on the
ground. The principal rebel groups (the Nouri and Erdimi
factions) had gathered near Ade in eastern Chad. Nouri's
faction apparently wanted to continue to fight, whereas
Erdimi's did not, and seemed prepared to make a deal with the
government. The two groups were squabbling, Serman reported,
with both sides wanting to claim all of the supplies coming
from Sudan. Moreover, ethnic friction between the factions
was increasing, with Nouri's Goran supporters at odds with
Erdimi's Zaghawa. Serman reported that Nouri's group had
destroyed a Zaghawa village, causing a further deterioration
in their relations. On the other hand, Deby had re-armed and
re-equipped his forces, using weapons and supplies coming
"from everywhere." Serman reported that Libya continued its
support to Deby, largely because the Libyans feared that his
fall would lead to Sudan's de facto control of Chad, which
would make Sudanese incursions into the C.A.R. more likely.
If Sudan controlled Chad and the C.A.R., it would have a
powerful influence over northern Nigeria and its Muslim
population. Libya could not tolerate this, Serman believed,
and thus continued to support Deby.

Chad Is a Vehicle to Criticize Sarkozy
--------------

11. (C) Serman said that the Chad/Sudan/Darfur crisis was
taking place during a period when Sarkozy was under intense
scrutiny because of his private life and other recent
political missteps. The press, Serman asserted, was looking
at Sarkozy's policy through an excessively negative and
critical prism, only seizing upon elements tending to show
Sarkozy's incompetence or lack of judgment. The press
emphasized France's supposed support of the dictator Deby
without giving much thought to what a rebel victory would
mean ("a compliant satellite Sudanese state resembling
Somalia"). Similarly, for many, Chad represented only the
Zoe's Ark incident (the child-smuggling episode) and the need
for Sarkozy to intervene on the smugglers' behalf. Serman
said that Zoe's Ark was a non-issue in geo-political terms,
although he acknowledged that the GOF had forwarded the
convicts' request for a pardon to Deby.

Chad Has Frightened Europeans and Kouchner Isn't Helping
-------------- --------------

12. (C) Serman said that many Europeans were also
misinterpreting events in Chad, their most notable concern
being that France's engagement there had compromised Europe's
"neutrality," thus jeopardizing EUFOR's chances for success.
Serman said that this view was misplaced. France had come to
the assistance of the legitimate government of Chad, had not
engaged in combat on the regime's behalf, and was working to
prevent a greater tragedy (victory by the rebels). EUFOR's
deployment should continue forthwith, he said. Speaking with
extreme bluntness, Serman (PROTECT) said that the French
presidency was not happy with FM Kouchner, who had been
phoning European counterparts to encourage EUFOR's
deployment. Serman said that this served only to heighten
European anxieties, as they were interpreting Kouchner's call
as a sign that there was some new and unknown danger that
they had to overcome. Serman said this was counterproductive
-- having made its decision, the EU should carry out EUFOR's
deployment without further ado. He indicated that the
Presidency would reign Kouchner in so as not to increase
European worries and to avoid giving credence to perceptions
that France was trying to "manipulate" European partners for
France's own purposes.



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


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